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Various attempts to formalize a concept of conditional obligation within the standard deontic logic have led

to paradoxes,

indicating that standard versions of deontic

logic are inadequate for expressing those obligations.
It has been suggested, most recently by P.S. Greenspan,

that the imposition of temporal restrictions on obligation

statements may provide solutions to these paradoxes.
argue in Chapter

I

I

that Greenspan has not provided an ade-

quate theory of time and obligation nor a solution to the

paradoxes she discusses.

Furthermore,

I

construct a more

careful theory of time relativized obligation than has

previously been presented.

My proposal makes it clear

why the addition of temporal limits alone to the standard

versions of deontic logic can provide a solution to some,
but not all, of the problems associated with conditional

obligation

VI

Many of the difficulties associated with
conditional
obligation in standard versions of deontic logic
appear
to arise from the use of the material
conditional connective in formalizations of sentences expressing

those obli-

gations.

And in Chapters II and III,

possibility of employing

a

I

investigate the

stronger conditional connective

to provide an acceptable way of expressing conditional
ob-

ligations.

Syntactic and semantic considerations lead me

to conclude that a mere change in the conditional connective

can not solve the problems confronted.

Moreover, my argu-

ments in Chapter III illustrate the inadequacies of semantic
analyses for deontic logic, such as Jaakko Hintikka's and

Dagfin F^llesdal and Risto Hilpinnen's, based on the notion
of deontic perfection or ideality.
In Chapter IV,

I

present and evaluate David Lewis'

much more plausible semantic analysis for deontic logic and
theory of conditional obligation.

I

conclude that Lewis'

proposal is ultimately unsuccessful and emphasize that it
is, moreover,

to-be

an analysis of a concept of conditional ought-

.

In contrast, my focus is a concept of conditional

ought-to-do.

In Chapter V,

I

present and discuss various

features of a theory of obligation developed by Richmond

Thomason within his indeterminist time model, and

I

attempt

to build an analogous theory of conditional ought-to-do

Vll

upon that branching time model.

Although

I

recognize the

plausibility of Thomason's model for an
analysis of conditional obligation, and conclude that it
is unlikely

that

an adequate theory of conditional
obligation can be devel-

oped without a semantic theory countenancing
the concept
of an open future,. I detail serious
difficulties which
arise for any theory of conditional ought-to-do
built upon
Thomason's theory of obligation.
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INTRODUCTION

Standard versions of deontic logic developed
by von
Wright, Aqvist, and others allow certain
symbolizations
of sentences about what ought to be the
case, what is permitted, and what is forbidden.
Unfortunately,
however,

within the standard or minimal deontic logic 1
it is possible to derive various paradoxes.
The most important
and

interesting of these paradoxes indicate that the
standard
deontic logic is inadequate for expressing statements
of

conditional obligation.
As has often been pointed out, the natural candidate
for expressing conditional obligations of the form
"Given

that p, it ought to be the case that q"

(where p and q 2

are schematic sentence letters expressing possible states
of affairs)

culties.

in the standard deontic logic leads to diffi-

0 (p

3

q)

,

where 0 is read "it ought to be the

case that," a symbolization originally proposed by von

Wright,
.

i

3

follows if p is forbidden no matter what q is.

That is, we can prove

O('ip)

3

0(p

a

q)

.

This formula

alone may be unobjectionable if we read it as asserting
that if vp is obligatory and compatible with one's other

obligations then

'ip

v q is also.

However, if 0(p

3

q)

is

to be a representation of conditional obligation, then

the formula tells us that the forbidden conditionally
For example, assuming that one

obligates one to anything
IX

.

X

ought not to lie, then lying
conditionally obligates one
to blow up the universe or anything
else.
Surely this is
unsatisfactory
Furthermore, if standard deontic logic
is extended
to include mixed formulas 4 then
p = Oq will be a well formed
formula.
But p = Oq, an alternative symbolization
proposed
by A N Prior,
is similarly inadequate for conditional
obligation sentences. For ^p
Oq) is valid.
(p
Yet if
.

.

=>

p

3

=,

°q is to be interpreted as indicating a conditional

obligation for q given that p then whatever is not
the
case conditionally obligates one to anything.
Thus

the

provability of 0(%p)

a

0(p

q)

=>

and %p

3

(p

0 q)

=>

shows that

the vacuous truth of a material implication with a
false

antecedent poses a problem for both 0(p

q)

symbolizations for conditional obligations.

and p

Oq as

=

In each case

too much is conditionally obligatory.
In addition,

if either p

^

Oq or 0(p

=

q)

serves as

our symbolization of conditional obligation we will be

forced to accept certain invalid inferences.
P

3

Oq then p

&

r

=>

Oq holds for any r.

standard deontic logic (SDL)
then 0(p

^

q)

0(p

&

r

=>

q)

,

since p

d

For given

Similarly, in the
q implies p

follows for any r.^

&

r

3 q,

And yet

it may be that given condition p, q is obligatory, although

given condition p

&

r,

q is not obligatory.

For example,

given that Smith has borrowed $50 from Jones, then he is

obligated to pay Jones $50.

But given that he has borrowed

XI

$50 from Jones and that Jones forgives
the loan, he surely
is no longer obligated to pay Jones
the $50. 7
in general
it is a distinguishing feature of
conditional obligations,

or obligations dependent on conditions,
that they may vary
as the conditions vary.
To deny this is to misunderstand

the logic of what

I

take to be the most interesting concept

of conditional obligation.

The inadequacy of expressing conditional
obligations

using 0(p

3

or p

q)

3

Oq has been further emphasized by

Roderick Chisholm in the following way.

He argues that

it is reasonable to agree that these four English
sentences

are intuitively consistent:

8

(1)

It ought to be that a certain man go to the
assistance of his neighbors.

(2)

it ought to be that if he does go then he tell
them he is coming.

(3)

If he does not go then he ought not to tell
them he is coming.

(4)

He does not go.

Yet the natural symbolizations of these sentences lead to
a contradiction.
(la)
(

2 a)

For

Og
O (g

(3a)

^g

(4a)

i>g

3
3

t)

0(^t)

yield Ot by an application to

detachment rule (axiom

(2)

and (2a) of a valid

(la)

of SDL

9
)

,

according to which

,

Xll
Op and O p
(

3

implies Oq.

q)

by modus ponens.

tions from (la)

And

(3a)

and

(4a)

yield

O('vt)

Hence we can derive contradictory
obliga-

(4a)

and this conflicts with another

principle of deontic logic that it is
not true to say, of
any p, both that p ought to occur
and ought not to occur.
The two principles appealed to above,
the deontic

detachment principle and the principle of
non-contradictory
obligations, are provable in SDL 10
and intuitively acceptable
as well.

But if we agree to accept these two
principles,

how can we explain the contradiction above?

Apparently

the process of interpreting and formalizing
sentences
(1)

-

(4)

as

(la)

-

(4a)

was incorrect.

A natural move would be to claim that there is

ambiguity in

and

(2)

(3).

a scope

Although the English sentences

appear to be formalizable most naturally as

(la)

-

(4a)

,

one might argue that the second and third statements actually ought to be symbolized analogously.

That is, one might

claim that both express conditional obligations and despite
the fact that in the English sentences the obligation oper-

ator governs the entire conditional in

consequent in

(2)

and only the

in an adequate formalization the scope

(3)

of the deontic operator should be the same for both
(3).

(2)

Thus we might suggest the following symbolization:
(la)

Og

(2a)

0 (g

(3b)

0(^g

t)

^
=>

M:)

and

.

)

xiii

(4a)

o,g.

Now it appears that

(la)

and (2a)

still yield Ot by the

deontic detachment rule but we can no longer
derive O(Mz)
from (3b) and (4a)
However the puzzle can not be
.

so easily.

solved

For the English sentences

(1)

-

(4)

are not

only consistent but also logically independent 12
.

a logical consequence of the others.

deducible from

(la)

(

3

3

q implies Op

plague us again.

q)

can derive 0(^g

3

is easily

given the rule easily derivable in SDL

according to which p
of 0 p

But (3b)

None is

r)

from Og

3

Oq

13
.

The paradoxes

For no matter what r is, we
.

Clearly this symbolization

does not preserve the independence of the English sentences
(1)

-

(4)

.

For the same reason, symbolizing our sentences as
(la)
(

2 b)

Og
g 3 ot

(3a)

^g

(4a)

^g

(la)

Og

(2b)

g

(3b)

0(^g

(4a)

^g

^

0

('Vt

or as

=>

Ot
=>

^t)

will be unacceptable.
(4a)

For in both cases

(2b)

follows from

Clearly the puzzle can not be solved merely by

XIV

paying close attention to the scope of
the deontic operator.
No symbolizations of (2) and
(3) by means
of

P

Oq or 0

q)

(p

alone will adequately express
Chisholm's

four sentences.

Sentence

(3)

expresses a special type of conditional

obligation sentence which Chisholm calls
duty imperative.
neighbors.

a

contrary-to-

One ought to go to the assistance of his

But given that he fails to fulfill that
obliga-

tion he is obliged not to tell them he is coming.

A con-

trary-to-duty imperative tells an agent what he ought
to
do given that he has neglected his duty.
In general it is surely possible for condition
p to

make q obligatory, for condition ^p to make %q obligatory,
for p to be unconditionally obligatory and yet for
^p to

occur.

But we do not have any adequate formalization of

such a contrary-to-duty situation in standard versions of

deontic logic. 14
In order to provide an acceptable way of expressing

Chisholm-type paradoxes, contrary-to-duty imperatives in
particular, and conditional obligations in general, we

might either
zations 0(p

(i)
3

q)

revise or restrict the traditional symboliand p

3

temporal restrictions, or

Oq, perhaps by incorporating
(ii)

augment the standard deontic

logic with a new formalization and interpretation for

conditional obligation, perhaps a new conditional connective

.

XV

or a dyadic obligation operator,
to escape the paradoxes

above
In this dissertation

each of these moves.

I

shall evaluate the adequacy of

The first alternative has been
sug-

gested by Lennart Aqvist, Wilfrid Sellars,
John Robison,
Lawrence Powers, and P.S. Greenspan. The

second has been

proposed by David Lewis, Bas van Fraassen,
Bengt Hansson,
and Dagfin F011esdal and Risto Hilpinnen.
I

that attempts to pursue

(i)

shall argue

alone, to the extent that they

avoid or solve the paradoxes, do so at the
expense of providing an analysis of a concept different from
that concept which

I

conclude that
I

take to be conditional obligation.
(ii)

While

I

is the most promising direction to pursue,

suggest that the current analyses of that type need to
be

revised to explicate that notion of conditional obligation

most crucial for normative ethics.

,
.

NOTES TO INTRODUCTION
1

.

2

.

See Appendix I for an explanation of my
use of the
term "standard deontic logic."
I shall adopt the common
convention of omittinq quotation marks and allowing symbols and formulas
to be
names of themselves.
In each case the meaning is clear
x
from the context.

3.

"Deontic Logic/' Mind 60 (1951), pp. 1-15.

4.

This extension is unproblematic as long as
deontic
operators are prefixed to sentences rather than

names

of acts.
5.

The Paradoxes of Derived Obligation," Mind 63 (1954)
pp. 64-65

'

.

6

.

That is, we have p
q implies Op d Oq.
This follows
the standard deontic logic (SDL) directly from rule
(R) and axiom (2)
(see Appendix I)
For given
n q
we have 0(p d q) by (R) and then Op s> Oq by (2). p

m

•>

.

7

.

See David Lewis' Counter f actuals Harvard University
Press, 1973, pp. 102-103 for another example.
,

8

"

.

t0 ' DutY Operatives
^^Y~
33-36.
(1963)

0n

and Deontic Logic," Analysis
Chisholm notes that he does not
believe that this paradox applies to the system set
forth by Hector Neri Castaneda. But see P.S. Greenspan's
"Practical Reasoning and Deontic Logic: Some Footnotes
in Reply to Castaneda," forthcoming in Journal of Philo(

r

24

,

pp.

phy.
9.

10

.

See Appendix

I.

The first axiom (2) and the second follows from axiom
(1) and rules of propositional calculus.
That is,
Op d ^OO'p implies MOp & Ovp)
.

11

.

12

.

But see Bas van Fraassen's "Values and the Heart's Command," Journal of Philosophy 70 (January 11, 1973), pp.
5-19, for an argument that it is our hasty acceptance
of the latter which is the root of the difficulty.
o

Lennart Aqvist, "Good Samaritans, Contrary- to-Duty
Imperatives, and Epistemic Obligations," Nods 1 (December

Cf.

1967)

,

pp.

365 ff

xvi

,

xvii

13.

See note 6.
In particular, since we have
q
then Og 3 0(^g 3 ^t) follows.

^t)

3

('Vg

D

o

14.

Cf. Aqvist's statement of this puzzle
in "A
Commitment," Philosophical Studies 14 (1963) Note on
"
PP.
22-25.
/

CHAPTER

I

One possible way of dealing with
the paradoxes explained above and providing adequate
expressions for conditional obligations especially
contrary-to-duty obligations, is to place temporal restrictions
on our symbolizations of conditional obligations.
Such a time relativized
,

view is motivated by Lawrence Powers'
examples in "Some
Deontic Logicians" Nods December 1967
(

,

,

)

.

it is also ex-

plicitly suggested as a way of avoiding
paradoxes of deontic
logic by Wilfrid Sellars, Lennart Aqvist,
and most recently
by P.S. Greenspan in her 1972 Harvard PhD
dissertation
Derived Obligation:

Some Paradoxes Escaped" and her 1975

Jour nal of Philosophy paper "Conditional Oughts
and Hypo-

thetical Imperatives."

The idea is attractive because it

seems there can be no contradiction between an absolute

obligation to do p at a certain time and an obligation to
do vp which arises at a later time when a certain condition,

perhaps a violation of a prior duty, is fulfilled.

Recog-

nition that certain obligations, notably those expressed
by contrary-to-duty imperatives, arise only after violation of a duty suggests that a proper characterization of

obligations relativized to times might block the derivation
of contradictory obligations.

This view has indeed been

defended but no adequate and complete theory of temporal

restrictions on obligations has been formed.
1

2

The most recent and explicit
attempt to restrict
obligations temporally is P.s. Greenspan’s.

I shall begin
by presenting Greenspan's proposal
and explaining why she

does not provide an acceptable theory
of time and obligation
nor an adequate escape from the
paradoxes.
Then building
on suggestions by Greenspan and
Aqvist

I

work out a more

careful and complete theory of time relativized
obligation
than has previously been set forth. My
proposal makes it
clear why the addition of temporal limits on
standard

symbolizations of conditional obligation statements
alone
can provide a solution to some but not all of
the problems
associated with conditional obligations, despite
Aqvist 's
and Greenspan's claims to the contrary.

Greenspan

s

main project is twofold:

(1)

to provide

solutions to some of the paradoxes arising in the standard

system of deontic logic, and

(2)

to defend some form of a

factual detachment rule which allows inferences from 0(p
q)

and p to Oq.

Both

(1)

and

(2)

3

can be accomplished,

on her view, if proper temporal restrictions are placed

on the obligation statements.

Greenspan argues that we are rarely faced with situations in which we ought to perform one particular act.

Rather she claims that there are usually several options
or possible states of affairs which we may bring about.

,

3

each of Which would be a way of
discharging a particular
obligation.
Thus she claims that the options
model or the
formal symbolization 0(p v
has wide application.
q)
Furthermore, since P v q is truth
functionally equivalent to
"'P
q <ln her s ymbol s, "”P * q)
she believes the formulae
0(P V q) and 0 (p =.q) may serve as models for
conditional
obligation.
It is unclear that the wide
applicability of
0(p v q) or 0(n.p = q) implies anything whatsoever
about
its appropriateness for expressions
of conditional obligation.
Surely the fact that the expression
0(p
q) contains
an obligation operator and a material
conditional
,

''

,

=>

is not

sufficient reason to adopt it as a model for
conditional
obligation.

Nevertheless Greenspan says,

Indeed, the formula 0 (p -> q) and its variants may be stretched to fit any case in which
an obligation is conditional upon certain
facts— —facts about the agent or his situation,
acts of other people, or what have you--as in
the statement:
(f) I ought to show up in court on
the 12th if I am able to do so
and the trial is set for that
day.
On this interpretation, of course, the condition, or 'if-clause,' is taken as falling within the scope of the deontic operator.
in (f)
it ought to be the case that, if my
trial is set for the twelfth, and I am to
appear on that day, then I do so
And
since all or most obligations are conditional
in the sense just indicated--apply to persons
in virtue of their possession of certain features,
or the truth of certain descriptions of their
acts and circumstances the "options"-model
appears to be applicable across-the-board. 2
.

.

—

.

.

.

.

4

Yet Greenspan is well aware
that, as we have shown,
the unrestricted formula
0(p 3 q) win not do as a symbolization of conditional obligations.
She proceeds to examine
unacceptable inferences which rely on
and thus appear to
discredit an unrestricted form of
the factual detachment
rule.
It might seem that if there is
an obligation to see
to it that q given that
p, then if p is true, then one has
an obligation to see to it that
For example, if one
q.
has an obligation to show up in court
if one swears to,
then the fact that one swears to appears
to validate the

conclusion that one ought to show up in court.

However,

Greenspan argues that the truth of
p alone is insufficient
for detachment of the obligation that
q.

next month

I

shall receive a parking ticket.

that it ought to be that if
fine.

For suppose that

I

Then it seems

get a ticket then

I

pay a

Presumably we would like to detach the uncondition-

al obligation to pay the fine at least next month.

do so now, before

I

But to

receive the parking ticket, seems wrong.

For my obligation now may be to avoid getting a ticket and

avoid paying a fine.

The truth of the antecedent, that

I

will in fact get a ticket, does not seem sufficient ground
for detaching an unconditional obligation statement that

ought to pay a fine.

Rather, Greenspan argues that such

obligations do not arise until it is too late to keep
their conditions from being fulfilled.

Furthermore, they

I

-

5

are no longer in force when it is
too late to see to it
that their objects are fulfilled.
Thus when q is obligatory given p, according to Greenspan
we need the "unalter

ability" of p, not merely the truth of
p, to allow detachment of Oq. The statement that
p is unalterable means,
for Greenspan, unalterable for the
agent at a certain time.
The proposal that conditions unalterable
by an agent
are required for detachment of absolute
obligations motivates
a non- traditional reinterpretation
of the deontic operator
0.

ing

Greenspan suggests that we interpret 0 not as
indicatwhat ought to be the case" but as giving directions

for choice, that is, as designating what ought
to be brought

about.

This reinterpretation of 0 requires the introduc-

tion of an agent relativization as well.

Greenspan supposes

that any particular obligation statement or argument containing several such statements will express obligations that
a single given nonempty set of agents ought to bring about.

Thus she suggests we interpret 0(p

=>

q)

as indicating that

this given nonempty set of subjects ought to bring it about
that if p occurs then q does.

Given this reinterpretation

it is natural to defend a version of Kant's "ought implies

can" principle.

For what would be the point of directing

an agent that he ought to bring it about that he avoid

getting a ticket once he already has one?

And once the

condition of getting a ticket is unalterable it seems quite

3

6

right to direct him to pay a fine, since
avoiding getting
a ticket is no longer a viable
alternative. Hence Greenspan
proposes the following rules as acceptable: 4
a factual

(I)

0(p

^

detachment rule,

q)

-UP

Oq

where Up asserts p's unalterable truth (unalterable
by the
agent)

and where the statements of unalterability and
obli-

gation all hold at the same time, and
(II)

modified Kantian principle,

a

Op

^Up

&

^U'vp

where antecedent and consequent hold at the same time.

Greenspan asserts, then, that we may detach Oq from
0(p

^

q)

(i)

by the deontic detachment rule if Op holds at

the same time that 0(p

detachment rule
0(p

=3

q)

(given)

holds.

agent

(s)

(I)

=

q)

holds or (ii) by the factual

if Up holds at the same time that

She concludes that 0(p

=>

q)

,

read "the

ought to bring it about that if p then

q," is applicable to conditional obligation statements as

long as its application is restricted by principles
(II)

5
.

(I)

and

Furthermore she argues that these rules "get us

out of Chisholm's paradox" ^ and other contrary-to-duty
puzzles.

I

shall argue that both these claims are mistaken.

.

7

According to Greenspan the time
limits imposed by
her "time-bound" view of
obligation need not be explicit
but are actually built into
her principles (I) and
(n) 7
If this is so, then Greenspan's
description of her proposal
may be inaccurate. She has
not merely
,

imposed temporal

restrictions on obligation statements
but has introduced
a new modal operator,
unalterability
The concept of p's unalterable
truth by an agent
at a time t is left undefined
by Greenspan.
it seems
plausible to suppose that she means
(Op)

s

p is unalterable for s at t =
s does not
df
have it in his power at t to bring
about %p.

Unfortunately the concept of "having it in
one's power"
may be no clearer than the concept of
unalterability. But
if the concept of an agent having something
in his power

is an assertion about what is physically
possible for him

then we might say
(0

2

)

P is unalterable for s at t =

it is

not physically possible at t for

s

to bring

about ^p.^

Apparently any time after p occurs we shall have not
only the truth of p but the unalterable truth of p as well.
But before p occurs we may have Up for

s

at t or MJp for

s

8

at t.

If the former, then it is
not physically possible
at t for s to bring about -up
although it may be logically

possible for

-up

to occur.

And in such cases the concept

of unalterability and Greenspan's
use of it in principle
(I) appear to be most
interesting.
For example, suppose that any
time before Friday we
may say that Smith ought to bring
it about that if he

accepts

a

job by Friday then he arrives for
work on Monday.

Further, suppose that during the week
Smith mails a letter
accepting the job.
If we assume that Smith can not
reach
a telephone or any other means
to cancel his acceptance,
and cannot prevent the letter from
reaching its destination,
then we may say that even when no acceptance
has reached

Smith's future employers, still Smith's acceptance
of the
offer is unalterable. At such times, according
to

(I),

we may conclude that Smith ought to bring it about
that
he arrives for work on Monday.

Clearly

(I)

allows detach-

ment of more obligations than the deontic detachment rule
and fewer than the unrestricted factual detachment rule.

Principle

(I)

also allows the following inference.

Suppose that on Monday, for example, we may say that Jones

ought to bring it about that if it rains Tuesday afternoon
then he closes the windows Tuesday morning.

Suppose we

also agree that it is unalterable for Jones on Monday that
it will rain on Tuesday afternoon.

Then we may conclude

.

9

on Monday that Jones ought
to close the windows
Tuesday
morning. Principle (I),
with its use of the conoept
of
unal ter ability is attractive
because it allows acceptable
detachment of overriding obligations
in cases where no detachment was possible in SDL.
,

The principle, however, is
clearly unacceptable.

cording to principle (I), o(p

=

q

)

entails Oq if p

.

s

Ac-

truth

is unalterable at the time
the ought statements are in
fore,

Now it seems reasonable to grant,
for example, that a given
agent s ought to bring it about
that if he charges a $10
shirt at Macy's then he pays Macy
s $10.
Suppose further
that s does charge a $10 shirt at
Macy's, so the condition
is unalterable.
Then, according to (I) „ e can
conclude
that s ought to pay Macy's $10, where
this is an absolute
or overriding obligation.
Yet this conclusion
'

is too strong

For even if it is unalterably true that

s

has charged the

shirt, a further condition might be sufficient
to override
his obligation to pay Macy's for the shirt.

Greenspan proposes an entailment substitution rule,^
(III)

Op

&

(~U(p

&

r)

~U (~p

&

~r)

&

)

3

0(p v r).

10

And given this rule we shall be able to conclude that on
her view if 0(p

=>

q)

in cases where ~0((p

holds then 0(
&

r)

3

q)

(p

&

r)

=>

q)

follows even

To see this, suppose that

we grant the situation described above.

S

has charged a

10

$10 shirt at Macy's and

s

ought to bring it about
that if

he charges the shirt then
he pays Macy's $10, which
we may
express by the formula 0(c o
p).
Suppose further that r
is the state of affairs that
s returns the shirt.
Then
as long as it is still possible
for s to return or not
return the shirt we may derive
0(~c v ~r v p)
or equivalently, 0 (~ (c & r) v p) and thus
0((c & r) op), that s
ought to bring it about that if he
charges the shirt and
returns it then he pays Macy's $10.
Surely this is wrong.
,

Utilization of the concept of unalterability
does not
block invalid inferences from
0(p
to

o((p&r)

q)

=>

Greenspan's reinterpreted formalization 0

(p

=>

3

q)

q)
,

.

com-

bined with her principles, is not applicable
across the
board to conditional obligation statements
which are meant
to assert what one really ought to do given
certain states
of affairs.
However successful she is at avoiding the paradoxes, it is clear that her expression for conditional

obligation, 0

(p 3 q)

,

reinterpreted as an ought-to-do,

not an ought-to-be, captures some notion other than con-

ditional obligation as explained above.
a notion for

which 0(p

o

q)

3

0((p

&

r)

It can only express
3

q)

does hold, with

certain restrictions.^
It is also clear that Greenspan has not provided an

adequate way out of Chisholm's paradox.

She tells us,

..

.

11

c ° ntra iction can
result from a timeKo
^
bound
ought-to-do
version of his premises
f
elr conditional oughts
are both'
i
K
t
hable
as he ass ™es. With
'O’
»„ wl'
l
aght to brin 9 it about that," read
and
u
as ? He cannot alter the
fact
premises now should be understood that " his

“

-

(

1

as follows0 (he goes to the assistance
of his

)

neighbors)

(

2

0 (he goes to their assistance 3
he tells them he is coming)
0 (he does not go to their assistance 3 he does not tell them
he
is coming)

)

(3)

U(he does not go to their
assistance).
Whenever it is open to the agent to
9
ab A
com P° und state of affairs, going-bring
°^
and telling, that is what he ought
to do, in
pre erence to bringing about any
object that
includes not telling. At such times
we can detach a prescription of the then
consequent
(2), but not in (3).
On the other
hand, once his failure to go is
beyond the
agent's control, he ought to focus his
efforts
on not telling, instead.
So at such times, we
can detach a prescription of the
consequent in
(3), but not in (2).
Hence (2) and (3) can
never yield conflicting conclusions, but
only
conclusions restricted to different times. 12
(4)

*

*

.

m

Greenspan's explanation of her solution to
Chisholm's
paradox may be misleading.
if we let g be a statement

variable for "he goes to the assistance of his neighbors"
and t for "he tells them he is coming," then Greenspan's

symbolization of Chisholm's sentences is:
(la)

Og

(2a)

o

(3b)

0 (~g

(4b)

U(~g).

n

+j

3

-

.

)

12

Then (la) and (2a) apparently
yield ot by the deontic
detachment role and ,3b) and
(4b, lead to 0(.t) by
principle
(I), making it difficult
to see how this solves
Chisholm's
puzzle
However, Greenspan's detachment
rules require that we
determine when the obligation
and unalterability
statements
hold.
Thus it appears that her view
is something much more
Plausible, perhaps the following.
Suppose that some particular time, say Wednesday at
3:00, is when the given agent
will or will not go to assist
his neighbors.
Then before
Wednesday at 3:00 we can say
(la)
(

2a )

Og
0 (g

3

(3b)

0(~g

(4a)

~g.

t
3

~t)

He will not go, but it is not yet
unalterable that he will
not.
These will not be inconsistent because (la)
and (2a)

will yield Ot by the deontic detachment
rule (since both
hold at the same time, in this case, before
Wednesday at
3:00)

and yet we cannot detach 0(%t)

from (3b) and (4a).

However after Wednesday at 3:00, when he does not
go, we
shall have

(la)
(

2 a)

(3b)

Og
0 (g
0 (~g

3

t)
3

~t)

13

(4b)

U(~g).

in this case the four
statements are inconsistent,
since
according to principle (XI)
0 g => ~U(~g), and rightly
so on
Greenspan's view. For one can
only be obligated to bring
about states of affairs which
are not unalterable.
Pre-

sumably Greenspan would say
that after Wednesday at
3:00,
(la) is false.
We cannot derive ot, therefore,
but 0(~t)

follows from (3b) and (4b) and
principle (I). Thus ot
holds only before Wednesday at
3:00 and 0(~t) only after
that time.
On this interpretation, the
conclusions are
restricted to different times" and
the inconsistency pointed
out by Chisholm is avoided.
As a matter of fact, however, Greenspan
must maintain
that on her view we can never derive
13
0(~t).
For on any

reasonable interpretation of Chisholm's
case u(~g) holds
only after he does not go. Thus 0(~t),
if detachable at
all,

is only detachable at those times after
he does not

go.

But at such times detachment of 0(~t) violates
principle

(II),

since 0(~t)

^

~U(t)

&

~U(~t), and at the times in

question we can not have both ~U(t) and ~U(~t).

After

Wednesday at 3:00 it is too late to tell or not tell his
neighbors he is coming.

How then can Greenspan block de-

tachment of 0(~t) after Wednesday at 3:00?
that at such times (3b)

,

0(~g

s

~t)

,

By pointing out

no longer holds.

This

.

14

13 S °

"“ Ce

~U(t ),

14

by (II

°<~9

>

=>

~t)

implies both ~u(~t) and

and we have seen that after
he does not go we
cannot have both. Thus Greenspan
must maintain that ot
may be derived before Wednesday
at 3:00 but that 0 (~t)
may never be derived
,
Q-t-i
Still,
Chisholm's
paradox, the
derivation of inconsistent obligations,
is blocked.
i

i

•

,

,

Promising as this solution sounds,
it will not do for
two reasons.
First, Greenspan's symbolizations
do not
preserve the independence of Chisholm's
four sentences.

Whenever it is possible for the agent
not to tell his
neighbors he is coming, Og will imply 0
o
(~g

span's principle (III), and thus

(la)

3

~t)

(3b).

by Green-

Indeed,

at such times it will also be possible
to derive Og
0( g

3

t)

.

3

Yet at no time does his obligation go
to his

neighbors' assistance imply a conditional
obligation to
tell or not to tell if he does not go. The
general diffi-

culty is that for any state of affairs

r

which it is still

possible for the agent to bring about at the time Og
holds,
Og will imply 0(~g

3

r)

,

and if the latter is to be an

expression for conditional obligation, as Greenspan claims,
then Og implies that the agent has a conditional obligation
to anything it is still possible for him to do.

Appeal to

unalter ability does not help Greenspan avoid this unwelcome
result

.
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Second, Greenspan restricts
her discussion to arguments in which the given
obligation statements are
taken
to be made at the same time.
This restriction prevents
her from providing a consistent
and insightful formulation
of Chisholm's paradox. For as
we have seen, her statements
(1)

-

(4)

time.
U('ig)

(see quotation p. 11

Given principle

(II)

)

cannot be held at the same

„ e can never assert Og and

as true premises in the same
argument, and for this

reason Greenspan cannot formulate
any contrary-to-duty
situation consistently. This may be
acceptable to Greenspan but I believe it is unhelpful.
For Chisholm's point
is that his four sentences may
be intuitively consistent
when valuated at the same time. The
interesting question
is what our obligations are when
we have neglected
our

duty.

Thus we want to formulate Chisholm's
sentences consistently so that we may understand that an
agent does have
an obligation to bring about
p and perhaps q, but that once
he fails to do p,

that

it is obligatory for him to see to it

'iq

Greenspan has claimed to present a time-bound view
of obligation statements, but in addition has supplemented

SDL by the introduction of a new modal operator, unalter-

ability

,

and suitable principles governing detachment of

obligations.

Despite the plausibility of her point that

detachment of obligations from avoidable conditions is

16

acceptable, her proposal
is clearly unsatisfactory.
It
may be, however, that
another way of temporally
restricting obligation statements
can accomplish what we
wish.

Greenspan did not provide
a way of designating
the times
particular obligation
statements are binding.
Thus our next project shall
be to make a specific
proposal
about relativizing ought
statements to times, hoping
that
once we can specify the
time at which an obligation
is in
effect and the time at which
it is violated,
we will have

natural and non-paradoxical
way of expressing obligations
which arise as a result of
past violations.
Our aim is to
determine whether temporal
relativizations provide a theory
which allows us to escape the
contrary-to-duty paradoxes
while providing a consistent
symbolization of Chisholm’s
four sentences as independent
statements and also providing an analysis of a concept of
conditional obligation which
will allow conditional obligations
to change as conditions
vary.
Let us first suppose that time can be
partitioned
into small units of unspecified length,
which we may

designate by

*

•' t

n

*

•

•

Second, let us retain

Greenspan's reading of the deontic operator 0 as
expressing

what an agent ought to do.

While some obligations may be

in effect for a single one of our units of time,

likely that most obligations will stand for

it is

a span of time

17

including many of these time
units.

Hence it would be

appropriate to designate nonempty
sets of consecutive units
of time, say by T, ,T ,T
1

23’

*'

’

m
T

N"

,

•

•

during which obliga-

tions will be binding.

Nevertheless, our exposition
will
be simplified and the points
we make will be equally
forceful if we restrict ourselves
to expressions of obligations
which hold for single units of
time.
Thus we might begin by introducing
the following symbolism:

to be read ”s ought

(has the obligation)

it about that p," where

at t

names an agent, t

s

±

±

to bring

one of our

time units, and p is a schematic sentence
letter for a
possible state of affairs.

With this symbolism we may make the following
type
of distinction.

Suppose, for example, that Smith borrows

$25 from Jones at noon on Monday.

paying Jones $25, and

Then if p stands for

for some time on Tuesday, and

s

for Smith, we may say

0

s

,

t

(p)

-

1

And if Jones, kind fellow that he is, releases Smith from
his $25 debt on Wednesday, then if

t
2

Thursday, we may say

names some time on

18

(P)

s, t

.

2

This enriched symbolization
is still not adequate
for our
purposes as it stands,
however.
Recall that one of our
goals is to be able to
distinguish conditional
obligations
particular obligations arising
from neglect of our
duties
from absolute obligations.
Thus we shall need to
temporally'
relativize not only obligation
statements, but also our
possible states of affairs,
in order to be able to
designate the times at which
contrary- to-duty obligations
arise.
For example, if Smith robs
Jones, although he ought
not, then Smith's contrary-to-duty
obligation to make amends
to Jones arises only after
the robbery.
Designation

“

of a

time at which Smith's
contrary-to-duty obligation is binding depends upon and is relative
to the time of the robbery.
Now it is important to note that
conditional obligations often arise from particular
actions, as in an obligation to return a book if one has
borrowed it. But conditional obligations may also arise from
possible states of
affairs which are not actions. For
example, on the condition that lightning strikes a neighbor's
house and sets it
on fire, one has an obligation to help
the neighbor.
Still,
it may sometimes be difficult to
designate single units of

time at which possible states of affairs may
be said to
hold.
Moreover, all our arguments will apply even if we
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restrict our attention to
acts.
ble states of affairs which

So let us locus on
possi-

are acts and agree that
we may
later augment our language
to include expressions
for all
possible states of affairs if
„ e wish.
We would like, then, to
have a formal language within which we can symbolize
sentences about acts brought
about
by particular agents at
particular times. Suppose we
let
S and X range over
agents named by s ,s",s'"
Fur _
thermore, let R and Q be predicate
variables for two-place
predicate letters A,B,C,.
which we shall use to form
,

.

.

.

symbolic sentences expressing
relations between agents and
units of time. Then we may say,
for example, if s' names
Smith and
expresses »s helps a neighbor at t.»
and

t

l

stands for noon on Friday, that

will serve as a symbolization for the
statement that Smith
helps a neighbor at noon on Friday.
in general, we shall
say that any formula of the form R

expression of our formal language.

s

will be a well formed
,

1

Moreover, any formula of the form

will also be a well formed formula of our language, and

,
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such a formula

win

express an obligation had
by an agent
at a time.
We may read it (rather
awkwardly) as asserting that s has at t. the
obligation to see to it that
x
bears the relation
ion R to t 17 Now
M
we shall be able tQ s ^_
bolize Smith’s obligation at
noon on Friday
.

.

to see to it

that Jones helps a neighbor
at 1:00 on Friday as
0

where

s’

Friday, t

s\t.

(A

s’’,t

>

names Smith, s" names Jones,
2

^

stands for noon

for 1:00 Friday, and where

expression for ”s helps a neighbor
at t

is our symbolic
”

i

We may define the rest of our
well formed formulas

inductively by saying
(i)

if

(J)

is a wff then

^tj)

is a wff,

and
(ii)

if
$

(p

D

and

$

and

are wffs, then
$

E

ip

(p

&

^

,

<p

v

ip

are wffs.

The obligation statements we are formalizing
indicate

what an agent ought to do

,

and so should yield prescriptions

about what it is possible for an agent to do, in
some sense
of

possible."

Often it may not even be physically possible

for an agent to see to some obligations.

For example, it

may be that it is not physically possible for Smith to see
to it at any time that Jones help a neighbor at that time

or any other time.

Jones' actions may be beyond Smith's

21

control

so if we wish our
obligation statements to
yield

genuine prescriptions about
what an agent ought to
do, it
seems reasonable to begin
by restricting our
attention to
those formulas for which (for
any s,x,t. tj,R)
(

1

)

°-V-t

X

’

.

Moreover, given that we can now
make explicit both the time
at which an ought judgment
holds and the time at which
the specific obligation ought
to be fulfilled,
it seems

reasonable to specify the relationship
between the two times
Although statements about what ought
to be may be timelessly true, in general statements
about what an agent ought to
do will not be.
It will at the very least
be odd to require

for example,

that at some time today Smith ought
to see to
it that he repays Jones yesterday.
Let us formalize
this

intuition by adopting the minimal condition
that (for any
/R)

where t

t..

i ^

is read "the time unit t

at the same time as t ^

±

occurs before or

Similarly, for statements about

"

negative, conjunctive, and disjunctive obligations, let
us

require that

(

3

)

0

s,t

^ (R

s

,

t

t

.

<

t
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(4)

O

S
s

t

(R

.

'

1

s

Qs

&

+'

t
^

<
£

3 t

)

,

t,

f

1
t-

V

*i*
and
(5)

C>

VQ

^ (R
s,t.-s,t.

vt.

t

)

<

t.

^

Furthermore, it is reasonable
... that
rpa^nn^Kio to maintain
/

<6)

where P

,t.
i

0

s,t. (R s,t

>

=

"P

MR S

s,t

,

t

1S read "it is permissible
for

.>

at t

s

where

(7)

P

s't

(R
i

S 'tj
t
s

3

>

t.
1

"

i

'

and

s t..
3

Permissions of negations, conjunctions,
and disjunctions
will be f ormalizable analogously to
(3)

(4)

,

,

and

(5)

.

Let us also accept the following time
relativized

axioms for well formed formulas of our system,
while continuing to maintain the temporal restrictions
we have given

(Al)

(A2)

0

°

S/t

^

(<j>)

*0

%((j))

i

s ,t.

i

(cJ)

3

^

&

°

s

t

.

^

3

°s t.

(iJj)

.

,
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and

(A 3

°

)

S

t

,

.

^

V

Our rule of interference,

%(j))

.

(Rl)

,

will be modus ponens.

Now, given this formal
language, how are we to for-

malize conditional obligations?

it appears that a time

relativized version of
p = 0q is doomed.
For we shall be
able to prove -vr
(r
= n
tr
s,t = lK
And if
s,t
°s,t <Q s,t ))
i
i
,

'

Rs

°

'fi

s -t^ (2 s,t

k

j

ls to be a symbolization
for condi-

’

k

tional obligations, the old
paradox recurs in a time
relativized form. For whatever
relation R that s does not
bear to
yields a conditional obligation
for s to bear

q

any relation Q to any time

q

such that

contrary-to-duty case, if for some

m ~

i*

°s,t

Ik

°s,t. ^s,t.

^

s,

t

t

m

^« R
bolds and yet R
s, t .>
s
m
i
follows for any s, t. and t

even if MD

(Q
'

S,t

j

)

I

,

q.

In the

where

q,
then

where

t.
3

<

^

t

k

,

is true.

k

Can a time relativized version of 0

better?

s

and

.

k

J

.

(p

=>

q)

fare any

think it can when we understand some natural

time restrictions that may be imposed on
this type of compound obligation for expressions of conditional
obligation.
In the standard system of deontic logic,

provability of O^p

=>

0(p

=>

q)

it was the

which made us view 0

(p

q)

=>

as

inadequate as a formalization of conditional obligation
(see page ix)

And given the time relativized axioms

(Al)

-

24

(A3,

it appears that in
our time relativized
deontic log ic
we will be able to
prove

(8)

0

S/t.

Oj

(
v

1

If so then we

win

R

s,t.

u

;

,

t

s
S
'

D

indeed find 0

^

(R.

s

i

=3

,

'

t
j

Qs

't

)

k

'

(r^

unsatisfactory as a for m
alization of conditional
obligation
For it seems that then
if s has an obligation
at t, to bear
the relation
to t
it
+.u
^ +
then it will follow that
l 6
j
whenever the forbidden, R
oes ho1( , s= has a
s,t.' does
condition"1 ° bligation
t. to bear Iny
relation Q to any time t
later than t..

V
\

.

,

l

However, it seems to me that
we can and should deny
(8).
We can show it will not
follow when o
(r
q
symbolizes conditional obligations
once we re^ognizXnd
=,

make explicit some appealing and
implicit time restrictions
on those obligations.
For it is natural to
say that if

s

has some absolute obligation
then any conditional obligation
arising from or generated by
fulfillment of this obligation
or its negation can only be
incurred by s after this obligation or its negation is discharged.
For example, I have an
obligation today not to rob Smith tomorrow.
Once I have
robbed Smith tomorrow, then after that
time I have the conditional obligation to repay him. Thus
we may say that a
formula of the form 0
(R
= Q
symbolizes a
S
S t
S 't
)

'

1

'

j

k

sentence expressing a conditional obligation provided
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°

<9>

8't

(

i

Vt

3
j

Q

s.t

=>

)

tj

<

k

t iS t

k

,

that is, only if t., the
time of the obligation
statement,
is strictly after the
time tj that the condition
holds.
Our enriched symbolism,
with this added restriction,
gives
US a way of making clear
the time relationships
implicit
in conditional obligations.
And every formula in our
time
relativized deontic logic with
any implication for conditional obligations must not only
follow from our axioms and
principles but accord with the
stipulated time restrictions
as well.
Surely it is now clear that
(8) violates the latter
3 Q
as a symbolization for condis,t
k
tional obligation, will not follow
from 0
‘

WVt

)

'

n,(R

s

in the latter it must be that
t.

must have
1t

t.

<

t^

,

<:

t

.

and

which is impossible if

a PPears then that the

),

iAhe
t.

<

i "

for

former we

t

*

j

imposition of natural time

restrictions has given us a formalization for
conditional
obligations which is immune to one of the basic
difficulties that arises with an analogous,
non-time-relativized
and standard deontic logic.

Let us now investigate whether

or not 0

sub 3 ect to the restrictions

s

,

t

<

i

that tj < t^

R

3

Sft

Qs

t^,

t
'

J

k

is susceptible to other contrary-to-duty

problems and paradoxes.
The type of contrary-to-duty puzzle discussed by Chis-

holm in "Contrary-to-Duty Imperatives and Deontic Logic,"
and Aqvist in "A Note on Commitment," has been presented
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in the following
general way.

it seems that for
some possible states of affairs
p and q, the following f
our statement forms may be consistent:
(10)

it ought to be that
p.

(11)

Given p it ought to be
that

q.

(12)

Given %p it ought to be
that %q.

(13)

%p.

Yet as we have seen,
formalizations of these four
English
sentences in standard deontic
logic lead to contradictions
or entailments that seem
incorrect or both. And even
if
we rephrase (10, - (13, in
terms of what an agent ought
to do we still seem to have
four English sentences which
may be logically consistent
and mutually independent.
For example, suppose that no
one should swim in the

reservoir supplying town water
and thus Smith ought not
swim in the reservoir.
But suppose Smith does swim
in the
reservoir and that anyone who swims
in the reservoir
is

then required by a court order to
spend a certain number of
hours cleaning the grounds surrounding
the reservoir.
However, if Smith did not swim in the
reservoir and receive
this penalty he ought not to have
cleaned up the grounds
since it would be inappropriate to trespass
on town property and others were hired to do that cleaning.
Then it would
be reasonable to assert each of the following
four sentences
(14)

Smith ought not to swim in the reservoir.

(15)

Given that Smith swims in the reservoir.
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(16)

he ought to clean the
surrounding grounds.
Given that Smith does not
swim in the
reservoir, he ought not clean
the surrounding grounds.

(17)

Smith swims in the reservoir.

we wish to show that with
our time relativised deontic
logic
we can symbolize these four
sentences (a) as consistent

statements and

as pairwise independent
statements.

(b)

Let us suggest the following
as an adequate formalizatron of (14) - (17), where W
g>t symbolizes "s swims in the
^

reservoir at g",
grounds at

g",

symbolizes "s cleans the reservoir
names Smith, and

s'

t
]_

names the time at

which Smith in fact swims in the
reservoir:

(14')

(15')

(t.Mt.Mt.

(t.

0

US')

)

S ',

(t.)

’>

t

fc

'

<

W

ti
1

(

i

C

=

s',t

3

tj

“s', tl

s',t.

t. s

s

x

(t.) (t ) (t.
'“k'
3

°s',t

(17

<

)

(t

<" W

-

k

)

(t

s',t,

<

=

t.

^C

t.

= 0

^

>>

k

* tk

s',t,

>>

=

s

,

jt

M ws

,

t

>)
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It seems that there
is an implicit
assumption in 17
that smith swims in the
reservoir at a particular
time,
(

which we may designate by

V

)

the name of one unit of
time.

However, although we may
infer by universal
instantiation
from (14')

(18)

(t

i

)

(t

i

<

t

that Smith ought not at any

reservoir at

t^

^

t.

0

s' ,t.

MWs',t

earlier than

^

>>'

swim in the

the time he does swim, the
more general

obligation expressed by (14')
appears to be true as well
and I suggest that that is
what (14) asserts.

In general,
at an^ time before the swimming
takes place we wish to assert that Smith ought not swim
at any future time.
The

conditional obligations expressed in
(15') and (16')
take to be general or standing
obligations of a sort.

I

also
it

is not merely true that after
Smith in fact swims he must

clean the grounds around the reservoir.

We may also inter-

pret (15) as claiming that at any time
t^, if Smith has
been swimming in the reservoir at an earlier
time he then
ought to clean the grounds.

And we may interpret

(16)

as

indicating that at any time Smith ought not clean the grounds
if he has not been swimming at an earlier time.

If

I

am correct that (14')

and symbolize

(14)

-

(17),

-

(17')

adequately express

then we do have a symbolization

29

in which none of the
four statements implies
any other.

For the specific occurrence
of Smith’s swimming at
does
not entail the general
conditional obligation in
effect any
time after a swimming for
Smith to clean the grounds.
Thus
(17’) does not imply
(15').
Nor will (14’) imply (16 ,,
Since in (14’) t i t. and in
(16') we require that t
±
<
We have preserved the
independence

V

of

Furthermore,

M7n
^

-

(14')

'

'

(14)

-

(

17 ).

are mutually consistent.
,

'

We may, as was indicated above,
infer from (14') that

(18)

(t

i

}

(t.

<

0

t.

% (w

))

Similarly we may use universal
instantiation to infer from
(15') that

(19)

(t

i>

(t

°s’,t

k>

(W
i

(t

l

<

tf S t k

=

s',t
1

C

s',t

=

)>

k

and from (16') that

(20)

(t.) (t

0

s

k

)

(t
x

<

t.

S

t

s

k

=

)

.

.
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But unless we wish to defend
a factual detachment
rule

w

according to which 0
Qs
& u
R
s,t (r S,t d 0
,t
s, t
i
k
and 1 think we should not,
°s,t (Q s,t
we

imply

>

.

)

i

°s'-t

'

can not infer

k

(C
i

s',t

.

)

from

<

17

')

k

and

(19).

And it does not appear

that any time relativised version
of the deontic detachment
rule Op and 0 (p
q) implies Oq would apply to
(18) and (20)
since the relationship between t
and
in (18) is incon±
->

^

sistent with that in

(20)

We have proposed a symbolization
for conditional obli-

gations which is attractive because
when restricted temporally as we have suggested, it is immune
to some standard
paradoxes of the analogous symbolization
in SDL, and looks

like it will give us a way of avoiding
the Chisholm- type

contrary-to-duty imperative puzzle.
Unfortunately, however, there are versions of
the latter puzzle which our symbolization still
cannot
handle.

First, in proposing temporal restrictions we have
also

reinterpreted the deontic operator O from an ought-to-be
to an ought-to-do.

But this reinterpretation is so narrow

that it does not allow symbolization of versions of the

puzzle like the following:
(21)

Jones ought not to rob Brown.

(22)

Given that Jones does rob Brown, it ought
to be that he be punished for robbing
Brown

(23)

Given that Jones does not rob Brown,
it ought to be that he not be punished
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for robbing Brown.
(24)

It may be that

Jones robs Brown.

does not express a
contrary-to-duty imperative because it does
not tell Jones what he
ought to do
once he has neglected his
duty and robbed Brown,
certainly
It does not tell us that
Jones ought to see to
it that he
himself is punished for the
robbery.
Ra ther. (22, tells us
what ought to be the case
once Jones has robbed Brown.
(22)

Thus we might not worry
about this version of the
puzzle
nor feel the need for a
solution for it because our
concern
only with those obligation
statements most crucial for
ormative ethics, that is, those
which prescribe action
for a given agent.
Nevertheless, this version of the
puzzle
presents a reasonable and consistent
set of deontic sentences
which we cannot symbolize adequately
because we have no provision for combining our time
restrictions with statements
about what ought to be.
Second, and perhaps more devastating
to our proposal,

our symbolization appears to be
inadequate for Chisholm's
own example and others like it. Chisholm's
example, unlike
the example just discussed, might be
transformed into our
ought-to-do language as follows:
(1)

A certain man ought to see to it that he
go to the assistance of his neighbors.

(2)

Given that he does go he ought to see to
it that he tell them he is coming.

(
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(3>

serto^hVr
^

coming.
(4)

3

h<3

n0t 90 he OU 9 ht to
" 0t tel1 them he is

He does not go.

Suppose we let

name our man and let G

s'

g

be our

symbolic expression for "s
goes to the assistance of
his
neighbors at g", and let
symbolize "he tells his
neighbors he is coming at t."'
Suppose also that if our
man goes to assist his
neighbors, there is a particular
time at which he goes.
Then we may let
designate the
time at which he would go if
he were to to, and may say
that he does not go to help
them at
Then we might try
to formalize (1) 4
as

T^

V

(

(lc)

(t

x

°s'

(2 °)

)

)

(t.) (t.

'

t

(G
1

S'
s

t

<

G

=

T

(t.

<

k

(t.)

tj

)

s',t

(t

k

)

°s',t.<" G s',t.
1

t.

>>

(t.)<t.)(t )(t

<

t. «

&

x

°s',t

(3c)

t

<

J

=

t. *

t

k

s',t>>

t.

"T

S tk

s',t

>>

k

=

=

.
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s

,

(V

But a closer look at ,2c,
and ,3c, shows that the
very temporal restrictions which
appeared so natural and
useful are

devastating in this example.

For normally „ e understand

,2,

to mean that if he does
go he ought to tell them
he is coming before he goes.
Thus we require that
i t
Yet we

^

.

have already restricted our
time relativised version
of
0,P - q, for sentences of conditional
obligation

so that in

<20

tj

4

ti i

t

k

and hence t.

<

V

Thus the restrictions

we presented which were so
appealing are strong enough to
block some unwelcome results
but too strong to allow a symbolization of all four sentences in
Chisholm’s very own
example
The difficulty we have met does
not arise solely with
Chisholm
example.
For we are similarly unable to
symbolize
the following sentences which we
might want to assert if a

certain man. Smith, ought to go to New
York City and can
only get there by plane.
(25)

(26)
(27)
(28)

Smith ought to go to New York City.
Given that he goes, he ought to buy
a plane ticket.
Given that he does not go, he ought not
buy a plane ticket.
He does not go.

Normally we understand

(26)

to mean that Smith ought

to buy the ticket before he goes.

But in general our

symbolic apparatus can not provide

a

formalization of

.
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conditional obligations
such as Chisholm's
(2, and ,26, abo V e, Where a given
condition gives rise to
an earlier obligate. Perhaps we should take
another look at statements
Uke these to determine whether
or not they are
genuine conditional Obligation statements,
that is, whether or not
obligations can be in effect
due to future conditions,
if so
then we have not solved
all the puzzles of
contrary-to-duty’
imperatives
,

Finally, although a time
relativized version of
0(P = q)
0((p & r) = q) will not always
hold, it still appears that as long as the
relevant times are related
properly
we will be able to prove some
invalid inferences in our
time
relativized deontic logic.
Specifically we shall have
=>

<29)
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Neither Greenspan's use of the concept
of unalterability
nor our proposed time relativizations
can completely block
inferences of this form. Those supplements
to SDL do not

change most inferences allowed by use
of the material conditional.
It seems that we must seek a symbolization
for conditional obligation statements which does not
rely on the
standard material implication.
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only have responded to her objector that
directions
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may never be
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CHAPTER

II

Many Of the difficulties
that anise when we
attest
to symbolize statements
of conditional
obligation by means
Of the formulas
0(p
a
ri
or ™
^ 3 q)
p d 0
q may be traced to the
material conditional
connective.
The connective appears
to be too weak for our
purposes since it allows
inferences
we wish to block if
these conditional
expressions are to
symbolize sentences of
conditional obligation. And
we have
now seen that the imposition
of temporal restrictions
on
obligation statements will not
be sufficient to block
those invalid inferences.
There is clearly
)

a real need
for a stronger conditional
expression for conditional

obligation sentences.
Brian Chellas has argued in
"Conditional Obligation"
^ggl^l- The °ry and Sem antic Analysis edited by Stenlund
that the best approach for
understanding conditional obligation divorces questions of
obligation and conditionality.
For then the relationship
between the notions of obligation in conditional and
non-conditional contexts

“

,

and be-

tween the notions of conditionality
in deontic and nondeontic contexts may be made explicit.
Richmond Thomason
argues similarly in an unpublished manuscript
"Deontic

Logic as Founded on Tense Logic", that

a

conditional obligation will separate

theory of the con-

ditional and a theory of obligation.
37

a

proper theory of

For the present we

38

Shall be following their
suggestion, focusing
notion of conditionality.

f irst

on the

Surely entailment or
strict implication,
written
and
P
q
interpreted in the usual
way, provides a stronger
conditional connective than
material implication.
Thus
we might consider utilising
it in a formalisation
of con-

ditional obligation.

1

Analogs of 0(p

= q

,

and p

3

0q prQ .

vide natural candidates,
and hence we shall first
consider
the plausibility of

(30)

p

=*

Oq

as a way of expressing
conditional obligation statements.
It is probably simplest to
treat the expression Oq as

"unbroken"

"unanalysable" statement variable
standing
for English sentences of the
form "it ought to be the case
that q".
Given this analysis, p =» Oq will
be a formal
expression for sentences of the form
"it is necessarily
the case that given p, it ought to
be that q".
And p ^ Oq
may be treated as a well formed
formula of the standard
alethic modal systems, where
p and Oq are statement variables in those systems, since the symbol
0 will not func,

tion as a predicate letter or operator.

Then even in the weakest modal system T 2 we shall
not
be able to derive
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(31)
d (p

^ 0 q)

,

which is as we would
wish.

However

(32)

CKp

(33)

holds for any r

3
,

r)

(p

and so in particular

CKp

for any q.

3

d

0 q)

(p

On this analysis, then,
an impossible

condition generates a conditional
obligation to anything.
it is difficult to have
definite intuitions about
(34)
what obligations (if any)
arise given impossible conditions.
And so we might not be
terribly troubled by 33 ).
But
(

(35)
(p =£ q)

is valid

m

T

3

(p

r

&

=*>

g)

and so in particular we shall
have

(p

=»

Oq)

3

(p

&

r

^

Oq)

.

.
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And hence if p

0 q is to be a
symbolization for conditional Obligation it Will
fan to provide expressions
for conditional obligations
which change when
conditions
=>

change
Perhaps p

*

Oq would be

more plausible symboliza-

a

tion for conditional
obligation if we altered our
analysis
of it.
Instead of treating Oq as
a simple statement
variable, we might take
p and q to be statement variables
for possible states of
affairs and O to be a deontic
operator read "it is obligatory
that".
But then p * 0q
can no longer be viewed as
a well formed formula
of the
alethic modal logic system T.
However we might augment
the system T in the following
way to form a formal system
within which P ^ Oq is a well
formed expression.

We might propose that the language
of our new system,
call it OT, be the language of
the propositional calculus,
PC, plus the deontic operator
0 and the modal operator .
Then we might describe the well formed
formulas of OT.

Single statement variables will be atomic
formulas of OT.
And for any wffs 0 and
of OT,
ip

^0
Ocf>

0

0

&

\p

p
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v

<t>

<l>

and

will be wffs of OT

cf)

i

D

ip

=

ip

ThiQ is^ ao very rich
This
language, for
it allows mixed formulas,
that is, formulas containing
deontic and/or modal
components as well as non-deontic,
non-modal components (for
example Dip s .Op)
and
iterated modal formulas (such
as DOp)
(Contrast SDL,
see Appendix I.)
This is just as we wish, of
course,
for P * 0 q, equivalently
Q (p = Oq)
win certainly be a
well formed formula of OT.
•

,

.

,

It seems reasonable that the
axioms of OT should at

the very least include all the
axioms of T and SDL.
we might propose

(0T1)

Dp

(0T2)

D(p

(0T3)

Op

(0T4)

0(p

3

Thus

p

d

q)

d

(Q p

3

Qg)

^O^p

3

3

q)

&

Op

3 Oq.

Then in addition to the rules of PC and a rule of
replace-

ment (0T5) according to which the result of uniformly
replacing any variable in any formula provable in OT by

.

,
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any wff of OT is itself
provable in OT, we shall
have
(0T6)

If a formula f
is provable in
OT, then Of is
provable in OT,

and

0T7>
OT,
OT

then

^ ls Provable in
is provable in OT.

<#>

But even given this
minimal description of
the
formal system OT, in which
0 functions as a deontic
operator, we find that whether
or not OT is objectionable on other grounds.

(36)

Op

(37)

(p

d

(p =* oq)

and

=>

Oq)

3

(p&r=^Oq)

will still be derivable in OT by
applications of (0T5)
(0T6)

,

(0T7

)

,

and

(0T2)

P

^

Oq is unsuitable even when

analysed as a formula of the augmented
language OT.
Furthermore, regardless of the formal
system within
which we analyse the formula
p ^ Oq, it appears that we
shall not be able to use
p ^ Oq to symbolize conditional

obligation statements with factual conditions.

For it

would seem that a factual condition cannot entail

a
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normative statement.

^

And if p expresses
a non . nQrmative

state of affairs and
o q expresses an
obligation that
g
di
iCUlt t0
former could
imply the latter.
Sure l y we would not
wish
example, that it is a
necessary truth that when
a promise
is made then there
is an obligation to
keep the promise,
for it is possible to
make a promise that ought
not to
have been made, such
as a promise to murder,
or to make a
promise and be released
from that promise, and
so on.
such cases the obligation
to keep the promise
will not
follow.
And thus the symbolization
p * 0 g, which asserts
a necessary connection
between a condition and
the resulting obligation is too
strong an expression for
what
seem to be paradigm cases
of conditional obligation

^ ^

“

m

statements.
If,

on the other hand, we consider

(38)

0 (p

=},

q)

as our formalization for
conditional obligation, where
p
symbolizes the condition and
g symbolizes whatever is con-

ditionally obligatory, it is difficult
to understand what
any conditional obligation sentence
expresses. Apparently
(38) says that what is obligatory is
that
entail
p

But suppose, for example, that

I

q.

have a conditional obli-

gation to call my sister given that

I

have promised to

.
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call her.

Then Khy

s hould

it

^

Qbiigatory
relationship between my
promising and my
necessary one ? What is
obli ga t ory

^

g

is that I call my

sister once

have promised to,
not that there be
a
necessary conditional
connection
onnection between my
promising and
doing so.
it seems that (38)
fails to capture the
rails
meaning of the conditional
obligation sentence.
I

w

'

Furthermore, if „ e appeal
again to the system OT
within which ,38, is a
well formed expression
and 0
functions as a deontic
operator, it is clear
that

(39)

is provable.

6

0(p

Thus

=*

q)

(38)

d

0(p

&

r

=*

q)

can only symbolise
sentences

for which augmented
conditions do not override
conditional

obligations
have argued that neither
p =* 0q n or o(p =* q)
alone can be adequate as a
symbolization for all the conditional obligation sentences
we wish to expresss.
Yet
one might argue that sentences
expressing conditional
obligations are ambiguous and that
if we used both
p =,> Oq
and 0(p =»q) we might be able
to provide adequate formalizations for the sentences in question.
It is unquestionable that sentences of English which
we use to make statements of conditional obligation are
ambiguous.
For
example, both the second and third
sentences in Chisholm's
I

.
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^

puzzle (see Introduction,
p.xii) appear to
indicate
ditional Obligations and
yet the scope of
the deontic
operator in each one is
different. an
And
a it is an open
question whether or not
an adequate
symbolization of them
should reflect that
difference or not.
other words,
difficult to determine
whether different formalisations are appropriate
for the two sentences
or whether
the scope difference
in the English sentences

m

can be
ignored and the same
symbolization used for both.
if
different conditional
obligation sentences are
indeed
most appropriately expressed
by different formalizations,
then any differences in
the scope of the deontic
operator
in the English sentences
might be a guide for determining
which symbolization is suitable
for a particular English
sentence.
But it is only a guide.
There may be other
features of the English sentences
which would help determine the appropriate symbolization.
And to single out
all such features would be a
nearly impossible task and
beyond the scope of this dissertation.
However if we
admit that we may need more than
one formula to express
adequately the conditional obligation
sentences we wish
to formalize, then we must
investigate whether or not
P ^ Oq and 0(p
q) together could be sufficient for our
task

^

Even without providing criteria for determining
which

sentences could be adequately expressed by which
formulas.
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xt seems clear that
p

*

^

Og and 0(p

* g) alone wiu
Neither proposal allows
expression of those
conditional obligations
which may no longer
hold given
an augmented condition.
furthermore, strict
implication
13 t0 ° Str ° ng 3 C °
nneCtiVe ** °ur purposes.
Any conditional obligation
sentence in the form of
stiff ice.

p e> 0q indicates that there is a
necessary connection
between the
condition and the obligation
conditional upon that condition.
And any sentence in
the form of 0(p*
indi _
q
cates an entailment that
is obligatory.
And yet in the
most common, paradigm,
examples of conditional
obligation
sentences there is neither
relationship.
Sure l y there
is no logical entailment
between borrowing money and
repaying it which makes the
latter obligatory given
the
former.
Nor is it obligatory that
the relationship
,

be-

tween borrowing and repaying
be a necessary one.
And
thus a contingent conditional
obligation to repay borrowed
money, and others like it, can
not be formalized by means
of
q or 0(p*q).
The sentences for which these
formulas may be appropriate do not
include the most interesting ones which may or may not
be true depending on
the circumstances.

P40

Perhaps a more plausible connective
to consider using
in formalizing conditional
obligation statements is the

subjunctive conditional represented by

m

>.

Robert Stalnaker,

"A Theory of Conditionals" in Studies
in Logical Theory.
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98 _ U2f first
pP
proposed and defended a
theory of conditionals
which provrded a formal system
and semantical
apparatus for statements rnvolving his
conditional connective. 7
The basic
conditional expression
he considers,
.

p

>

^

is a co

q

.

factual statement read
"if p were the case
thgn q
be the case".
Lennart Aqvist has
suggested (in "A Note
Commitment
P hilosop hical
Studies 14 (1963), p. 24
that an adequate notion
of commitment may be
designated
by Pig, where we let
"pig denote some relation
,

)

of impli-

cation that is stricter
than material implication
but
weaker than strict implication."
stalnaker s subjunctive conditional satisfies
this condition.
Thus let us
next consider using this
connective and the semantics
Stalnaker provides for it.
'

We might first evaluate the
acceptability of

(40)

p

>

Oq

as an expression for conditional
obligation statements.
If we again treat Oq as an
"unbroken", "unanalysable"

statement variable which serves as

a

formalization for

sentences of the form "q is obligatory",
then we might
analyse (40) as a formula well formed
in Stalnaker 's
system and read it as "if
p were the case then it would
be the case that q is obligatory".
This proposed analysis
is attractive for several reasons.
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First, although vp

does not in Stalnaker
(see note 7)

prove

%n

d

'

=

s

(

r,

(41)

>

tp

holds,

(p =

r)

=

,

>

The converse of (S9)

is invalid
invalid.
y.\

(p = r)

u
Hence

and so

m

=

0q)

j

(p >

we shall not be able
to

particular we will not
have

_

Thus we can avoid the
paradoxical conclusion that
whatever
not the case yields a
conditional obligation to
anything.
Second, since P >
q
s r)

-

=>

(

<p

>

q)

is an

invaUd

formula in Stalnaker's
system
ybc em, we
wp \ji-\-\
will not be able to
prove

(42)

(p

>

Oq)

d

(

(p

&

r)

>

0q)>

The count erf actual conditional
connective apparently provides a symbolization according
to which conditional obligations may change as conditions
vary.

Third, although the negation
of p = Oq does not capture the negation of the conditional
obligation sentence
"if P then it ought to be that
q", the negation of
p > 0g
does seem to be a fair translation
of the negation of "if
P then it ought to be that q"

.

For any reasonable nega-

tion of a conditional obligation
sentence must assert
that the obligation no longer holds
under the given condition.

Yet if conditional obligation statements
are
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^

symbolized by means of
p = 0q thgn
sentence statin, your
conditional oblivion
to call your
mother if she is ill
is merely an
assertion that your
mother is ill and you
are not obligated
to call her
Whereas given P > Og as
the symbolization tor
the sentence
the negation becomes
the much more plausible
"if yoU r
mother were ill then
you would nQt be
her"

^

^

^

^

.

Fourth, If p

>

Oq,

understood as a formula
in stalnaker's language, serves
as our formalization
for conditional obligation
statements then we may have
a way of
formulating Chisholm's four
sentences consistently
and

independently.

sentence

(3)

if we understand both
sentence

and
as expressing conditional
obligations, then
(

2

)

we may write

(la)

Og

(2d)

g

(3d)

^g

(4a)

^g.

ot

>

>

0(%t)

As we have seen above (cf.
(2d).

And

(la)

(41)),

(4a)

does not imply (3d).

does not imply

Neither the obli-

gation to go nor the agent's failure
to go implies that
he would have any obligation
whatsoever if he were to go
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or not to go.

This formalization
of the puzzle appar
ently yields four
independent sentences.
Moreover, by (S9) (see
footnote 6 ), (2) implies

(43)

and (3d)

.

g 3 ot

implies

(44)

%g 3 O('vt)

And although (4a) and
(44) yield O(vt) by modus
ponens,
we can not derive Oft) from
(la) and (43).
Thus „e can
avoid a derivation of the
inconsistent obligation state

ments which was possible given
the formalisation of
Chisholm's sentences using 0
(p = q)

Although P

>

for our project,

expectations.

and p

=

Oq.

Oq is thus a very plausible
candidate
it still appears to fall
short of our

First, using the subjunctive
conditional

connective we have given a symbolization
of Chisholm's
puzzle as four consistent and
independent sentences.

Nevertheless our symbolization is somewhat
unsettling.
For as was pointed out, ^ > 0(it)
g

implies ^g

Thus from (3d) and (4a) we can derive
0(vt).

may be objectionable.
to help his neighbors.

13

0(vt)

And this

For the man’s obligation was to go
And given fulfillment of this

obligation he has an obligation to tell them he is
coming

51

Thus it seems odd that
we can deri,^
derive an absolute
obligation for him not to
telll fhom
them uhe is coming.
it i s
especially odd if we
recognize that we may
derive o(-vt)
only When (4a) holds.
And yet once
(4a)

holds, it is no

longer possible to
discharge the obligation
to tell in the
sense intended in
Chisholm's example.
For telling or not
telling presumably is to
take place before going
or not
going.
Thus given the proposed
symbolization we may derive an absolute obligation
not to tell when it is
no
longer possible to fulfill
the obligation in any
meaningful way.
Second, although

(45)

%n

r>

(P

>

Oq)

is not provable in
Stalnaker's system,

equivalently „«p,

still D „ p

,

or

will be a sufficient condition
to imply

Oq.

That is, any impossible condition
will imply a
conditional obligation to anything.
As mentioned above,
P

>

it is difficult to have settled
intuitions about whether

impossible conditions can generate
any obligations at all.
Since one type of impossible condition,
a self contradictory one, implies any consequent
it may seem reasonable
to allow impossible conditions
to imply any conditional
obligation.
My own tentative intuition is that it would
be preferable to have no conditional
obligations follow

.
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from impossible
conditions.

However, „e might
stipulate

certain changes in the
formal system and
semantics for
the subjunctive
conditional to block the
conclusion that
(46)

And so

Ckp

^

(p

0 q)

>

do not feel the validity
of ,46, in Stacker's
system should be viewed
as a reason to abandon
the approach we are considering.
I

third oddity which arises
when using p > Oq as
our formalization for
conditional obligation statements
is that

(47)

(p

&

q)

o

(p

>

g

)

is provable in Stalnaker’s
formal system.

9

Thus in par-

ticular if condition
P holds and Oq is true then
p > 0q
follows.
Any condition that is true
yields a conditional
obligation to any absolute obligation
that holds.

is true for any state of
affairs q,
it conditionally obligatory.

If Oq

then any fact makes

Given that q is absolutely

obligatory it may not seem objectionable
to find that q
is conditionally obligatory
given any true
condition.

But it is at least odd.

For then we have not captured

any special relationship between the
condition and the

conditional obligation in such cases.

And in general it
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m that there is some
rather unique relationship,

Whxch we have seen can
not be material or
strict implica .
txon, that holds
between conditions ana
the

generated by them.

oblations

A much more serious
di fficulty with the
symbolization P > Oq is evident
when we examine

(48)

(

(p

>

q)

vq)

&

d

This formula is also
aerivable in Stalnaker's
system.
Thus we shall be able to
prove

(4 9)

Ana if p

(

(p

>

Qq)

&

'vOq)

=>

'vp.

0 q is to express conditional
obligation statements then ,49) tells us for
example that if an agent has
a

>

conditional obligation to repent
if he sins and has no
absolute obligation to repent
then it follows that he does
not sin.
This is clearly untenable.
Surely the antecedent may be true and the consequent
false.
We must be
able to express all of the following
in some consistent
manner:
that a state of affairs
q is not absolutely obligatory, but that q is conditionally
obligatory given condition p and that p is true. However
no such situation
can be expressed consistently if
p > Oq is our formalization for conditional obligation within
Stalnaker's system.
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We might believe,
however th^i
that «
OUr attem Pt to
analyse
n as a
P „ Oq
formula of
alnaker s system was
misguided.
Perhaps that analysis
obscured i mpor tant
features of
obligation and we would
be more successful
if we considered
P > Og as a formalization
within which 0 functions
as a
deontic operator.
'

i

unfortunately, however,
although we have an
axiomatic
system governing > and
an axiomatic system
for 0 when applied to material
conditional statements,
no formal system
has been developed
which combines the
connective > and the
deontic operator 0. There x-ra +-k
ere are thus no
straightforward
syntactic methods available
for determining whether
certain formulas involving
both > and 0, and analogous
to
the paradoxical formulas
of SDL extended to
include
mixed formulas, are true
or false.
However, in order to evaluate
the adequacy of
p > 0 q,
we might attempt to develop
an extension of SDL
which
would provide the syntactic
apparatus we are lacking. To
begin, we might supplement
the basis logic, BL, of
SDL by
incorporating the connective >
in the language of BL, appropriate rules for forming well
formed formulas, including mixed formulas, involving
>, and Stalnaker's axioms
governing >.
Given the latter, certain other
symbols
will have to be incorporated in
the language. 10 Thus we
m lght simply take as our augmented
basis logic Stalnaker’s
logic for the connective >.
in Stalnaker's system

^

.
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validity can be defined

in

+-h
Q
thS

USUal
“d he has shown
his system to be
complete in the sense thee
that every valid
formula is a theorem.
Hence it
if seems
satisfactory as an
augmented basis loaic
(Compare Hansson's
description of
BL, see Appendix
I.)
„.

•

<

We might form an
augmented deontic logic,
call it 0S
from s analogously to
the formation of SDL
from BL, by
adding the deontic
operator o to the language
of s, and
adding „ffs of the form
Of where f is a formula
of s.
The axioms, in addition
to those of s, win
b e the axioms
We shall have a rule
of replacement allowing
uniform substitution of wffe
of os for variables
in formulas provable in OS to
yield formulas provable
in OS, and

a rule

according to which if a
formula

then Of is provable in OS.

clearly p

f
>

is provable in S,

0 g will be a well

formed formula of OS

Unfortunately, even given our
new formal system OS,
in which 0 functions on
its own as a deontic
operator,
>
Oq
can not be adequate for
P
expressing all sentences
of conditional obligation.
For as long as we maintain
Stalnaker s axioms for the
subjunctive conditional, now
applicable to formulas including the
deontic operator 0
by the replacement rule, we
must still accept
'

(49)

(

(p

>

Oq)

&

%0q)

d

o,p.

.
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indeed, as long as we
maintain that a version
of (s9)
holds, namely that

(50)

(p

0 q)

>

and it seems we must,

the provability of

=

(

p = 0q)

(

it does not appear
that we can avoid

49

Hence we are again left
with the
unwelcome result that if
p > Oq is to serve as a
symbolization for conditional
obligation, then we cannot
formalize
case
which q is not absolutely
obligatory,
(

)

m

but is

conditionally obligatory
given condition p and that
p is
true.
And surely such cases are
common in normative ethics
and are the basis for
a major portion of
the conditional
obligation sentences we wish
to formalize.
I may now have
no absolute obligation
to take a book to
the library, but
it may be that if I do
borrow a book from the library
then
I

am conditionally obligated
to take back the book.

is consistent with rnese
k
thp^p that
4-

library.

Yet using p

sentences

1

>

-a j-

t
I

a^
do
borrow
i_

a

it

book from the

Oq we can not symbolize
these

7

We have noted that the subjunctive
conditional is
midway in strength between strict
implication and material
implication, that is,

(51)

(P

=^>

q)

=>

(p

>

q)

d

(

p 3 q

)
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,n

om

merited system OS.) 13

And it 13 thS ° nl
y conditional connective we have
considered thUS
thus r
far whlch blocks
certain
ferences we wish to
avoid
id.
aven the unacceptability
P > Oq, then, it is
natural to consider
np „.

•

.

^
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0 (p

>

q)

as a formal
expression for conditional
oblication.
° rder
analySS °<» > 0) we
need to view it as
a
well formed formula
of a rormal
formal language
allowing expressions involving
ng bof
h fh
Q
both
the
subjunctive conditional >
and
the deontic operator
0.
it is natural to
refer again to
the system OS described
above.
We might also want
to

^

^

,

.

choose additional plausible
looking axioms combining
>
and 0.
For example, we might
want to add as an axiom

(53)

If 0(p

0(p

>

q)

=

(Op

>

Oq)

14

serves as our expression
for conditional
obligation, then according to
(53), a conditional obligation for q given
p implies that if p were absolutely
obligatory then q would be
absolutely obligatory. Thus,
for example, a conditional
obligation to keep a promise
given that it is made implies
that if it were obligatory
to make the promise then
it would be obligatory to keep
it.
>

q)
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This in turn implies
that if itt is
h= „t,
obligatory to make
the
Promise then it is
obligatory to keep it.
0

If it is not

19at ° ry tD

thS

implication is true

this entire material

=
^
that
does
not seem objectionable
in a contrary-to-duty
case, (53, says that
a conditional obligation to
repent
epent given
diver, a
= sin,
which we would
represent by 0(s > r,
im p i ies 0s > 0r
,
if
were obligatory to sin
then it would be
obligatory to
repent.
And given Os , Or,
it will follow that
Os = Or
an obligation to sin
materially implies an
obligation to
repent.
The falsity of the
antecedent forces the truth
of OS 3 Or, but since
Os 3 Or has no
implication in terms
of conditional obligation
ligation its „
vacuous truth when it
has
a false antecedent
seems unproblematic.
1- 1-,

hn-t-

+.

•

,

^^

,

It is thus at least
plausible to add

(53)

to OS.

Furthermore, its addition is
advantageous if o(p >
q)
is to be our symbolization
for conditional obligation
since it provides a
straightforward rule for detachment
of unconditional obligations
from conditional
ones.

For

whenever q is conditionally
obligatory given p and
p
itself is obligatory then we
may detach an absolute obligation for q.
That is,

(54)

0 (p

Op

Oq

>

q)
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will be a valid
inference since ofn ,
°(P > q) will imply 0 >
0q
p
,
and
this
turn yields Op = 0
q
qAnn anni
application of modus
ponens then justifies
the conclusion
usion.
we may want to detach Oq even -ore often
than (54, allows,
but (54, provides at least a minimal
detactaent rule which
could be
supplemented.
.

.

m

•

Given the formal system
OS it is appropriate
to consider certain formulas
analogous to those which
caused
difficulty for the symbolization
0 (p = q)
In particular,
if 0 (p > q) is our
symbolization for conditional
obligation
we hope
.

(55)

0(^ p

0 (p

)

>

q)

is not derivable, since
we do not want the forbidden
to

conditionally obligate one to
anything.
matic system as presented above

Given the axio-

we find that 0(ip)

nothing whatsoever about the
truth of 0( P
OKp> does imply 0 (p = q), as we have

>

q)

.

implies

Although

seen, there is no

implication from 0(p

to 0( P

= q,

>

q)

.

A n assumption of

the negation of (55) does not
lead to an inconsistency.

When we consider

(56)

0 (p

>

q)

d

0( (p

&

r)

>

q)

,

)
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we find that the
obligatoriness of P
p
whatsoever about the
obligatoriness

>

of

„
imDli
q implies
nothing
(p

&

r)

>

q

Furthermore, when we use
o,p > q) to symboli
Chisholm's four sentences
ententes, we can produce
in many „ ays
satisfactory formalization
proposed thus far for
that puzzle.
Let us again suppose
that both sentences
2
and ,3, express
conditional obligations.
Then we may have

^

,

(la)

Og

(2e)

0 g

(

3e)

(4a)

(

t)

>

0 (%g

,

>

%t

^g.

As pointed out above,

(la)

does not imply (3e)

And it
seems clear that (4a) does
not imply (2e)
ig is not a
sufficient condition to yield
the modalized counterfactual
conditional in (2e)
This is as we wish since the
fact
that he does not go does not
imply a conditional obligation to tell or not tell given
that he does go.
Thus we
apparently have a symbolization of
four independent sentences.
Also (2e) implies Og > ot by
(53) and this implies Og = ot.
Similarly, (3e) implies O(ig)
.

.

.

>

and this yields

O(-ig)

we may derive 0(t)

and

(4a)

=

O(vt).

0 (vt)

Thus from (la) and

but we can not derive 0(^t)

(2e)

from (3e)

and hence we do not have the inconsistency
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pointed out by Chisholm.
n

..

e ° Ver
Moreover

.

but not OK-M

^

bUt n0t ° (t> fr ° ra

seems quite correct.

'

that we can derive

PP ° Sed to bein 9 able
to derive

symbolization on page 49

,

p or it iis
s right
riaht- 4to say that his

obligation is to go to
his neighbors’
yuu °rs assists
assistance, and to
is coming.

He has no absolute
obligation
tell them he is coming,
however, although he
ought
not to tell given
that he does not go.
It appears,

then, that the formula
0(p

> q)
provides
expressing sentences of
conditional obligation
which is immune to the
difficulties which arose

for any
of the other
symbolizations we have
considered.
Encouraged as we are by these
findings, it is difficult
to be

completely satisfied at
this point with 0
(p
may wonder what English
sentence provides an
translation of expressions
in the form 0
(p
we to read 0( P >
q) as asserting that g
factual conditional is
obligatory?

>

>

q

,

We

.

acceptable
q

)

Are

.

And if so, what does

that mean?

Moreover, how are we to
determine the truth
value of substitution instances
of 0 (p > q ? The syn _
tactic apparatus provided by
OS may show that certain inferences will not follow from
the formula 0(p >
But
q
it does not help us determine
whether or not those English
sentences which we believe express
true conditional obligations will be true when symbolized
in the form 0(p > q)
,

)

.

.
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in order to

0<P " q)

'

and P

tlCn ° f ° (P
we

—t

>

q)

confi™ our conclusion
about p ,
>
P-vide a m ore co mp l e te
by diS

—

Qq

evalua-

to these q uestions,

seek se.antic analyses
tor these for.al
egressions.

°
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standard deontic
logic discussed
tbus
or without temporal
restr-io+-Ctl ° ns and the
sterns within
“
we analysed alternative
conditional obligation
33 USlng StriCt
lmplica tion or a
subjunctive conditional, have all
been P
presented
esented as
** axiomatic
systems.
is noteworthy that
for several years
deontic logic
was viewed purely
syntactically.
The adequacy of an
axiomatic system was
tested by deriving
theorems from a
set of axioms,
translating those theorems
into sentences
°f English and
judging the intuitive
plausibility of
those sentences.
The difficulties
es of
ot thi=
this approach are
now well known. choice
of a set of axioms
is often
achieved merely by trial
and error.
Moreover, translatxons of formulas into
English often involve
ambiguous
expressions such as •'implies",
"requires", and "commits"
which make it difficult
to understand the
English sentences and thus to determine
how intuitively acceptable
their formal counterparts
are as principles of
deontic
logic.
'

.

For these reasons the
adaptation of the semantics
for alethic modal logic
provided by Kripke to deontic
logic has been a welcome advance.
Model theory provides
systematic way of interpreting
deontic formulas and
67
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jUd9in9 thSir

“^abUity

meanings.

based on their
assigned

in Ch ap ter II we
found that p
p

oq were unsati

;.igation

—^

and that 0(p

*

Oq, o(p

fo rmali2ations

„

q)

,

and

for condltional

appeared to be more
acceptable when analysed
in the syntactic
system OS. However
at is difficult
and perhaps impossible
to evaluate the

alize 0

(p

>

>

q

)

q), without any semantic
apparatus.

Por many
complex formulas of OS,
such as substitution
instances
of the proposed axioms,
it is difficult to
find a meaningful and understandable
translation into English
with
which to evaluate their
acceptability as axioms in
an
augmented deontic loaicc*
Anri without
And
g
any semantic apparatus we have no systematic
way of comparing alternative axiomatic bases.
Furthermore, to determine
the
truth value of instances of
0(p > q, we need a semantic
interpretation of that formula.
Thus it is essential
that we provide semantic
analyses for the formalizations
we are considering to confirm
the unacceptability of
P

Oq,

0 (p

ation of 0

=i>

(p

>

q)

and p

,

q)

>

oq, and to complete our evalu-

.

Jaakko Hintikka was one of the
first of several modal
logicians to present semantical
theories for deontic
logic.
Moreover, in "Some Main Problems of
Deontic Logic",
he addresses in particular what
he calls the problem

69

by the notion of
commitment.

That is, he asks
what can be me ant by
saying that a certaln
P commits one to acting
in a certain way,
1
q
The phrase "conditional
obligation" has often
been
used to refer to any
obligation arising from
any state
of affarrs, whether
that state of affairs
is an act or
-t. And the term
"cogent" usually refers in
particular to those
conditional obligations
which an agent
incurs based on his nror her own actions.
clearly. Hintikka
make use of this
conventional distinction,

^^
.

indeed, his description
of what he calls the
problem of
the notion of comment
indicates that his focus
is what
we would call the
problem of conditional
obligation.

Hintikka suggests that
his model theoretical
interpretation of deontic logic
shows that the traditional
formalizations in deontic logic
can be used to express
at least
some commitments or
conditional obligations
without being
paradoxical.
I shall argue
to the contrary that

0(p 3 q
and p 3 0 q are inappropriate
for expressing conditional
obligation or commitment sentences
even when interpreted
with Hintikka 's semantics.
However I go on to appeal to
his semantic interpretation
to complete the evaluation
° f P * °q
0( P - 1), p > Oq, and 0
(p > q) as symbolizations for conditional obligation
sentences.
'

)

.

FOr Hintikka

'

State

™ —t
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what is obligatory
or
permitted are taken to
be statements not
about what people
actually do or fail
'
Ut 3bOUt what they
do and should
.
a possible would
where an

.

oblivions

are fulfilled.

These expressions are
thus oounterf actual
and contain an
implicit reference to
alternative worlds.
The basic notion
in Hintikka
semantics for deontic
logic, then, is the

notion of a deontic
alternative to a given
world, a kind
of "deontically
perfect world". A deontically
perfect
alternative to a world,
the actual world, for
example, is
defined by Hintikka as a
world in which all
obligations
nmg in the actual world, as
well as
any further ob-

ligations obtaining in the
deontic alternatives, are
fulfilled.
Moreover, according to
Hintikka, whatever is permissible in the real world
obtains in a deontic alternative.
Since not all permissions
in the real world can
be made
use of in the same world,
(as when p and not-p are
both
permissible in the actual world),
we must consider more
than one deontic alternative
to a given world.
In particular, if w is a deontic
alternative to
2
Hintikka
pro-

poses the following conditions:
(i)

(ii)

dii)

If Op is true at w

If Op is true at w

(i)

then p is true at w
then p is true at w

2

2

If Op is true at
Wl then Op is true at w

We may focus on
imply

x

(ii)

and

(iii)

,

,

2

-

since taken together they

Furthermore, according to Hintikka,

)
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(iv)

(p p

i s true at w
=
1S a de °ntic
alternative to w 1 and
1
Ifi
ana
n
p is true at w.
i
1
op is true at w
3
3W
alternative to
and

L

and

(

V

)

(

^

Hintikka'

\

(

& ii

^
•

at

description of deontio
alternates as
deontically perfect
worlds is a orm
problematic
one and we
shall return to discus
uj-scuss it
more detail
ueraii.
However if we
suppose for the prespn-tpresent that we can
understand and use the
notron of a deontically
perfect alternative to
a world, we
SXamine Hintikka S
ttat a world theoretic
interpretatxon provides a
firm foundation for
traditional symbolizations for conditional
obligation.
s

+-

^

m
4

'

Hintikka makes a distinction
between logical consequence and deontic
consequence. „
q is a logicaln consequence
t'f P just in
case p s q noids,
holds that is, just
•

,

in case p and
-q are not both true,
whereas Mq is a aeontic
deontic consequence
on
Of P just in case
0(p =, q, holds, that is,
just in case
P and v q are not both true
in any deontically
perfect alternative.
Given this distinction,
it is clear that the
two candidates in standard
deontic logic (extended to
include mixed formulas) for
formulating commitments or con-

tional obligations,
(

and

57

)

(58)

o (p d q)
p

s Oq

are not equivalent.

Rather than focusing on one of
these, Hintikka believes it is an inescapable
conclusion that " our commonplace
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notion of commitment
is intrinsic!!
sically ambiguous
between
renderings" 2 and possibly
still others.
Thus he
maintains that sene
sentences expressing
and
conditional obligations
may be formalized
uslng Q(p _
while others are best
symbolized by p = 0q
He believes
semantic interDrpf^f
nn shows
u
P etation
the paradoxes of
derived obligation to
be "but particular
cases of the
Paradoxes of implication,
and hence devoid of
special
interest for a student of
deontic logic." 3

counts
.

i

According to Hintikka,
(59)

0(%p) ? 0 p

3

(

and

(60)

Op

d

0(q

=>

q)

p)

are indeed valid, however,

ss

s“

ecr worlds
the appearance of a paradox ic
considerably dimished.
in [59]
it is tniP +-o
say that P cannot be realized
i^ a deontlcluv
perfect world without realizing
not be so realized simpliciter? q because p can
cannot be realized in a deontically ?601 a
perfect world
without realizing p, for
has to be realized in
p
any such perfect world in the
first place
ThCs
the paradoxes' lose their
sting
" against our in*
d
realise ^hat
preSse^!? E ont lnsq ' AtprOTid
worst
we
have
a residnal feeimg
fill?
f
uai
of awkwardness
which can be traced
to the same sources as the
usual 'paradoxes'
*uoxes or
of
entailment (implication). 4
,

.

m

>

<

1

*

Similarly,
(61)

^p

g,

(p ^ oq)

is valid in Hintikka 's system.

Yet he claims that "what

creates the appearance of paradox here is
not so much the

,

.

73

* ,r

“9 “

_ th „

...

M

material implication
'" ..5 » - whatever the
motivation
or desiring a
stronger connective,
pra gma tic or otherwise, Hintikka
nevertheless clai ms that
there are many
deontic notions for
which n
n
p ^ Oq,
With material implication, serves well.
The world theory
interpretations Hintikka
gives for
(57) and (58) do
provide one way of
understanding those
formulas as well as
(59), ,60, and (61),
to be nonparadoxical.
However the interprotatinn
ui-erpretation *does not
tie
those formulas to any
,
ny concept
concent- of „
conditional obligation
or commitment,
And if (57) and ,53)
are to serve as
symbolizations for commitment,
then it seems guite
clear
that Hintikka can not
deny that by ,59, a
forbidden act
commits one to everything,
by (60) evervfht
y
everything commits one
to an obligatory act,
and by (61) the realization
,

of

whatever is not in fact
realized commits one to
everything.
And these are the paradoxes
Hintikka claims his interpretation avoids.
Hintikka 's interpretation
does show that
that interpretation the
relevant formulas are unproble-

—

matic.

Rut his interpretation alone
does not justify
using those formulas for
symbolizations of conditional
obligation or commitment.
In fact, given his interpretation,
it is difficult to understand
why ,57)

and

,58)

are even

likely candidates for symbolizations
of commitment.
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Moreover, Hintikka
b

C

's

semantic analysis
does not

thS deriVati ° n ° f

;°

; mUSt be invalld

fences

-

«

expressions of commitment.
„k
hen

P

‘

r

^

.

0,.
s

are to serve as

5 B,

.
p or
„
r if
lf „
p logically
°
implies Oq

l0giCally

both be true, then
p

<

we have discussed

«

P and .oq can not

r and .0q can not
both be true.

if q is a deontic
consequence of p,

deontic consequence of
P s r
not true in any
deontically

That is

.

then q is a

^

^

if p and

,

perfect world then
p s r and
-q can not be true in any
of those worlds.
Thus on
Hlntikka
view if either 57 or
58
is a symbolization
for commitment, then
if p commits one
(

)

(

)

to q, then P

commits one to q for any

q.

*

r

On his view changing
con-

ditions do not give rise
to changing commitments.
It is clear that Hintikka
's

interpretation, though it
may be helpful in assessing
the acceptability of
deontic
statements, does not alone
transform 57 and 58 into
(

)

(

)

satisfactory symbolizations for
commitment.
Hintikka himself notes in particular
that if p is forbidden then
in
such "unusual circumstances"
57
will
(

the purpose at hand.

)

not be useful for

For if p is forbidden „e can
not

have any way of determining what
p implies in a deontically
perfect world; since no transgressions
occur in deontically
perfect worlds, p can not occur in
such a world at all.
But surely it is not at all uncommon
for agents to do the
forbidden in the actual world. And we
have stressed that
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an adequate theory
of normative etnics
ethics will
will adirect agents
to act
certain ways
given their
y
th P ir 4transgressions.
9
These
directions, or contrary-to-duty
imperatives, are what
we
Should like our deontic
logic to be able to
express.

m

.

Whatever other deontic
notions
adequately, they will

(57)

and (58) may express

not do for expressions
of commitment or conditional
obligation, particularly
contrary-toduty obligations, even
when given Hintikka's
model theoretie interpretation.

Although Hintikka's semantic
analysis fails to transform 0(p = q) and
P = Oq into suitable
formalizations
for the sentences we
wish to symbolize,
nevertheless it
may help us evaluate
the other expressions
we have con-

sidered.

think it can be used to
confirm the conclusions of Chapter II that
p =* Og
o (v
n)
a *
I

t

4f

^

q)

,

and p

>

Oq can

not serve as the symbolizations
we desire.
First, we noted that any
conditional obligation sentence in the form p => Oq would
indicate a necessary connection between the condition
and the conditional obligation.
And since it seems clear that
factual conditions
can not entail normative
statements, p ^ Oq is a poor

symbolization for conditional obligation
sentences.
if
we apply the Kripke semantics
for alethic modal logic and
Hintikka's semantics for deontic formulas
according to
which

,
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(62)

“

op is true at
w.
deontic al ternaf
feet world

the m ° St natUral

-

“»

For consider
(63)
a

D

=

^

/J

i

Q

true at every
.

P“confirm these'results

Oq o 00q

formula in our system
Y tern OT
OT.

Ana suppose
And
we are evaluatmg this formula with
respect to „
cne real world
the
r
ThSn WS mi9ht haVe
0q
-t
thus q true at ail
c alternatives
to the real world,
although Doq
1S falSe
31
F ° r an valuation
of Ooq presumably
requires determining the
truth value of Oq at
every
world which is an
alternative to „
And even^thou^h
r
q
1S trUS 3t 311 dSOntlc
alternatives to w
there is no
f
ce that q will be
true at all deontic
alternatives
to every alternative
of the real world.
Thus

—

,

V

V

_

,

if

is an alternative
to „

r

^

w

"
then q may be true at
all the

,

deontic alternatives of „

r

but false at some
deontically

perfect world with respect
to w
Since (63) will not hold,
then even if 0 g is true,
we will not always be
able to affirm
(3 0)

For

p

Oq.

can be interpreted as saying
that in all worlds
if P is true at w. then
"iOq is true at w., that is,
q
is true at all deontically
perfect worlds with respect
to w
r But as we have seen, even if Oq is true at the
(30)

—
77

deontic al ternatives
to

a

given world

not foiiow that
q h ° ids

r£*3*
5

-

alternative where
p holds.

Wl and "

lhSn

«

" Wl 15

^

^^^--2

altSrnati

^

?

alternatives
Thus if p ig

-

^

where p is true

-ontie alternatives of
w
but false at some
1
deontically
Y perform
P rfect world with
respect
to w

^

.

2

x ample,

it may be that
in

W;L Smith has received a
manuscript from lores
and W rites lores
promising to return
Xt
PreSUmably
ought to return it,
“l
and
so in deontically
perfect worlds with
respect to w
Smith sends the manuscript
bach to Jones.
It also'may be
that in w . Smith,
believing that he has
2
'

^

-

,

been sent the
manuscript, writes to Jones
promising to return it.
However suppose that in
w Smith never did have
2
the manuscript;
Jones still has the paper.
Then there is no reason
to
believe that Smith keeps
his promise in the
deontic alternatives to w , and thus
ought to return the manuscript
2
in
w
even
though
he has made the promise
2
in
Presumably
it is physically
impossible for him to return
the manuscript in the deontic
alternatives of w
And although
2
Hintikka does not specify all
the relevant details
,

*

about

deontically perfect alternatives,
it is plausible to assume that in such worlds
agents do not perform acts they
are physically unable to
perform.
But more generally, in
this case failure to keep the
promise
does not appear to
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be at all incompatible
with deontic perfection.
Hence
we can not conclude
that Smith keeps the
promise i„ all
the deontic alternatives
of w 6
2

With respect to 0 (n
(P

*
-*»

rr\
q)

'

'

a semantic analysis
using

the Kripke semantics
for
tor strictstrict implication
and Hintikka's
eontic semantics in
the most obvious way
shows that
0(P ** q> iS true at the
-rid just in case
p * q is
true at all the
deontically perfect worlds
with respect
w
But
P * q is true in some
r
deontic alternative to
Say ' ^st in case
-X
p . q is true in all the
alternatives to w
if
we
.
assume
we aj e evaluat ng the
x
formula
in S
so that every world
is an alternative to
5
every other
world, and agree that
deontic alternatives are
possible
worlds, then 0(p
* q is true just in case p a q is true
every world, that is,
just in case p =>
q holds.
And
surely any symbolization
for any type of obligation
sentence, conditional or
otherwise, which implies Op 5
p is
unacceptable.
•

f

n

.

.

V

.

.

,

And finally, when we consider
p
tion we again confirm our
conclusion
table.

For when we interpret
p
Hintikka-type semantics for the

>

>

Oq as our formaliza-

that it is unaccep-

Oq using the basic

deontic operator o and

Stalnaker's semantics for the
subjunctive conditional, we
find that there are many conditional
obligation
sentences

we believe to be true that we
can not express formally as
true sentences.
For applying Stalnaker's semantics
first,
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to evaluate the
truth value of
p > 0q (assuming
p is
possible)
we must consider
the woria ciQsest

—

,

1

"

t0 the aCtUal

’

IT
-true,

ana if not,
P

^

^

*1

and

0qisfalse
In order to evaluate the truth of Og
at w, we must again
appeal to the
assigning truth values
to deontic formulas
according to which Op
is true at a world
just in case
p
true at every deontic
alternative to that world.
Then
Oq will be trnp
t?
he
world most similar to
1'
the
real world where
p is true,
trnp just
P
case q is true at all
the deontic alternatives
of w
>

.

-

,

i

m
•

.

But we can see that,
for example, „ e can
not express
a true conditional
obligation for an agent
to repent if
he sms.
For if „ e let s > or
express Smith's conditional

obligation to repent if he
sins, then this expression
can
never be true. We must
first consider the possible
world
most similar to the actual
world in which Smith sins,
and
then determine whether or
not Smith repents in all
the
deontic alternatives to that
closest world in which he sins.
When we do this we inescapably
face some of the dif-

ficulties of the standard
Hintikka-type deontic semantics.
We might wonder, for example,
whether Smith will even
exist in the deontic alternatives
to the real world.

Ap-

parently on Hintikka's analysis if
Smith has any obligations
at all then he will exist in
deontic alternatives to
see to

.
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their fulfillment.

„

.

fl U6d

^

That isS

.

911 the

'

if n
lf
° P 13 true then
p is ful _

alternatives.

Hence i f ful .
of P entails Smith's
existence then Smith
will
exrst in all the
deontic alternatives.
Nevertheless, we
might ask whether
Smith exists in those
alternatives as
the same type of
person as he 1iss ln
in the actual
world.
if,
in the real world,
he is fho
the type of person
who never
makes reparation for nacf
Past injustices, will
this be compatible with deontic
idealitv"?
YSuppose we imagine that
the deontic semantics
are restricted (although
present!,
they are not)
such a way that Smith
exists in deontic
alternatives as much like
himself as is consistent
with
the deontic ideality of
those worlds.
t

m

.

m

Then, given that on the
deontic semantic analysis
we
are utilising the
deontic alternatives are
"deontically
perfect worlds" with respect
to the world where
Smith sins,
it is clear that it
is not true at all those
worlds that
Smith repents.
indeed. Smith does not
sin or repent at
any of those deontically
perfect worlds. Thus s > Or
is
false in this example 7
.

And p

>

Oq will be false given
Stalnaker's and Hin-

tikka's semantic interpretations
whenever the conditional
obligation is incompatible with
deontic ideality. Thus in

Chisholm's puzzle we may express
an agent's conditional
obligation to tell his neighbors he
is coming given that
he goes to their assistance,
but we can not express his
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Given the semantical
interpretations
that we have been
considerinq,

ays be false.

rSleVant

—

that formula

The agent does not
fail to tell in

ization we proposed
on page
font sentences as
formally

ives.

„

And hence the symbol-

presgnted

consistent and independent,
but
not all true when
analyzed
usinn these semantic
y
using

Wlth

theories.
It has often been
pointed out that a major
difficulty

semantics for the counterf
actual conditional is the problem
of determining a
similarity ordering of possible worlds
in order to establish
the closest
world in which the condition
holds.
However the problem
we have just discussed
does not turn on the
ambiguity of
the similarity relation.
Rather, the basic deontic
world
theory analysis, with its
appeal to deontically
perfect
alternatives, is at fault. We
must conclude that
p > 0q
is unsatisfactory as an
expression for conditional obligation statements if it is
interpreted semantically as
above.
And we have seen that given
Stalnaker’s axiomatic
system for the subjunctive
conditional it is formally
inadequate as well.

Given Hintikka's deontic interpretation
we have been
able to reaffirm our view that
p =* Oq, 0(p =* q)
and p > Oq
can not serve as acceptable
formalizations for conditional
,
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obligations.

However, 0 (n
(P

>

similar formal
difficulties.

Jiysis Coates

ro
q)

18 not susceptible
to

Nevertheless. semantic

that there are ob
ecUons
<p > q) as our formal
expression as well.
First if we again
apply
ne semanfi’n
y the
sem antic analysis
proVided by Stalnaker
for > and Hintikka's
semantics for o,
lf P 1S trUS ln S °
me World and
q is also true in that
world, then the
subjunctive conditional
statement p >
is true in that
world
Thnc lf P an d
Thus
q are both true in
the deontic alternatives
with respect to some
given world,
then 0 (p > q) is true
in that world.
it appears, then,
that on this analysis
too much will be
conditionally
obligatory.

^

.

,

_

•

-p

It might be replied
that if P and
q are both true in

the deontic alternatives
to some world, then
given the
nature of these alternatives,
p and q are both consistent
with deontic perfection
and hence the truth of
o(p > q
for such states of affairs
is unobjectionable.
Nevertheless, it must be admitted
that 0(p > q win the n
express
true conditional obligation
statements between unobjectionable but also sometimes
unrelated states of affairs.
A second and much more
serious difficulty is that we
can find examples which show
that given these semantic
analyses for > and 0, conditional
obligation sentences
symbolized by 0(p > q) may turn out
to be false when we
believe them to be true. For
example, suppose s stands for
)

,
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Srnith sins"

and
fnr
1U r ror

"cm-ij-u
Smith

repents''
pents

analysis we would symbolic
Smith
to repent if he
sins by
0 ,s

value of 0(s

>

r)

>

r,

.

,

s

*

°n j_u
the proposed

conditional
To evaluate

thfi

we must determine
whether or not

^
s

>

r

the counter factual
conditional within the scope
of the
deontic operator, holds
at all the deontic
alternatives
to the actual world.
At this point the semantic
analysis
gets more complicated.
For according to an
extended
version of Stalnaker's
semantics for the subjunctive
conditional, s > r is true
at some deontic alternative
to the real world,
say, just in case the
consequent r
IS true at the world
most similar to
Wl where the antecedent s holds.
Thus we must determine the
truth of r at
worlds most similar to deontic
alternatives of the real
world.
Let us again assume that Smith
exists in the deontic
alternatives to the actual world
as much like himself as
is consistent with the deontic
ideality of those worlds.

Then clearly in the deontic
alternatives to the actual
world he neither sins nor repents.
Neither is compatible
with deontic perfection.
But then what reason do we have
or could we have for believing
that in those worlds most
similar to the deontic alternatives (of
the real world)

m

which he does sin that he repents?

We might be tempted

to conclude that the worlds most
similar to deontically

ideal alternatives in which he does sin are
deontically

— ~'
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perfect except for his
sinning (and any
other

Yhi

6

bSSt W ° rldS in Which

^

sins, and conclude
that

m

those worlds Smith
does repent for his
sins.
However
that conclusion is
clearly unjustified,
for it is tantam ° Unt
aSSUmPti0n that similarity
is measured with
respect to goodness, and
of course such *an
assumption can
not be made.

^ “

It seems just as
reasonable to conclude
that Smith
does not repent in the
worlds most similar to
the deon-

tically ideal alternatives
where he sins.
as a deontic
alternative to

For suppose w
'

the real world.

Then Smith
neither sins nor repents
in
Hence a world w, in
which Smith sins and
repents may be less similar
to w
than a world „ „hi ch
is just like
3
except that
sins and does not repent
there.
In any

^

^

case we have no

clear way of determining
which of „
lar to w

2

and w
3

is more simi-

we can not merely count
the number of properties that each of „ and
« has in common with w^
2
3
since
in both cases the number
will be infinite.
And any intuitive argument that one of «
or „ is more similar to
2
3
than the other will apparently
appeal to features about
Smith as he exists in deontic
alternatives that are left
2

.

undetermined by Hintikka's deontic semantics.
Hence we
are not justified in concluding
that the semantics guarantees that Smith repents in all
worlds most similar to
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deontic alternatives
where he sins
sms. And
a a
without this
we oan not assert
the truth ° f ° <s
>
it
USi
the
-antics for the obligaion operator and
the subjunctive
conditional.
Clearly, an appli
cation of these
to evaluate instances
of formula 0(
P > q requires two
world relativizations
and is extremely
cumbersome.
it
alS °' beCaUSS ° f thS
a
of the similarity
relation required for
the interpretation
on of the
•

rr

—

—

-

,

"

^uity

the count erf actual

conditional, diffipnit
some instances of o,p

+-~

>

q,

etermme the truth value
.

.

But it seems clear

of

^^^

least some cases, a
conditional obligation
sentence will
be true although its
formal counterpart as
an instance of
°(p > q) will be false.

our discussions in
this chapter have forced
us to face
some of the difficulties
of Hintikka's deontically
perfect
world semantics. What is
deontic perfection? Can
we make
sense of the notion? Is
it even a consistent
concept as
used in Hintikka's theory?
Apparently not. Hintikka
tells us that all obligations
of the real world will be
fulfilled in its deontically
perfect alternatives. But
then how can "good Samaritan"
obligations to help criminals,
for example, be fulfilled
in deontic alternatives
if

people always behave as they
ought in those worlds? Furthermore, we may ask who is in
these worlds? will each deontic
alternative of a given world have
the same inhabitants?

.
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WiU inhabUantS

°f

Pe^ect alternatives be
the same type of
people as they are in
the given world.
Htntrtha gives us little
information for answering
these

questions

Moreover, as we have
clearly emphasized,
an analysis
Of deontrc alternatives
as deontically
perfect is blatantly
inappropriate for an analysis
of those conditional
obligations which are
contrary-to-duty
For example, Smith
.

gation to repair the harm
done.
can be given of
obligations

Yet no account at all

to make reparation
using

Hintikka's deontically
perfect world semantics;
acts of
reparation are not fulfilled
in deontically perfect
alternatives and so on his
analysis are not obligatory.
Since a major aim of our
project is to provide a
symbolization and analysis which
can account for
contrary-to-duty
obligations, we must revise
Hintikka's deontic semantics.
One natural revision, which
has been suggested by
F011esdal and Hilpinnen 8 and
by Bengt Hansson, 9 is
(roughly)

to maintain the same
interpretation as Hintikka’s
for formulas of the form
Op, but to introduce a new
dyadic
obligation operator, 0(p/r)
for conditional
,

obligation

sentences.

According to F011esdal and Hilpinnen,
0(p/r)

means that p is true in all
(possible) worlds in which
IS true,

r

and which resemble deontically
perfect worlds as

much as possible." 10
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First, all of the
difficulties which arise
for
Hintihha.s theory of
unconditional o b lr gat ion
will retain
problems on this intpmrof
interpretation.
For
'-’i
ex^mnio
example there will
consistent way of
maintaining that there
can be
•'good Samaritan.,
obligations to those who
have committed
morally forbidden acts.
•

Second

if the notion of
a deontically
perfect world
is problematic and
vague
gue, then the
4.
-hho notion
of an "almost
,

•

deontically perfect" world
is even less helpful.
An extension of Hintikka s
semantics in this way is
not as
easily managed as
Frfllesdal, Hilpinnen, and
Hansson would
have us believe.
How are we to understand
the description
that these deontic
alternatives "resemble
deontically perfect worlds as much as
possible" except
'

for the truth of

the condition?

How extensively will these
worlds alf£er
the given world and from
deontically perfect worlds?
What will these worlds be
like? To emphasize the
difficulties of this proposed extension
of Hintikka’
s

semantics,

let us consider the following
example.

Suppose Smith has a conditional
obligation to buy his
wife some medicine since he has
lost her full medicine
bottle.
Suppose also that he has promised
to buy a friend
a book and so has a
conditional obligation

to buy the book.

Let us suppose further that he
does not have enough money
to buy both the medicine and
the book, although he can buy
one or the other.
Since he cannot fulfill both conditional
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obligations we may wish
to deny that he
has both conditional obligations.
But presumably we
would want
hS d ° eS

^^

to say

1SaSt

conditional obligations.
Perhaps the obligation
to replace the
lost medicine,
-nee it would provide the
most utility, or be
the most
stringent Prima facie
duty, or whatever

“"a 1

thSOry ” e

(depending on the

Yet if we extend
Hintikka's
theory to apply to
conditional obligations
as proposed
above, then Smith has
this conditional
obligation gust in
case he buys the medicine
in all those deontic
alternatives
which are deontically
perfect except for his
loss of the
medicine and any other
changes required by that
loss.
Is fulfillment of that
conditional obligation even

compatible with the degree
of deontic perfection
in those
worlds? if „ e answer no,
on the grounds that Smith
must then break his promise
and
not buy the book, then we

appear to have a counterexample
against the proposal.
Thus advocates of the proposal
will have to argue that
buying the medicine is compatible
with the deontic perfection
these alternatives. But how
can a proponent of
this view support such an
argument?

m

He might first say that Smith
is richer in the rele

vant alternatives and so can buy
both the book and the
medicine.
However it seems implausible that
anything in
the vague description of these
deontic alternatives as

deontically perfect except for the loss of
the medicine
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assures us that

th-ic

„

SO.

gestion made earlier
that

Even if we adopted
the

s

Hinti^s

semantics be supple _
merited with the
assumption that the
agent exists i n the
de ° ntlC alternatives
••
Uta himself as is consistent

”

thS reqU1SltS deont

-

ideality, it seems
implausible
that we could be
assured that Smith
would be richer in
the deontic alternatives
merely because he has
also
promised the friend to
buy him a book.

Second, a proponent
might argue that Smith
never
makes the promise to
buy the book in the
deontic alternathus It IS compatible
in the almost-deontically
perfect worlds for him to hnv
^
t0 bUY the m edicme.
But on what
grounds can he claim Smith
never makes *.u
the promise in the
deontic alternatives?
Making the promise is not
incompatible with deontic
perfection.
it is fulfillment of
the
promise that is incompatible
with fu lfillment of the
conditional obligation to buy
the medicine.
And if the advocate gives this as a reason
to claim that Smith never
makes the promise in the
relevant alternatives he is ap•

.

pealing to a characterization
of the deontic alternatives
not only modified to accomodate
the truth of the condition,
but also tailored in terms
of what insures that fulfillment of the conditional obligation
is compatible with the
near-deontic perfection of the
alternatives.
However since
the semantic analysis directs
us to determine the truth of
a

conditional obligation based on whether
or not it is
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fulfilled in all the
deontic alternatives
then to be noncircular we need a clear
characterization of those
alternatives independently
of whatever is
compatible with ful _
f lllment of the
obligation.
our example shows that
the modification in
Hintikka's
semantics appealing to
..nearly deontically
perfect worlds"
presented above is much
more problematic than
it appears
way of determining
whether or not in the
case just described
Smith buys the medicine
in all those
orlds in which he loses
the medicine and which
are otherwise as deontically perfect
as possible.
The concept of
an almost-perfect
deontic alternative is too
vague to
provide an adequate foundation
for an analysis of conditional obligation.

David Lewis has proposed a
deontic semantics which
differs from Hintikka’s more
radically than the proposal
we have just discussed and
thus it may be more plausible 11
He abandons the notion of
deontically perfect worlds altogether.
Lewis' semantic insight is
to evaluate a formula
Op at a world by reference
to deontic alternatives, but
to characterize deontic
alternatives differently.
On his
view we imagine that the deontic
alternatives of a world
can be ranked according to some
unspecified moral principle or set of moral principles.
Then a formula Op will be
true just in case p is true at the
"best" deontic alternatives.
Lewis also proposes a dyadic obligation
primitive
.
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for conditional
obligation, accompanied
fcy a
analysts in terms of
-best- worlds.
This type of sug _
gestion will be
teleological

^
^
- *
^' “ — ^

WU1

7

t

defin

° f g00d

—

of goodness

^

,

although

independently

9 tness, may be left
undetermined in the formal

analysis.

This approach, with
an

^

^

than "deontically
perfect-"
ect unri^
P
worlds may provide a
more
plausible framework within
which
wnicn to analyze
conditional
obligations in general
and especially
PeciaUy contrary- to-duty
12
obligations
.

.

Let us pause at this
point to clarify the
notion of
conditional obligation we
are attempting to
analyze.
Our
work thus far has shown
that we are focusing
on a concept
for which (i) there is
a non-trivial connection
between

conditional obligations and
their conditions; on our
view
it will not follow that
everything or nothing is conditionally obligatory, (ii)
conditional obligations may no
longer hold if overriding
conditions
hold,

(iii)

further

conditions may reinstate (and
override again, etc.) the
original conditional obligation,
<iv) truth of the condition alone does not justify
detachment of an unconditional
obligation from a conditional one,
(v) contrary-to-duty
obligations are a type of conditional
obligation, and (vi)
sentences in the form of Chisholm's
four sentences, where

the second and third are both
taken to be conditional

.
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obligation sentences,
may
* be trulv
truJ-Y/ consistently
and
independently expressed

™

•

at the same time.

».
"

lB tll< ch>pi>r

““

connective alone can not
transform either 0
(p = q) or
P = ° q into an expression
for a notion of
conditional obligation which satisfies
br ies the above
conditions
Lons
n- appears,
.
It
then, that we must
develoo
ew obligation
P a
operator for
our concept of
conditional obligation.
*

•

interestingly, David Lewis'
proposal satisfies many
of the above conditions.
Nevertheless, satisfaction
of
the six conditions above
does not narrow down
a notion of
conditional obligation
sufficiently. For Lewis
explicitly
presents his analysis of
conditional obligation as
an
analysis of a conditional
ought-to-be. Yet even if
it
2iHht to be that there is no illness
in the world, it may
be that no individual
oucfht to do anything in
particular
to see to it that there
is no illness in the
world.

Our hope is to develop a
symbolization and analysis
for a concept which satisfies
the six conditions above
(and perhaps others) and
which is, moreover, a conditional
ought-to-do, as opposed to a
conditional ought-to-be 13
There may be other concepts of
conditional obligation sat
isfying different conditions from
those specified above.
However I believe that we have
intuitions about a concept

-
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WhlCh dOSS SatiSfy
311 th °- conditions
and that it is
£2- concept which is most
important for normatlve
in Chapter IV we
shall car.ft.Uy
explain and evaluate
S
the ° ry WhlCh sat
isf ies so many of
the conditions
have focused upon,
although it t'provides
v l ueb an
ana!
analysis
of
a concept of
conditional ought-to-be.

^

'

•
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namely
mely f-ha-tthat formulas of
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deontic alternatives
of that world.
However L ewis proposes a novel
interpretation of deontic
alternatives.
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assumes that deontic
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world may be
ed based on their
comparative goodness. 1
H e says.
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of accessibility
around w 113 that ° f " bein

Th e aaccessibility
„
The
relation
9 evaluable from
.
„ deontic
.
Thus
nus the
al-natives may be viewed
as part of a
system of spheres
O
evaluability each
world or deontic
alternative in the
SPhSreS
or ranked by the
unspecified Standards of
evaluation that ive
g
rise to the
ordering from the
standpoint of »
Tf the preference
ordering
the standpoint of
w
13 3
'
° rdering
that is
reflexive, transitive
and °° nneCted ' the
" a
*2 i- tetter than a world^
th respect to W]
3
gust in case some
sphere contains w
but not w
The idea is that
3
spheres closer to the
center
of the system contain
worlds that are better,
or are
ranked higher, with
respect to the preference
ordering.
.

.

;

^ ^^

-

—

r

fL

^

'

™

'

-

_

.

Moreover, worlds which
differ only in respects
which are
wholly irrelevant to
their comparative
goodness, or for
which relevant differences
are balanced out, will
be tied
'n thS Preference
ordering, and thus will
occupy comparable positions in the
system of spheres.

Given this description,
we might be tempted to
view
the system of spheres as
centered or weakly centered.

Centering means that for each
world i,
SPh re around i; and that would
LL\\*\
mean that each world is, from
its own
standpoint, the best of all
possible
w ? ak centering means that
each
world i belongs
to the innermost nonempty
sphere around i; and that would
mean now

\

o
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that each world
° Wn stand ~
Point, at least
° ne of
one
of^h^K
th e best worlds 3
i

.

But, Lewis
correctly notes,
it is quite cle^rWhat
reason) is the
source of °“ r ref (wit hin
ordering, that ours
P
erence
f, f
one of the best
"® 31 belng
possible worlds

Thus the system
of spheres has a
n C °" Parative
°
goodness
will not be
h centered
or weakly centered.
Lewis suggests that
it
tUral to impose a
normali
con ltion on the
system of spheres.
That
lclt:
is we may
ls
w 0 u to grant
that some world is
evaluable from every
world, or, more
clearly, that every
world is such that
some world is
evaluable from it.
This condition is
reasoni <=

,-

.

/

tron does not hold
nothing is obligatory
and everything
IS permitted.

Lewis leaves open the
question of whether or
not to
condition of universality
which specifies that
every
world is evaluable from
every other world,
xf we impose
universality then we abandon
evaluability restrictions.
Similarly, Lewis leaves
open the question of
whether
or not to accept
absoluteness.
if absoluteness does
hold,
then whatever relation
there is between two worlds
with
respect to one world, holds
between them with respect
to
any other world.
That is, the relative
goodness of

v
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eoritic

„„ v „,

vllJ

Wl11 bS abS ° 1Ute;

SamS PrSferenCe
world.

^

io

m

alternatives will have
the
th. standpoint 0 f
ever,

~

As Lewis points muout, an ordering
of worlds accordthe amount of utiuty
in the w ° rid wui
6
S Same fr ° m the
StandP ° int
«ny world.
However an
ordering b ased, for
example, on the extent
the inhabitants
° 3 “° rld ° bSy thS
laWS ° f ^e ruling
god in the given
world will differ from
the standpoint of
different worlds
with different gods.

rr

It is an asset of
Lewis'

semantic analysis for
obligation statements that
the criterion used for
ranking
the deontic alternatives
is left unspecified.
However if
we assume that whatever
criterion is used will be
an objective moral standard of
some kind, then it will
be reasonable to accept both
universality and absoluteness.
Nevertheless, Lewis' formal
theory does not commit us
to
doing so.

Lewis explicitly states that
he is proposing an analySis of obligation as what
ought-to-be the case.

Obligation is here used in a
special
impersonal sense. What is obligatory
(conditionally or unconditionally)
what ought to be the case, whether is
or
not anyone in particular is
obligated
to see to it.
Personal obligations
may or may not follow from these
impersonal obligations 5
.

'

'

.
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One formulation of
Lewis' theory about
what ought
to be the case is:
(64)

Op

(read "it is obligatory
that
P") is true at w
e
1

(3w

}

(

w

j

&

is evaluable from

j

the standpoint of w.)
ii) p holds at
all worlds that
are best from the
standpoint
of w.
.

i

This interpretation,
however, can only be
applied if
Lewis' Limit assumption
holds, that is, if
there is an
innermost nonempty sphere
relative to each world
containing all the worlds which
are best from the
standpoint of
that world,
and Lewis is careful to
explain that we can
not assume that the Limit
Assumption does hold.
"
We
might have an infinite ascent
to better and better
worlds,
and no innermost sphere
containing best worlds of all.
For every world there would
be a sphere small enough
to
exclude it, so the intersection
of all nonempty spheres
would be empty.
Thus, if there are no best
worlds with respect to
W
but rather an infinite ascent
i'
to better and better
worlds, then Lewis proposes
(65)

Op is true at w
i)

(

3 Wj

)

(Wj

.

i

E

is evaluable from

)

.
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the standpoint
of w.)
ii) P holds
throughout all worlds
which are sufficiently
good
from the standpoint
of w

&

.

We might rephrase
the second clause
more perspicuously
and have

Op is true at w. =
B w j {(Wj is evaluable
from
the standpoint of
w.) &

(66)

(

)

<V

(»

is at least tis
good as w

k

from the standpoint
of w.
is
true at w )]
P

=>

R

For conditional
obligation sentences (also
about
at ought to be the case)
of the form "Given
that p, it
ought to be the case that
g,
(which I shall symbolize
P
Lewis provides an analysis
q)
of a deontic primitive
analogous to ,64) which
depends on the Limit Assumption-

«

,

(67)

p

w

q is true at w.

i)

M3w.)
w

or ii)

(

3w

)

(w_.

^

w

is evaluable from

(w.

P is true at w

s

i

=

l

.

is evaluable from

P is true at w
& q
holds at all the worlds where
p holds which are best from
the standpoint of w
i

&

.

)

.

l

And we might reformulate
our reformulation of (64).

(67)

Thus

in a manner similar to

)

)
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(68)

p o* q is true at w
1)

M3w.)
w

or 11

)

(

Wj

is evaluable
from

&

P is true at w
(3w.) (< Wj is evaluable
i

.

p is true at

at
2

v

s

from

<v

<w

is

k
as good as w
from the
standpoint of
s p i s true
at w D 5 is tr
ue at w
l
k
i
least

R

)

If we assume that
since we are assessing
moral ob-

lation, universality and
absoluteness do hold and
hence
every

world is evaluable
from every other world,
and the
relative ranking of
worlds will be the
same frQm
point of every world,
then we may restate
(66) and

^

(68)

as

(69)

Op is true

(3w i
Wj

(

w

i

^

D

true at w
&
W
s at least as
good as
j
is
true at w^)J
P
)

[ (p

is

)

'‘

and

(70)

p <> q is true
i)

°r

^(3w.)

n) (3w
i

=

(p

is true at w.

)

{ (p is true at v^) &
(w^) (v\^ is at least
as good
)

P is true at w, ^ q

It is readily apparent that
if

(70)

is

as w.

true at

&

wj

j

is our analysis of

conditional obligation then any
impossible condition yields
a conditional obligation
to anything.
We may recall
that

)
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the same result
followed for not
°)
P => °q (cf p. 39)
and for (40}
s ~
<PP- 51-52).
Lewis is well aware
of
th 1S rSSUlt and
18 not sure
whether an impossible
conditfgn generates
all or no conditional
obligations.
Thus
“ PrSSentS tW ° C °
nditi0nal
analyses from which
e m ay choose.
Hl? alternativg
primitive
'

.

'

,

.

'

^

igation sentences has
an analysis exactly
Uke (70)
except that the
conditional obligation
sentence is false
rather than true whenever
n
o
s
P
impossible no matter
what
i find the
q is.
latter Preferable
prefershio
•

i

(see p.
i

51)

and so

shall focus on Lewis'
alternaf-}v
alternativeQ primitive,
namely,
•

•

(71)

p a? q is true

•

=

(^Wi) {

is true at w.
i
q is true at w.) &
(

w

Wj
i

^

(p

&

W

at least as good as
P is true at w. ^
is
j

&

true at w.)

q

]

.

This proposal of Lewis'
for conditional obligation
sentences is a particularly
plausible one for several
reasons.
First, even if p <*<j, it
will not generally follow that p & ro»q.
That is, even if there is
a world
where p and q hold such that
all equally or higher ranked
worlds are such that both
p and q hold in them, there is
no guarantee that there will
be a world where p s r and
q hold and for which p s r and
q all hold in all equally
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——

good or better
worlds
-lxus.

T+it
may be hp=;f

" t0 h ° ld

When
but not when bofch
p & f
second, p cte>q i s
a primitive
a nd is not
defined in
the
operator.
Thus
rUlSS f ° r faCtUal
of unconditional
obligat
a
° m COndlti ° nal
°n
we need
accept a principle
jus ti fy i ng tactual
detac hme nt ot
an unconditional
oblivion based on the
truth of the
condition alonp
T
would be appealing
if we could prQ _
pose some rule for
relating conditional
and unconditional
obligations but we may
one; no such
is imposed by the
semantic analysis.
P does,

^

^

IT

^

I

- --

+-

,

For this reason a
symbolization of Chisholm's
sentences (interpreted
as sentences about
what ought to be
the case) as
(la)

Og

(2f

)

g

)

o.g

(4a)

%g

(

and

3f

t

0=^ t
.

where the second and
third formalizations are
interpreted
according to 71
is appealing.
We might think that it
is better for the
agent to go and tell than
merely to go to
aid his neighbors, and
hence believe that if there
is a
world where he goes such
that he goes in all better
worlds.
(

)

/
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then surely there iq

=

t7/^

,

,

^

^

WherS
9063
tell. such
that he goes and
tells in all worlds
at least
CaSt aS
as gOOd.
a
rpV» no
•

nothing in the formal

settles

assures us of this
The
1Catl ° n dSPendS ° n
the P-ticular
criterion of goodness used fnr ^ „
*"» »i.
J-y left
unspecified.

"P

.

•

1

3

'

eVSn

"

therS

"

3 W ° rld Where
thS

--

to
help
his neighbors which
P I"
is such that he
also goes in
all worlds as central
or more central
in the system of
spheres, there is no
assurance
ranee that th
there will be a world

9068 and tSllS

that world.

^

Nor

311

win

“

within the sphere
containing
it follow that there
is a world

where he neither goes
nor tells such that
he neither
goes nor tells in all
equally or higher ranked
worlds.
And the fact that he
goes to help them in
the real world
implies nothing whatsoever
about what happens in
better
worlds.
The four formalisations
are truly independent
on
this formal analysis.
But is the symbolization
proposed above consistent?
We might be tempted to
conclude that from a conditional
obligation for q given
p that we can detach an obligation
for q.
For we might think that if
there is a world where
both p and q are true such
that in all equally good or
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-

b6tter worUs
P and g

then there is
surely a
6qU

good or better worlds
taken

—

But th 3

f

W ° rldS WhSre
P

Y

rSaS ° ning wou ld
be mis-

^

alS ° tr -'
be even better
b
worlds where d 13
? is not
and neither is
*3*
Thus q 34 t dooc
nGt yiSld 0t
-9
M: yield
0(%t)

***

*.

<

•

.

,

-

.

We have already
noted that truth of
the condition is
Lewis’ view for
detachment of an uncondilonal obligation.
Thus ,4a, and ,3f,
do not yield 0,v
t
,

mg

in a certain order

'

ind-io^+-^
lndlCate

nothing whatsoever
about

how worlds in which
he rails
fails to ftell
0 n (whether
u
or not he
goes) appear in the
ordering.
,

Thus even if

(la)

and

(2f)

together yield Ot we will

not have the inconsistency
noted by Chisholm.
Nevertheless it is interesting
to ask whether or not
(la, and
<2f> do, on this view,
lead to ot.
Suppose there is a
world where the man goes
to help his neighbors
such that
goes in all worlds at least
as good.
And suppose
further that there is a world
in which he goes and
tells
such that he tells in all
equally good or better worlds
in which he goes.
Then it follows that there
is a point
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_^^

at which equally
or higher ranked
Morlds
that he tells an
them.
Thus we apparently
can aff irm a

eontic detachment
principle
(

72

)

p

^q

Op
Oq

usinq Lewis' analysis.

And even with this

principle we have found
that Chisholm's
sentences are not
inconsistent given the
formalisations above.
Another nice feature of
Lewis' proposal is
that we
can compare deontic
alternatives. Clearly
proposals which
classified all deontic
alternatives as deontically
perfect,
or Which distinguished
perfect and near-perfect
alternatives, were found to be
inadequate. As Lewis says,
*
di vision of worlds
;
d
ideal
and less-than-ideal will into the
not meet
our needs. We must use
more complicated
value structures that somehow
bear informatron^bout comparisons or
gradations of
•

*

In our example from pages
87-90 we could not determine
whether or not Smith bought a
new bottle of medicine

for his wife in all deontic
alternatives which were

deontically ideal except for his loss
of the medicine
(and other changes required by
the loss).

However, on

Lewis' view, we need not determine
whether or not certain

108

“

tates of affairs
are compatible with
° me Va 9 ue
™ount
of d„o
deontic perfection.
Rather
ner, we can
consider al

~I

1

—- —
*
“ WhlCh ^

and ha

l

-

-s

^ ^ ^end

^

thS m0neY t0

the medicine

^

the booh

mediClne and thS b
°° k
Th
C ° nditl
al obligation
to buy the
medicine if
he
e b uys rt rn
those alternatives
in which

JT

he has

-

are SUffiCient

^

-

—-

-

he loses it and

H°mE££ative ranking of
An d this ranking
is determined
only
when we
iffiSsanS^ superimpose a definite
principle or
set of principles
for ordering the
deontic alternatives.
^ ^ seems clear,
t_
then fhatthat Lewis
Proposal is superfor to others we
have examined.
But it is appropriate
to
ma 6
eValuati ''e comments and
also to analyze two
recent criticisms of
Lewis' theory of
conditional oblige-

I"
eontic

alternatives.

•

'

.

tion.

In Chapter III we notpd -v-ua-inoted that given Hintikka's
inter4

pretation of deontic operators
(63)

Oq

^

[]Oq

does not hold.

Interestingly, given Lewis'
semantic analysis for obligation the
truth of (63) turns on his

absolute-

ness and universality
conditions.

if absoluteness does

not hold, then the ordering
of deontic alternatives may
differ from world to world
and so q might be true at all

)
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the best worlds
with respect to w

world with respect to
w
.

Hence,

(63)

r
^
n
1

w

r'

r

butz talse
falsp at, some
best

an alternative
of w

will not be valid.

However, if we adopt
absoluteness and universality
and maintain that
the ordering of
deontic alternatives
the same from the
standpoint of every world,
and that
every world is evaluable
from the standpoint
of every
other world, then
(63, is valid and
so we can see that
this version of Lewis'
semantic analysis
ictrysis is not
equivalent
to Hintikka
For o q is true at w
gust in case there
r
18 8 W ° rld
“1 Say -Stable from „ , and
such that q
r
is true at all worlds
at least ac;
as good as w^ from
the
ndpoint of Wj.. Thus if
absoluteness and universality
hold, then for every
world
it is true that
there is a
world evaluable from w.
namely
x w
sucn
such that q is true
!
i»
at all worlds at least
as good as it is.
'

-

'

'

,

•

What are the implications
of the truth of (63)?
appears that

(

(alternatively.
is true.

29

Oq

p

Dip * Oq„

it

,

will be true for any
p if 0q

Thus it seems that a factual
condition can, on
Lewis’ view (assuming absoluteness
and universality)
tai1 an obligation statement;
yet we have argued that
such an entailment is clearly
implausible.

—

'
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lthOUgh (29) is true
according to Lewis'
semantics
f or a ethic and
deontic Logic when
we assume
absoluteness
and universality
*

—

any p and any
q.

(2g)

is not true

Thus the Provability
provabilitof (29)
n
the special case
when Oq i s trn«
th ° Ugh Perhaps
odd, may
a harmless
consequence of the theory.
TO "" thiS ' n ° tiCe
29
implies p 3 0
g
Th
<29)
and P iS
-ue we may derive Og.
fi
Ce <29> 13
°g
-ue then derivation of
0g
in this instance
is unsurprising.
j_

’

" "

^

r

—
—

^^

Second, since the

<

>

-

bailment

in

,29,

q 13 ° bligator Eer.ee.
y

will hold only

^

truth of (29) in such
a case
-rely indicates that if
q is ob l igatory then any
tion entails that it
is obligatory.
And although I find
this result odd, it
seems no more peculiar
than the analogous result in alethic
modal logic, that
necessary truths
are entailed by any
factual or contingent
statements, as
is clear from

(73)

AS long as

Oq

s-

0 (p

5 Qq)

.

has no implication in
terms of conditional obligation, as we
have argued it can not,
then
its truth when Oq is true
may be harmless. And if we
find the result worrisome
we might block it by
restricting
(29)

Lewis' system (although he
does not) so that iterated

.

Ill

modalities ate not allowed.

T his type of
restriction
imposed by Bengt Hansson
on his deontic
systems. 8
a more serious
peculiarity of Lewis'
view turns on
his analysis in terms
of best worlds.
We have pointed
out
even if P » q, it will
not generally follow

^

that

‘

r

P*

q

P

q

'

H ° WeVer there

imPUeS

Plt ”)q “

still be cases in
which

Lewis

analysis even though
we
believe the English sentence
corresponding to the former
to be true and that
corresponding to the latter
to be false
For example, it seems
reasonable to assert that
(74)

'

Given that Smith promises
Jones an application form, to mail
ought to be that he mail a then it
form to
Jon0s
'

and to deny that

Given that Smith promises to
Jones an application form and mail
he hand carries one to Smith, that
then
it ought to be that he mail
a form
to Jones.
In other words it is reasonable
to claim that the second

condition, bringing a form in person,
overrides the conditional obligation to mail one.

^

seems to me that on Lewis' view, if

true then (75) must be true as well.

(74)

To see this,

is

suppose

we agree that given Smith's promise
it is better for him

112

7wh2

nq JOneS an
aPPliCati ° n ln Person
th

^

to mail one,

Jones outweighs any
inoonvenience to Smith.
Th e n we may
say that worlds i n
which Smith promlses
_
mans one, and also hand
carries one to Jones,
are better
than worlds in which
he merely promises
to mail a form
and
d ° eS S
ThUS
iS
-at there is a world in
°\
Which Smith promises to
mail Jones an application
such
that all worlds at least
as good in which he
promises are
such that he does mail
a form to Jones,
then it will follow that there is a
world in which Smith
promises to mail
and also carries one
to Jones such that

^

“

^

—

in all

equally good or better worlds
in which both conditions
hold he mails a form to
Jones.

The point of the example
can be generalized,
if, according to whatever standard
of goodness is adopted,
given
a certain condition
an additional condition
is better than
what is conditionally obligatory,
then on Lewis' analysis,
whatever is conditionally obligatory
given the original
condition will be conditionally
obligatory given the augmented condition. And yet surely
augmented conditions
which are better as well as those
which are worse can override a conditional obligation.^
Lewis' proposal has also been
criticized recently by
Holly Goldman in "David Lewis'
Semantics for Deontic
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Logics

and by Alan HcMichagi

^

„

Too Much

Thing:

^

a

^

A Problem in
Deontic Logic - 11
According to both
r
man and McMichael,
Lewis' ranking of
deontic alternaith respect to
goodness leads to
difficulties
Both argue that Lewis
anal ysls is toQ
strong
•

.

^

tional obligation
sentences we believe
to be true turn
out to be false on
his analysis
analysis. Let
r
us evaluate these
criticisms in turn.
^

*-

Goldman critiri
7 pc a
ticizes
version of Lewis' theory
of
conditional obligation
according to which
(76)

P

q is true at world
"(A) there are no

i

=

evaluable worlds

in which p

or

(B)

true,
some p &
q world is better
from the standpoint of
i than
an Y P & not-q world ." 12
is

Her criticism is as
follows:
iCati ° n to actaa l cases
;hic'S
this definition fails to
ascribe

shows that
truth
to
entS f conditiona l obligation
which
are
nh
?
e obviously
true, because it
adequate account of the affect fails to take
features of the world on such of contingent
obligations
1 P
miS< to return a borrowed
p°
book
tomorrow
f
Clearly
if i do not return the book
tomorrow, I ought to apologize.
But now conider possible worlds in which
I do not return the book tomorrow.
it is better, other
ng GqUal/ not to break a Promise.
i
Thus the best
worlds in which I fail to return
the book tomorrow are surely
worlds in which
do not thereby break a promise:
either because
.

,
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promise before
tomorrow, or because
made such
promise in the first
P
BUt ln
either of these worlds
^o?h
°
th
ing
is gained
by my apologizinq
for
returnin
book.
9 the
So it appears th^r
that a world in
which I do notrfr
book and do not
apologize (eg a
1
which I have
been released
10 3
1S at 16331
as good as any
world^in which^ 1 do
not
return the book
apologize.
The
statement "If t de
?
r0

^

a

:

f™

wV

m
^

^

ou°t°to
9
[76] .
Nevertheless°this statemfif 0 "
is
b

not be

"

WU1

r“e“el"f^

The most notable feature
of Goldman's
counterexample
thS C ° nditi °nal
obligation sentence she
suggests,
<77)

n

then

fe
°L
I ought

return the b °°k tomorrow,
to apologize

is only true in this
world
kj.L_Lu given that

promise.

She argues that

(77)

T
I

u
have

made the

is false on Lewis'

analysis since his analysis
ignores contingent features
of the
world such as the facts
that I win not be released
from
the promise and have made
the promise.
But analogously,
her sentence (77) ignores
those very same features and
is
true only when they are.
The crucial point on Lewis'
analysis is to restrict one's
attention to deontic alternatives where the condition holds.
Then we determine

what would be best in those
circumstances.
sentence

(77),

Goldman's

however, forces us to focus on the
wrong

set of deontic alternatives.

It appears,

then, that what
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9°es wrong is not
Lewis' theory but
rather that the
sentence expressing the
conditional obirgation
misleadingly
d

nS WhlCh arS
Clearly necessar f
°t the truth
^
and thus, justifiably,
for the proper

o7mT T°

restriction

or deontic
alternatives in the
semantic analysis.
In Goldman s Gx^inni a
example, if p stands
for "i promise tQ
return the book tomorrow"
and r lor
for "tI do
dr, not
return the
ook tomorrow and
q for "I ought to apologize,"
then we
would say that
p & r conditionally
obligates one to
q and
" P & r dOSS n0t
And these
Just the results we
would
achieve on Lewis' theory.
On his view the
conditional ob-

m

1

•

.p

'

ligation may change when
the conditions change.
is carefully designed
to accommodate
that fact.

His theory
But the

result is, of course, that
careful specification
of conditions is required for
accurate evaluation of
conditional obligation sentences.

Goldman is aware of this
sort of reply to her
objection.

She says,

m

ht attempt to defend
definition
that the con ditional
ot return the book tomorrow,sentence
then
T ought
,,
I
to apologize," is merely
a shorthand way of expressing what
really means, which is more the speaker
adequately expressed by the following statement:
"if
3 5 pro
sed to return a book tomorrow,
!*
and
,
n
released
f rom that promise,
°y
and Ir d
do not return the book, then
I ought
to apologize."
The only version of the oristatement which is completely immune
sort of argument I have just
advanced
would require an antecedent describing
all
?7fii hv
"If
T
1
1
.

V

“

"

.
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the features of tho
W ° rld Which
affect the suitabili^v
o?
But no speaker of
apolo 9izing
ordTn^
utters the original dlnary English who
ntence intends it
to express a s
aining SUCh an
extended antecedent--an C
ntecedent which
may refer to
indefim>^i
f
of which would
facts few
be known
hlm
defence of [76] fails f >
Thus this

^

1

^

'

’

The defense raises
the particularly
diff icult prob _
of distinguishing
conditional and
unconditional obligations. And Goldman’s
reply
P Y may be even ”>ore
pressing
than indicated here.
For suppose we agai

"

„

^

defend Lewis as suggested
above by arguing that
Goldman’s
sentence (77) is an
inadequate expression
of the conditional obligation; the
antecedent,

or condition, needs
to be supplemented
in order to be
k. a true
conditional obligation sentence.
But then, why not
argue analogously
that for any sentence
of the form Op there
are certain

background conditions which
must be true if op is
to be
true, and these too
must be incorporated
into the obligen sentence if it is
to be
true?

For example it may be

ntly false to claim it
is obligatory not to
kill, although if the killing is
not in self defense it
may be
obligatory not to kill.
if this argument is
allowed then
appears that there can be no
true unconditional obligation statements, but merely
sentences of conditional obligation.
Yet we have been maintaining
that there is a
distinction between conditional and
unconditional

.
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obligations.

Thus we discover
that Goldman is
correctwe can not require
that conditional
obligation
SUPPlemented
*>
*. -sanction between
con d ltional and
unconditional obligation
sentences to
collapse

"-

^—

interestingly,, it seems
clear to me that in
Goldman's
example the conditional
obligation is conditional
not only
°n not returning
the booh but also
on promising to
return
The sentence makes
no true statement
of conditional
obligation unless we take
account of the assumption
that
I have promised
either by adding it
to the antecedent
as
a conjunct or by
accounting
icing tor
f or it
t
some other way.
Similarly, Lewis' analysis
requires that we incorporate
act of the promise.
And whether or not
"all the
features of the actual
world which affect the
i

m
h

Stability

of my apologizing " 15
must be included in the
antecedent,
it seems that the fact i-hat- t u-,
Ct th ^t I have promised
surely must
be included.

But

see no way of justifying
this view, nor do I
see any way of distinguishing
those features which must
be
included in the antecedent
of the
I

conditional obligation

sentence.

it is hardly fair to
stipulate that we must

include exactly those features
which, when included in
analysis, yield intuitively
acceptable results about
the truth of the relevant
conditional obligation sentence.
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-*
ot Lewis' theory.

«

.

.«o„,

ss

Historically, deontic
logic, with its
tripartite
division between the
obligatory, possible,
and for .
bidden, developed at
about the s ame time
as other logicians and ethicists.
developed formulations
of act-utilitananism separating duties,
right acts, and wrong
acts
The latter formulations
generally distinguish a
duty
or obligation as the
(possible,
act of the

£ii-2££Aves which produces

avails

(or would produce,

maximal
The background conditions
are built into the
structure of specifying
alternative acts.
For our project I have
emphasized that I do not
believe there is a way of
specifying exactly which
conditions must be included
in the antecedent of
a conditional obligation sentence.
Nevertheless, a plausible way
of
keeping track of relevant
(and then also irrelevant)

utility.

background conditions on an
obligation or conditional
ligation is to build into the
semantics certain restrictions narrowing accessible
deontic alternatives.
In
particular, temporal restrictions
may mark off many of
the relevant conditions.
For as time passes certain
background conditions come to be true,
and these should
be held fixed in our theory.
Goldman's sentence (77,
is true at a certain time,
namely at a time at which she
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as promised to
return the book and
has not been
reused
rom the promise.
Thus incorporating
into the semantic

apparatus a temporai
reference to reject
the tact that
(77)
as true at a
particular time may help
the semantic analysts more accurately
evaluate obligation
sentences.
These
comments provide only a
rough introduction
to the type of
proposal we shall investigate
in Chapter V.
It was clear from
our discussion in
Chapter 1 that
statements about what agents
conditionally or unconditionally ought to do can
be expressed most clearly
by

retir-

ing that such statements
be relativized to both
times and
agents.
Thus in developing an
analysis for a concept of
conditional ought-to-do, we
must augment it with time
and

agent relativizations

And it may be that in so
doing we
gain the ability to make a
clearer distinction between
.

con-

ditional and unconditional
obligations. For what made it
appear that the distinction
between conditional and unconditional obligation sentences
could not be made was
the sweepingly general character
of the latter.
Nearly
every example one can give of an
unconditional or absolute
obligation sentence seems to be
implicitly conditional
upon the situation.

Yet if all obligation statements
are

relativized to agents and times then
while we may not
truthfully claim that it is unconditionally
obligatory
that one not kill, we may truthfully
say
that agent

s
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(unconditionally, ought
not kill at tiffle
t
references to agent and
time may specify
the situation
carefully enough to
assure us that the
obligation statement has (as we have been assuming
it has, a truth
value.
xceptions due to extenuating
circumstances will have
no
place.
We shall exnlnro *-u
is suggestion more
carefully i n
Chapter V.

^^

•

nother recent criticism
of Lewis' analysis
of conditional obligation has
been presented by Alan
McMichael.
He also argues that
Lewis' analysis is
too strong; true
conditional obligation
sentences will be false
on Lewis'
account.
He says.
I am inclined to
believe
good, perhaps happiness that there is a
is such a qood
which may exist in amounts
of any size'
But if i am right, then
all of the usual
examples of conditional
obligation
to
tru “Condi t ion
^"consider
Lewises

y

ba

f

,

returns the loot

Tthat^ SSS.SS'.S'
conresses and
1071

(p

than

but ln which Jesse robs
confessi ng and returning
the loot (Mij)
*,,.
This is so because
some such world w'
there will
enough extra good to counterbalancebe
the
S nCe
C ° nfeSsion and surpass
the goods
of w
rn ° tbe
words since there is a good
which may exist^ in amounts of
any size, the
lack of a confession puts no
bound on the
goodness of the worlds in which
Jesse robs
the bank.
Consequently, Lewis's truthcondition yields the undesirable
result
rUS that given that Jesse robs
^
the bank it ought
to be that he confesses and
returns the loot 16
,,

m

££

J.

,

L

/

.
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McMichael

point is that although
Lewis believes
his theory to be general
insofar as it is suitable
for
any plausible ordering
of the deontic
alternatives, his
theory is unacceptable
for theories which
are consistent
With the view that there
is a good which may
exist in
amounts of any size. Lewis
has proposed a
teleological
analysis. Obligation and
conditional obligation are
defined in terms of the best
worlds.
The criterion for differentiating best worlds is
an independent one.
And this
criterion may be one for which
there are no limits to
the
values or goodness of best
worlds.
s

Lewis is well aware that
there may be, in this deontic context, an ascent to
better and better worlds which
is unlimited.
(Cf. his discussion of
the Limit Assumption,
‘
PP 97 3 ° f Counterfactuals)
Thus the criticism is not
merely that worlds may be better
without limit, but, more
strongly, that even worlds in
which
and a,
‘

.

p

any p and q, may get better
without limit.

q hold,

for

Hence there

is no point at which all the
higher ranked worlds where
P is true are worlds where p and
q are true.
Thus p

never yields a conditional obligation
to q for any p and
We might have expected Lewis to reply
to McMichael
that the better and better p and %q worlds
are somehow

excluded from consideration in the analysis by
his evalua
bility restrictions. McMichael claims that references
to

standpoint and evaluability are dispensable if we are

q.

*

09

“ — —
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° bli

P* the notion of a
world being evaluable
from another world
could be made
m0re SPeCiflC
^
« could be said
2
to be
evaluable from the
standpoint o f a world
w, just in case
w ls
sufficiently similar"
2
to w 1*
mh
Then worlds which
1 fer fr ° m
3117 ° thSr W ° rld
° nl ^ ins °far as
more good
them, would not be
deemed "sufficiently
similar "
Lewrs does not take
this line, however.
Lewis responds to
McMichael's objection 1 ’
by granting
that his semantic
analysis does produce
the results
cMichael claims it
produces when applied to
a "strange
doctrine" like the one
McMichael suggests. But
he maintains that this is the
fault of the ethical
doctrine appealed to, not his semantic
analysis.
He believes it is a
virtue of his analysis
that when applied to
what he considers is a "strange"
(counterintuitive?) doctrine,
the
theory produces "strange"
(counterintuitive?) results.
The "strange doctrine"
Lewis claims McMichael
appeals
to is characterized by
Lewis as "radical utilitarianism,
•

-

.

stark and unqualified," a
view for which "agreement
with
our ordinary ethical thought
is not its strong point."

surely this characterization
of McMichael 's theoretical
point is oversimplified and
thus misleading.
Certainly
one may be a dogmatic utilitarian
and believe that what
ought to be the case is whatever
maximizes utility, and

maintain

«
“»
,h

exists m amounts
:i;:;r

^
"'7
" "^
"

of any

the

"

90 °d

assertion

—
sue
^

^
-—

•

-
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.

„ «.

and which, „ hen
added to

-

-

"goodness ordering,

pleasure, this hedonistic

is a natural one
tor many utilitarians,

indeed,
it has been
associated with utilitari*
tilitarians since Mill.
But
the assumption is
consistent for

ans as well.

non-hedonistic utilitari-

Por a non-hedonist
who believes that
whatever
ought to be is determined
in terms of the
a may
good
define
the good as love of
beauty, truth,
sympathetic im part i al
approval, knowledge,
justice, love of virtue,
or may even
actenze it as a simple,
non-natural quality C f.
Lewis'
description of the goodness
ranking for deontic
alternatives
quoted in the beginning
of this chapter,
An d for each of
these is it not reasonable
to grant that it may
exist in
amounts of any size? Even
philosophers such as Brentano
and Moore who denied
that there is always a
straightforward
relationship between the value
of a whole and the values
of
its parts, agree that
there is a good which may
exist in
amounts of varying size.
(

.

When Lewis admits that deontic
alternatives may be
ranked according to some
standard of

good, then he is ac-

knowledging that there is

a standard of good which
exists

in unlimited amounts and
McMichael s point follows.
'

The

argument is not restricted to "radical
utilitarianism" or
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even hedonism.

Given the dif f icnl

^

associated with Lewis'
analy-

Sis
sis of obi
obligation in terms °
nff best
k
w °rlds
•

x.

new approach to the nmKi
™
chan b
Chapter
V.
Timp
again
a

“
1

approach.

,

we shall begin

C ° nditi °-1

obligation in

i

a pivotal role
in this
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CHAPTER
t lm e

V

in Chapter I we
developed a language
for expressing

relativised obligation
sentences by appealing
to
ts of time which
were assumed to be
ordered linearly.
That is we assumed
that y-Lven
given any
anv
,

two times t
+-

if

*"1

^

then

t,
1

<

t

or t

<r

and

t

+
t

However for many
i*
Philosophical purposes a
non-linear temporal m odel
may be
-re illuminating. In particular
A.N. Prior first suggested, and Richmond
Thomason has developed,
an indeter° r branchin
g ti— structure as a model
for tense
logic
-i-

2

2

Such an account of t-imo w-;
er,llt instances
in which a time a has
altern ative possible
futures
The
C
i i

possibilities^althou^^

^^^

>fa

S"

--

e
a of

.

whar;h: fu?Le^in

V

t

S

f

^^

k

;*'

abaIn; c
*'

n'

one possiat

be ?ihe srthfrf
thS
arS ™ any nlhernative futures
for a.
a® "mb"
These alternatives, however
beina
n
1 ®^ knowled e «ther
9
?han
by the' nature
nfture^f?
of time itself,
into the truth-conditions for do not enter
tenses
But
n a
time PUtS thGSe a lternatives
into
i ^
the n
ontological
structure of time, so that
be takSn int ° account in
Y mU
reckoning
ihe truth
i^_ values of
the
tensed formulas.

r

•

4-

i-

1

1

The fundamental semantic idea
behind this model theoretic

technique is
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.
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° f a given
formal
,

language^

which may differ f rom ^? nod truth-values
to tira ®, and
that the truth-Jal^
1
formu las at
a given time
will depend nn
taken by that formula
ValUeS
at other\imes^

”^

in two unpublished
manuscripts,

"Deontic Logic as
Founded on Tense Logic"
and
Dn 4--ic Logic
nd "n
Deont
and Freedom of
Choree rn Moral Deliberation,"
Thomason extends his
indeterminist temporal model
structure to provide a
semantic
analysis for certain
formulas taken to express
obligation
statements.
Thomason suggests that
difficulties which
arose in early deontic
logic relevant to ethical
questions
such as questions relating
to relational oughts
can only
be solved with a combined
tense and deontic language.
He
also claims in particular
that his theory provides
solutions to those difficulties 3
Although Thomason does not
go on to discuss this
claim, it is an intriguing
and challenging one.
In this chapter we shall
attempt to build a
theory of conditional
ought-to-do on his indeterminist
time
model
.

Thomason first distinguishes
between two uses of
"ought." The deliberative use
is appropriate for advising or deliberating while
the judgmental ought is appropriate for passing judgment or
wishing.
This distinction
can be illustrated with an example.
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forT?^™
d
r
Se
f°r°Ur lL ?uj e
HZ

notes that

you need

^t5r
spend time,

•

°W
?°
to 1:30 I ouqht (on
‘]
up
he d
lb
tiVe readin 9>
to return the notes
by
d we can even
measure the increasing 2 ()0 aand
P
of the ought as ttme 5 stren 9 th a " d urgency
by the time
30
a^aiLtle^efor^it^Ui
11 become
impossible for me to fninn tu
-

(

'

^

'

*

*

deliberative

beL^he ^ture^Vd T""

the
notes
ure
and also gives
wav tn ^ rini
1
re
some sort--perhaps ro ht r ? ti ° nal ° Ught of
i

'

.

,

.

i

ifxi irs„*jr
further condemnations.
4

“Ss

r
“-

^

The ought of judgment
thus arises from a wider
set of
alternatives than the ought of
deliberation. To a recording angel who is judging
me with respect to the
alternatives that have been open
to me at 1:45 it is clear
that I
ought to return the notes at
2:00.
But the deliberative
ought is determined from a
narrower set of alternatives,
namely those actually open to me
or in my power at the
time.
Thus at 1:45 it is false to say
I
(deliberatively)
ought to return the notes. A
deliberative ought must be
possible for me in some sense of
"possible."
The terms "deliberative" and
"judgmental" suggest that
Thomason's distinction might be very like
the traditional
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^

distinction between what
ou ght to be and
what an agent
to do.* However
given Thomason s
,

^

the ou ght -to- d o.

Perhaps the deliberative
use is appropriate tor situations
in which one is
choosin g what to do
” various alternatives
that are in fact
open at the
tlme WhUe the
jUdgmental
suitable for evaluation

-

°f

^H2lib__to^Ji a ve__b ee^i_done at

If so,

instants in the past.

then it would seem
that an analysis of
the judgmental use of "ought"
could be developed in
terms of

the

deliberative use of
that this is so

"oucrht-

»

T

a
ndeed,
Thomason suggests

6

Whether
nether oror no+not +-u
this development can
be
carried out successfully
is an open question
at this
Point.
still, if this rough
characterisation of Thomason's
uses of ought is accurate
and time provides a way
of
drawing the distinction,
then clearly we must focus
on
the deliberative use of
"ought" to develop meaningful
prescriptions about how an agent
ought to act.
.

•

Our concern, then, is with
the deliberative use of
ought for which certain
alternatives which might have
been open to me are no longer
available.
Some are ruled
out by physical circumstances,
perhaps others by psychological factors.
But the main point is that many
are
ruled out as unavailable options
as time passes.
Hence we
may begin to see the plausibility
of building a theory of
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^^

conditional °ught-to-do
on the indeterminisUc
according to which available
alternatives may vary
from
time to time.

Thomason's formal semantics
is based on a theory
in
which time may branch
toward the future.
There may be
two times, both in the
future with respect to

a given
time, that are temporally
unrelated to each other.
These
two times, then, are on
different "branches" of
the time
Structure.
If we assume that time
may be partitioned
into discrete units we may
have treelike structures
as
the following finite
illustration:

m

y2
Y

3

n
At a there are four possible
future courses of events or
scenarios
At $
and 3 there are two future
1
2
scenarios.
We may designate the instants by
Greek letters to emphasize that they are non-linear units
of time.
According to
Thomason "the fact that instants
and 3 are incomparable
2
.

^

signifies that realization of

^

will exclude those
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alternatives in which

B,

is realised,..’

Presumably if „
are
incomparable
2
then it will not be
the case that
^1 = 6 2 or that B, < B
or that B
2
This theory of
2 < Bl
time "allows certain
future alternatives
that formerly
were open to become
extinguished with the flow
of time," 8
just what we require forfor an analysis of
the ought
of deliberation.

and

b

.

•

Thomason begins with a
nonempty set K of
discrete times, or "reference
points" at which
Will be evaluated, ordered
by a relation < (to
preted as an "earlier than"
relation.)
Then a

-Structure

(non-linear,

formulas
be inter-

temporal

is defined as a pair
<K,

<), where the
most important condition of
the structure is that
for all
Y e K,

B,

if 3 < y and a <
y

,

then

B

<

y or y

<

B

or

= Y.

This condition assures us
that time can not branch
into the past. Moreover, <
is transitive, that is,
if
a < 6 and B < y, then
a < y.
Finally, Thomason requires
that for all a e K, there is
9
a B e K such that a <
B.
A hi story h on a model
structure is a subset of K
such that
B

1)

for all a,

6

£

h,

if a f

then a

3

<

6

or

3

<

a,

and
2

)

if g is any subset of K such that
for all
a

'

3

£

g,

then

a

<

3

or

3

<

a,

then g = h if h

c

g

»
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A history is a
maximal chain on a
struct
str
ucture, that is,
a

nr
....

,r:

“ r“

31'

"•

“*«

«“»

-

;rr™ ~
y

nee time branches
only toward the
future then,
„„ represents the set of scenarios
open at a
may locus on a subset
of Thomason's
formal languagl
including atomic sentence
variables P,Q r
and
•

,

-

'

sentence connectives

,

F

(for future tense)

obligation),

,

^

a valuation V assigns
truth-values v h
formulas A of the given
language L at an instant
to a history h in H

q

^

(A)

to

/relative

V>

defines the truth-value
taXen
A at a, erovided that
history h includes what
will happen after
Th us the valuation
function gives the truthvalue of A at a time
assuming that a certain
course of
events will come to pass.
This valuation function
is defined by induction on the
complexity of A. For an
atomic
sentence letter P,

^

(78)

and,

V

a

.

h
a

(p)

= V

a

(P)
v
'

'

for example, for a formula
A,

(79)

vN%A)
u

= T iff V h (A)
a

= F
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Thomason captures Prior
tense by defining

(

80

v

)

a

(

FA

)

'

s

"Ockhamist" theory of
the future

= T iff
ff xr
V hg(A)
, tv

x

- T for some

such that a

3

e

h

<

"

thSre 13 m ° re than one
course of events h in
H
V h (A) will not reflect
a
the unqualified
truth-value V <*,
taken by A at a. Thus
Thomason defines V (A)
using van
a
Fraassen's method of
truth-value gaps:

(81,

(82)

V

V

a

a

(A)

(A)

= T iff V h(A)

= T for all h

£

H

a

'

= F iff V*(A> = F
for all h c H

and

un<3efined

otherwise.

These truth definitions which
allow for truth value gaps
are especially useful for the
semantic analysis of future
tense statements.
They provide a formal development
of
the view that "future contingent"
statements are neither
true nor false.

,
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In order to provide
a semantic analysis
for the

deontic operator o,
interpreted deliberativelyf
introduces a model^tructure
<K, <, s> where S
is
lation between instants
and histories
then h

c

V

a re-

such that if aSh

The sen? antic deten^
L

S is used to
interpret the deontic
operator 0
Thomason says, •'intuitively
the meaning of aSh is
that h represents a
future course of
events at instant a that
would be an acceptable
moral
Choice...
Those histories related
by s to an instant a
form the ough^set of a.
Thomason's semantic rule for
the
deontic operator, interpreted
.

deliberative^

(84)

,

is

V (0A) = T iff V 9(A) =
T for all g
a

such that aSg,

or equivalently.

V (0A) = T iff
a

With V

a^

0A

^

defined using

(81)

(g)

-

(aSg

D

(A)

= T)

(83).

This analysis gives 0 an S^like
structure. 11

truth-value of a formula 0A with respect
to

a

The

history h

and a time a depends solely upon the
truth-value of A at
a

in those histories in the ought set
of a.

The history

.

.
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*

*«•>•••«

"" u " •>
°”"T
then
V (OA) = t fnr n

—
a

“

u

Xt iS " 0t thS C3Se
that V

e

«

then V (OA) - P for all
h
a

H

a

<A)
e

<« «>

’

-

H

».

...

.

~K

„s,

and hence V (OA) =
T
a

when

.

T f ° r 311
5 such that uSg
a

and hence V

a

(OA)

= F

.

ligation statements will
thus be either true
or false
When we supervaluate
according to (81) (83)

OA will never lack
truth-value.
V„(OA) - T iff

(85)

(OA)

= T,

a formula

Thus for any history
h,

and so

V (OA) = T iff
a

,

Ob-

(84)

(g) (aSg

reduces to

c

(A)

= T)

The idea is apparently that
OA is true at a in every
alternative future which represents
a morally acceptable

course of events from the point
of view of a.
That is, A
would be true in all morally
acceptable histories containing a if those histories were
actual, regardless of which
course of events does follow.
But upon reflection this
explanation (and thus

(84)

and (85)) does not appear to be
as clear as it may at
first have seemed.
For in evaluating a formula OA at
a
time a we merely check the truth-value
of A at_a.
Thus
it is difficult to see how any
future alternatives, even

those which are morally acceptable, are
relevant to the
analysis

137

“

Indeed

;

/'

S

—

for a sentence
variable p>

,

SOlSly

—^

" 13 n0t at ° miC

'

^

^

•!«. of P

Qf

at

^

similar _

tUt COntains

future tense operathe evaluation of OA
at a stiff depends
onf y on the
truth— value of a _t__
at fhaf
that same t .imp
There
mere isQ no reference
different time and thus
again reference to
future afternatives is irrelevant.
Thus if A contains
no
tense operators, then

°rs

,,

i

(86

)

(a) (V

(OA

e

A)

= t)

12
.

We do not wish to
affirm in general that
whatever is
Obligatory is true 13 Hence
a formalization of
straight.

forward obligation statements
may not be symbolized
using
OA, where A is atomic
or has no future tense
operators,
Thomason's system, contrary
to what we may have believed and what Thomason
suggests in some examples 14
Rather, Thomason's formal
expression of the English sentence "I ought to pay," for
example, must employ a future
tense operator.
if P stands for „ r pay< „
he must

m

.

as the formalization, OFF.

^

Then "I ought to pay" is true

at a time a just in case
every morally acceptable history
through a is such that there
is a time on it after a when
I pay.
Using this formalization we may
truly say that I
ought to pay is true at a even
though it is not true that

I

.

——
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I

pay at a, which is as
we wish.

This does seem to be
Thomason's intention and
perhaps
it shows one way of
understanding his claim
that deontic
logic is intimately tied
to and reliant upon
tense logic 15
The interesting obligation
sentences in his system
are of
the form OFA.
And OFA may be true when
FA lacks truthvalue

However we still seem to have
a difficulty,
For Thomason uses as examples of
English sentences which express
obligations that we wish to
formalize.

(

87

)

George provides transportation
Saturday,

and
(88)

I

ought to give you $50 tomorrow.

Thomason says.
To take an example, let A correspond
to
I will give you $50
tomorrow' and suppose that I owe you the money, have
promised to give it to you, and can do so
there are scenarios ahead of me on
which
I pay you the money tomorrow.
Then I
would want to say that OA is true
ought to give you the money tomorrow
and so every scenario in my ought set is
such that on that scenario I do give
you the money tomorrow. 16

—

Although indexicals such as "tomorrow" or "now" pose
special problems, it does seem that we would like to

symbolize

sentences such as
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(89)

I

ought to pay you
Saturday at 3:00

(where we even include
a calendar date
it the reference
to Saturday is
ambiguous. Let us assu
me for our examples
that we need not add
reference to a calendar
date.,
flnd
there does not appear
to be an adequate
symbolization
for

(89)

available in Thomason's
system.
Imagine that ,89, is true

at „.
If we first attempt
to let the atomic
sentence letter P stand
for »i pay you
Saturday at 3:00" and use
OP as the symbolization
for
(89). as seems to be
suggested by Thomason in his
example

above, then (86) holds
in this case.
With this symbolization it follows from
(89, that it is true
at a that I pay
you Saturday at 3:00, which,
given my fallibility, may
clearly be false.
It is natural,

then, to attempt to symbolize

using the future tense operator
F so that

(86)

(89)

by

will not

hold.

(90)

FOP

is an implausible candidate.

truth of

(89)

For we wish to assert the

at a and so wish to consider the
ought set

or morally acceptable histories
open at g

true at a just in case

,

whereas

(90)

is

,
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(91)

<h) (h e

(g)

H

3

(33) (B E h

(3Sg 3 v^(P)

= T

)

)

s

a <

&

)

that is, just in case
on every history
through

features.

3

a

there is

Hence we might try
to syrabolize (M)
u
(92)

OFP

where P stands for either
"I pay you" or '!
pay you Satur _
day at 3:00. "

Consider first that p
corresponds to
Then if (92) symbolizes
"I ought to pay

"I

pay you

.

..

you " as we have

argued above, it can not
be adequate as
for (89).
These two English sentences

a

formalization

are not equivalent
and so identical
symbolizations can not be
satisfactory.
The difficulty seems to
be that even though
(92) indicates
that in each history which
is morally acceptable at
a
there is a later time at which
I pay you, nothing
in symbolization (92) captures what is
expressed in the English
sentence, namely that it is on
Saturday at 3:00 that I
ought to fulfill the obligation.

Suppose then that P stands for
at 3:00."

Then (92)

"I

pay you Saturday

is true at a just in case

7
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(g)

(aSg

=3

(36) (B

e

g

a <

&

g

&

v-[(p)

= T)

)

that is, jU Bt in case
all histories which
are morally ac-

later than a at which
it is true thatthat
at 3:00.

t
I

pay you Saturday

This suggested symbolization
(92) is closer to what
We would like than the
previous ones and also
seems in
with Thomason s view.
However we may still ask
how
we are to evaluate
vf CP, - T if P stan ds for '! pay you
Saturday at 3:00." Thomason
addresses this difficulty in
a footnote:

think °

f (2 4)
[' G e°rge providesV°
ldes transportation on Saturday']
'

as
true at any time if and only
if 'Georqe
provides transportation' is true
on
Saturday.
1

Analogously, for a given history,

"i

pay you Saturday at

3:00" is true at any time
in the history just in case
"I
pay you is true at 3:00 on Saturday
in that history.

Notably, we can not express this
in Thomason's language.
For P symbolizes "I pay you Saturday
at 3:00" but we have
no symbol for "I pay you." More
importantly, we have no
way of referring to Saturday at 3:00.
It is what we

might call (recalling a phrase of Thomason's)
a "clock-time"
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and is not a time in
the sense that a,
B
and T
are times.. For eaoh
of a
g
and Y
is an
occurring in at most
one position in
the branching time
structure.
y et presumably
ere 13
Y there
is a itlme
corresponding
_
„
to Saturday
r 3J.oo
-on in
in every
y at
history open at a.
Unfortunately there is
no way of formulating
in
Thomason's language the
general principle which
he advocates in the footnote,
If we attempt to
formulate it by
reverting to let P stand
for ”1 pay you" and
p
f or "i
pay you Saturday at
3:00
then it appears that
he is say
ing
,

,

,

.

,

(94)

But

(94)

(a) (V

.

.

.

h
a (p,)
3

T iff V^(p)

= T)

.

is not well formed in
his language.

As pointed
out above, Saturday at
3:00 is not a time in
the sense
that a, $, and y
are times; it can not
serve as a
reference for the valuation of
P.
.

.

.

Despite the inadequacy of his
language for expressing the principle, the
intuition behind it is a plausible
one, and is commonly appealed
to in explanations
of the

truth of such time-relativized
sentences.
accept

(92)

OFP

However, if „ e

.
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where
a

P

corresponds to

"t1

Pay you Saturday at 3:00"
as

symbolization for
(89)

I

ought to pay you Saturday
at

3

:

00,

and accept the intuition
underlying Thomason's
informally
Stated principle, then
we are forced to an
unacceptable
consequence
T_

Whenever V (OFP)
aSg there is a
(see

(3 ,

B

e

iq

4-™^
true then *for every
g such that

g

a

,

c

B

,

such that v|(P) = T

(93)).

since aSg we know that
g s
have a truth-value at a
in g.
According

principle, applied with respect
to
pay you Saturday at 3:00")

a

h/

,

Thus P must

to Thomason's

history, if p

ri

is true at a time in
that

history, then P is true at
any time in that history.
Hence, if V^(OFP) = T then
if we let g be a history
x
such that aSg
there
is
a
ir
tj £
gi such that v^fP) = T
And so by Thomason's principle
1
as stated above
(P) = T
But notably P is an atomic
sentence variable. And so
according to (78), the truth-value
of P at a time relative
to a history is just its value
at that time.
Thus we
have V (P) = T.
,

.

,

V

.

a

In sum,

if V

(92)

a

OFP

(OFP)

= T,

and hence V (OFP) = T, then if
a

.
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symbolizes

(89)

I

ought to pay you Saturday
at 3:00

^

where P stands for "I
pay you Saturday at
3 ^., ±t
lows that by appealing
to Thomson's informally
stated
principle we can derive V
m
=
(p)
I£ „ TI ought to pay
a
you Saturday at 3:00" is
true at Q then
pay you
day at 3:00" is true
at a.
This is clearly an
unacceptable consequence.
'

One might suggest that
Thomason should not have
used
as examples sentences
like (87) and 88
For if we restrict our attention to
sentences of the form "I ought
to
Pay you," Thomason's proposal is
immune to the difficulty
above.
His theory is unproblematic
as long as we are
careful to understand that the
atomic sentence variables
P. Q, R,
can not symbolize English
sentences which
contain references to particular
clock-times such as Satur
day at 3:00.
However I believe we should have a
symbolization and semantic analysis for
sentences like (89) and
Thomason's examples indicate that he
believes so as well.
(

.

.

)

.

One might also suggest that Thomason
drop the principle he
has stated informally in a footnote.
However if we are
to symbolize sentences of the form
of

(89)

version of the principle is crucial and

I

then some
have claimed it
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is plausible as
well.

Yet

t
I

see no way of
formulating it
plausibly in Thomason’s
system.

There may be a way of
preserving Thomason's
system
and U, symbolizing
sentences of the form
of ,89)
(2)
maintaining and formalizing
the intuitive idea
underlying
his informally stated
principle, and (9) avoiding
the

difficulty presented above,
and

I

explore that possibili-

ty in Appendix II.

But for the remainder
of this chapter
be careful to recall
that we must restrict
the

English sentences which may
be symbolized by atomic
sentence variables (thereby
restricting the obligation
sen-

tences of English that we
may express) in Thomason’s
language by excluding those
sentences which contain a

reference to a particular date
and time.
We have made no attempt
thus far to provide any

agential references in our semantic
analysis for obligation sentences.
Thomason presents 84 as the
semantic
rule for the deliberative use of
(

)

"ought," but he has not

incorporated any reference to the
agent for which the
obligation may be said to hold. Rather,
he has presented
a one-person theory; that is, he
has assumed
that the

obligation statements hold for a single agent.
Thomason is well aware that different agents

However

have different

obligations in the deliberative sense 18
.

do to refer to

a

Thus it will not

general, impersonal ought set at

a

time.

.
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Rather, at any given
instant, every individual
has his or
her own ought set.
Thomson takes this
suggestion in the
illustration we gave on
page
138.
^
tie
He says
savq ir
there that he
gives the $50 in every
Y scenario in uhis ought set.
Thus
it is his ought set
that is used to determine
what he
ought to do. At another
point he claims, more
specifically that "everyone
should have his or her
own ought
•

set.

Thus we might amend
Thomason's
is

(84)

to state that OA

at a time in a history

fo^^gent just in case
A is true at that time
in all scenarios which
are acceptable moral choices
for_that_aaent (that is, those
scenarios in the aaentjs ought
set) at that time.
Thus if s
is a variable ranging
over agents named by s’,s"
and S is a relation between
s

instants and histories such

that if aS g then
g
s

ought set for

(95)

e

V

and, intuitively,
g is in the

at a, then we might state

s

v

s,a

(0A)

T iff

(g) (as

(84)

as

g
g o v a (A)

= T)

However, valuations of non-deontic
sentences of the
language are determined solely with
respect to times and

histones.

Ultimately, using

(81)

-

(83),

is evaluated solely with respect
to a time.

every formula
To maintain

this feature for obligation sentences it
is preferable to
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define truth-value S for
sentences, not of the
form Oh,
but of the form 0 A,
which
may be read "A is
s
(deliberatively obligatory for
s
or "s ought to see
A." 20 Then
we shall have
)

(96)

V

!>s A

>

T iff

(g) (aS

d

gg

V^(A) =

t)

where h is irrelevant.
Let us now attempt to
develop an analogous
semantic
analysis for conditional
obligation as an ought-to-do

and

deliberative ought, and let us
attempt to formulate it
for
sentences of the form "Smith
is conditionally
obligated to
repent given his sin
where no mention is made
to speci
fic clock-times.
Thomason's truth definition for
unconditional obligation sentences tells us that
A is obligatory for s at a
lust in case A is true in all
those histories which are
morally acceptable for s at a.
Thus, recalling other
analyses of conditronal obligation
that we have
discussed,

we might wish to say that C is
conditionally obligatory
given B for s at a just in case C
holds in all those

histories which are morally acceptable
for
which condition B holds.
This proposal will not do, however.

s at a

and in

At any given

time a there is, on Thomason's view, a
set of histories
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Which are morally
acceptable ror
for

s at a,
„

namely s's ought
Thus, for example,
if it is true at
a that s
ght not to sin, it is
true that s does not
sin in all
those histories in
his ought set.
But then there can
not
e a subset of those
histories in which he
sins.
Hence
is vacuously tru,
that any C is
conditionally obligagivcn that s sins. On
this proposal the forbidden conditionally
obligates one to anything.
e

at a.

We might attempt to
block vacuous truth of
conditional obligation sentences
by altering the above
proposal to
say that C is conditionally
obligatory given B for s
at a
lust in case (i) c holds
in all those histories
which are
morally acceptable for s at
a and in which condition
B holds,
and <ii, there is at least
one history morally
acceptable for
s at a in which
condition B holds. But this
proposal is
also flagrantly inadequate.
For as in the case above,
there will be no acceptable
histories for s at a in which
s sins (assuming s
ought not to sin at a) and so
we can
not express a true conditional
obligation
at a for

P

t for a sin.

s

to

No contrary-to-duty obligations
will be

true on this analysis since
in those cases condition
(ii)
can not be satisfied.
To avoid these unwelcome results
let us try another
approach.
We might rather sloppily say that
C is condi-

tionally obligatory given B for agent

s

at time a just in
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case c is true in every
a-history in which there
is a
time such that condition
B is true then and
which is i„
the agent's ought set
with respect to that
time.
To clarify this intuitive
idea, let us consider
an
example.
Let us suppose Smith now
ought not to sin.
His
ought set now contains no
future scenarios in which
he
sins.
But we wish to maintain
now that he ought to
repent
if he does sin.
Thus it seems reasonable
to claim that
once Smith does sin he
repents in all the histories
in

his ought set at the time
of his sinning. After
his sin
those histories in which he
does not sin are no longer
available; they have been bypassed.
The morally acceptable futures available to him
at the time of his sinning
are such that he repents in
them.
A proposal based on
this intuitive idea is clearly
more plausible than our
first proposals and will
capitalize on the feature of the
branching time model that available
alternatives may vary
from time to time.

More specifically, if
agents, and a and
g,

3

s

is a variable ranging over

range over times or instants, and

f,

and h are variables ranging over histories,
then for

formulas B and C we might suggest

(97)

V

a

(0

s

(B/C))

= T iff

.
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)

<g)<6H(g

(

f

e

H

(BS f =
s

a

s

(C)

9

*

H

&
b

V 9(b) =

t,

=

= T},

which is equivalent to

V

a

(

0

s

(B/C)

(g)

}

(3H

= T iff

H

(g e

Vg(OC) =

T)

e
a & g

h
3

&

v|( B

)

= T)

3

}

On this proposal, like
Thomason's

(84),

conditional obli-

gation statements will not lack
truth value when we supervaluate using (81) - (83). Hence
h is irrelevant again.
Unfortunately, if this proposal is
intended recursively, and is thus intended
to apply to any formulas B and
C,
it is unsuitable for at least
two reasons.
As before,

the interesting cases will be
those for which C and perhaps B as well, are future tense
formulas which lack truthvalue.
And yet if we try to symbolize
Chisholm's sentence
that it is now true that if a certain
man goes to the as-

sistance of his neighbors he is conditionally
obligated to
tell them he is coming, where s' names the man,
and
G and
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T abbreviate "s'

goes to assist his
neighbors" and
tells them he is coming,"
using

(98)

I

O ,(FG/FT)
s

we can see two major
problems.

First, the analysis tells
us that at every time
and
history at which the condition
is true the acceptable
moral histories at those
times are such that FT is
true
then.
Thus all histories morally
acceptable at a time
when the condition holds are
such that there is a later
time when s' tells them he
is coming.
And yet clearly we
would like our analysis to allow
us to assert that Chisholm's sentence is true and that
the conditional obligation. telling, may occur before
the condition, going.
Given (97) we can not symbolize
true conditional obligation sentences for which the
conditional obligation is to

occur before the condition. 22
Second, the analysis in (97) directs
us to every
history g and time 3 such that
and g e H and
g e H
a
3
V (FG) = T.
But
if
FG
is
true at any particular time
3

m
3

,

g,

because G is true at

a

particular time

y

3

later than

then surely FG is true at many other times in
history

g.

We wish to look at the histories which are
morally accept-

able at those times when he goes, that is, when G is
true.
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but not at all those
times when it is true
that he will
go, that is. When FG
is true.
Us in g
97) we are forced
to focus on too many
times at which a given
formula expressing the condition is
true.
,

appears to me, then, that
the general truth
definition (97) can not, capture
the intuitive idea we
are
trying to express about
conditional obligation
sentences
However, even if (97, fails
as a general definition,
we
might propose that for atomic
sentence variables P and
Q

(")

v

a

(O

s

(P/Q))

(f) (aS

s

= t iff V^(P)

F d V*(Q)

= T

= T

d

)

And in the more interesting
cases,

(

10 °)

v

(0

(P/FQ))

(f) [aS

V

and

(Q)

g

f

3

= T)

= T iff V h (P)

(3y) (a < y &

]

f e

= T

3

&
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(1 °1)

V^(O (FP/FQ)
s

(g) (6)

vp

(P)

(f) [3S

{

= T iff

(g e

= T)

s

)

f

d

&

g

e

Hr

&

a <

y &

f

e

&

g

D

(3 Y

)

(a

<

h

&

Y

V
y

(Q)

= T)]).

Some diagrams may help us
illustrate (101). suppose
that at a Smith has an obligation
to return $100 if he
should steal it. Surely his
ought set at a contains no

histones

in which he steals the money
since he ought not
to steal it.
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However, if

s

corresponds to "Smith
steals $ 100 " and R
to "Smith returns
5100," then consider
a particular
history
9l through a and a time
3, on that history such that
S) = T '
ThSn SVery History f
in Smith's ought
set
with respect to
3, is such that there is some
instant y
f
such that V (R) = t.

V

a-ought set

3-^-ought set

Again
h,

,

in the final valuation the history of
evaluation,

is irrelevant.

Moreover, since we are proposing an

analysis of conditional ought-to-do, it is in line with
our earlier discussions (Chapter

I,

p.

21 and Appendix II,

.

.
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P-

204)

to require that
a

If the

<

Y

in

(100)

and (101)>

condition obligation

in question ig
tQ
stoien money or to
repent tor a sin then
presumably
returning comes after
er thp>
tne stealing and
the
c ie
reDPnf^.
Penting comes
a ter the sinning,
and so we have
B < y.
However if we do
not require this
relationship between
B and y, then our
analysis is appl icable
to cases Ufce chisholm
s
the conditional
obligation for the agent
to tell his
neighbors he is coming
should be fulfilled
before he goes
to help them.
Thus we appear to avoid
the first difficulty discussed with
respect to 97

^

•

,

(

^

^

)

Furthermore, if we restrict
the sentences symbolized
by the atomic sentence
variables P, Q, R
to those
English sentences which are
such that if ever true
in a
history, they are true only
once in that history, then
these proposals avoid the
second difficulty associated
23
with (97)
.

.

.

But (99) - (100) allow
statements of conditional obligation to be true vacuously.
For example, for the most

interesting case,
time

B

such that g

(101),
s

H

if there is no history
g and

a & g

e

Hg s a < B & v|(P) = t,

then O (FP/FQ) will be vacuously
true for any Q. Thus an
impossible condition, a condition which
is not true in
any possible alternative future,
yields a conditional
obligation to anything. Hence we might
amend (99) - (101)
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as we amended Lewis.
proposal

(from (7Q)

tQ

“

^

^^ ^
^

(?1)

103)

pp

#

by adding an exi sten
tial clause ensuring
an alternative future
in w hich the
condition

is conditionally
obligatory do hold.

_

For example, for
(101) w e might now say

<102)

V

1

a

(0

s

(FP / F 2>>

(g)

)

s

(SH(g

V
y

&

ii)

H

e

a & g

3

f

i

H

Sr

a <

n

Sr

&

a < $

f

e

z

H

h

= t)

(Q)

£

H

(3y) (a < y &

(3i) (3a) (3n) (i

&

e

=

= T)

Vjj(P)

(f) [3S

&

= T iff

V "(Q) =

T)

£

H

a &

a

&

a <

i

n

Sr

a

V^(P)

T

.

t

Given (102), if there is no history along
which
a

time later than

time after

a,

a

P

holds at

and along which Q also holds at some

then we get the appropriate result that it is

.

.
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not true to say 0 (FP/pq,
is true for any
S
agent s
One consequence of
Thomason's truth
definition for
obligation sentences is
that whenever A is
true, OA is
also true. One way
of seeing why this
is so is by introducing an operator L
for inevitahi
u into the
inevitability
language
The semantic rule for
this operator is
i

(103)

V^(LA)

T iff

(g) (g e

h

V^(A)

= T)

A sentence LA is true
at „ if a's truth at
„ is i ndepen _
scenarios at a. Then, as
Thomason points out, A
semantically implies LA.
Whatever is presently true
is
presently inevitable.
Furthermore, in deliberative
contexts, LA implies OA, for
if A is true in all
possible
futures open at the time, A
is clearly
true in that sub-

set of alternative histories
available at the time which
are morally acceptable.
Thus, by transitivity, A
implies
OA.

Whatever is true is obligatory. 24

similarly, given

the proposals we are discussing,
if whatever is conditionally obligatory is true, it is
conditionally obligatory
given any possible condition.

When 0 is construed deliberatively
this may seem
somewhat peculiar, for it is difficult
to imagine advising
someone to see to something which is
already the case.

However these odd results merely indicate
that on these
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analyses past and inevitab
le actions are
classified as
morally acceptable in
the deliberative sense.
We mlght
not judge that all our
past actions have
coincided with
what a recording angel
would deem to be
obligatory for us,
but it is reasonable to
discover that such a view
must be'
expressed using the .judgmental
use of •'ought.” Furthermore, in deliberative
contexts, obligations are
determined by choosing among
possible futures open at
the time
of deliberation.
Thus if LA is true, it
is not open to
the agent to choose .A, and
so we would not wish to
say
-A is obligatory (or conditionally
obligatory on any condition) in the deliberative
sense.
There are other interesting
consequences of the proposals given above.
If for atomic sentence
letters P and
Q
V

'

a

V°s (P/Q))
(P)

= T,

= T and the condition
is true at a,

that is,

then it follows from (81) and
(99) by modus

ponens that

U04)

(f) (aS

s

f

=

V^(Q) = T

and so that

(105)

V

a

(O Q)
s

= T.

)

,

,

(
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Similarly, if v
ot

ing

(O

s

(P/FQ)

= T and V

)

o

(P)

= T then apply-

and (100) and modus
ponens it follows that

(81)

(106)

(f) (aS

g

f

3

v y<Q> = t)

(

3Y

)

(a

<

y &

f s

&

v

(P)

= t

Hy

&

)

from which (107)
we can conclude

v

a

(O FQ)
s

T.

Hence we have

V (° s -(P/Q)

(108)

a

V

(109)

a

(0 Q)
s

)

= T

d

= T

and

V

V

If V

rive

a ^°s

Fp / F Q)

(107)

,

)

a

(O

s

(P/FQ))

as'
(O FQ)

= T and V

= T

V

&

(P)

= T =

= T.

a

(FP)

= T,

an obligation at a for

s

then we may not deto see to Q in the

.

.
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future.
for s

However it will follow
that if pq is obligatory
given PP and Fp is true
_

thafc is>

p

,

s

^

future history, then every
history is such that
there is a
°n
at WhlCh Q
^ue (earlier or later, in every
member of s's ouqht
ugnt set.
set ^5
t-f j-u
if
the condition holds
sooner
later in every future,
then sooner or later in
every
future there is a time at
which whatever is conditionally
obligatory is true at some time
in each scenario in the
agent's ought set.
This seems to me to be a
welcome con
sequence

“

These results. indicating the
relationships between
certain conditional and unconditional
obligations, are
not susceptible to the difficulties,
pointed out by Greenspan (see Chapter I,
pp 3 ff.), which arise for a general
factual detachment rule.
To return to her example,
given
a general factual detachment
rule, the truth of
.

the con-

dition that

I

will get

a

ticket by the end of next month

is sufficient to allow detachment
of an obligation to pay

the fine, and this is unacceptable.

Clearly, if P symbolizes "I get a ticket" and
Q
symbolizes "I pay the fine" then if I get the
ticket at
a,

the time at which the conditional obligation
holds, then

from (109) we can detach an obligation at
fine

(some time in the future)

a to pay the

^
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Also, if F p symbolizes
"I win get a
ticket" and
thlS 13 3 true fUtUre
statement, then in every
fu _
ture history I do get
a ticket; getting
a ticket is inevitable.
In such a case it
will foliow that in
every
history there is a time
when my ought set is
such that in
each of its members, I
do pay the fine.
This is reasonable
deliberative contexts since
it is not possible
for me
not to get a ticket.

“

If,

on the other hand, FP
symbolizes "I win get a
ticket" and this is a future
contingent statement, then
V (FP) will be undefined
a
and nothing whatsoever
will follow about whether or not I
eventually pay the fine in
alternative futures.

Our discussion of proposals

(99)

-

(102)

illustrates
many of the advantages of
building a theory of conditional obligation within Thomason's
indeterminist time model.
Conditional and unconditional
obligations may be relativized to times, clarifying what
is settled when an obligan is in force.

If

i

have already made a promise, then

that fact will be settled; any
subsequent obligations or
conditional obligations will arise from
future options
open to me, and not promising is not one
of those. Moreover, since future alternatives open
to me may vary from
time to time, obligations and conditional
obligations may
also vary over time. This feature of the model
makes it

.
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particularly appropriate
for expressions
of contrary-todUt y ° bli9ati0ns
paradigm, an obligation
to
repent for a sin.
Finally, our discussion
has shown that
analyses built on this
model, unlike most
dyadic analyses
of conditional
obligation, may allow
for acceptable factual detachments of
unconditional obligations
from conditional ones, without
allowing those detachments
which
cause difficulty for
general factual detachment
in standard
deontic logic.
But there are serious
difficulties with these
proposals.
Recognition of these problems
may provide some
insight into a more
appropriate way of developing
a theory
of conditional obligation
within the indeterminist
time

model
Due to difficulties with

(97)

we proposed (99) -

(loi)

as non-recursive definitions
for atomic and future
tense

sentences.

And while many paradigm
conditional obligation
sentences can be analyzed
appropriately using
(100)

and

(101)

(amended with an existential
clause as in (102)),
these limited semantic rules are
clearly insufficient.
In particular,

it might seem that a further
advantage

of the intuitive idea underlying
these proposals is that
even if Q is true in every history
morally acceptable for
the agent at the times when P holds,
Q may not be true in
every morally acceptable history open at
those times when

163

'

S

R h° ld

-

ThUS

'
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—

it seems that we can
say,

°»r example of
Chapter

I(

as Greenspan can
not, that if

Smith charges a shirt
at Macv's
i<acy s, it
is conditionally
obligatory for him to pay
for it, although
given that he charges it and returns it
he may no longer be
obligated to pay
Even if he. pays for
it in every history
morally
acceptable at the times
when he charges it,
he may not pay
for it in acceptable
futures at those later
times when he
charges and returns the
shirt.
•

However to substantiate
this claim we must
formulate
an analysis for conditional
obligation statements with
conjunctive conditions. To
cover the interesting cases
we shall also need to
include a future tense
operator.

the analysis is to be
analogous to

(

99 )

-

(loi)

'

we must agree that for any
P and R, if P and R
symboli e
sentences true at most once in
a history, then p & r

symbolizes a sentence true at
most once in a history.
Yet I see no way of providing
a rule analogous to
(101)

(99)

for conditional obligation
sentences with conjunc-

tive conditions which gives us
the results we wish.
For
we have agreed to let P correspond
to a sentence which is
true at most once in a history.

Yet this assumption pre-

vents us from allowing conditional
obligations to vary when
a condition is augmented.
This follows because
if P

&

R

is true at all in a history it must
be true at that time

.
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niSt ° ry
.

^ ^
P iS

times at which con .

d
dition
t
P . R holds

(assuming that there
are some) wiu
a subset of the
ti m es when condition
P holds,
whatever is
conditionally obligatory
given P (or Fp) for
, ±s
each scenario
ought set at those ti
mes when P holds

^

^^

of.

at those times when
p
ly obligatory given
P

&
&

r hold^
n ld
r

'

(or p (p

and uhence is
conditionals

R)

It is also troubling
that none of

j

(99)

-

(i 01)

pro _

vides a suitable
symbolization and analysis
for a conditional obligation to do
Q given not-P.
i n Chisholm's
puzzle, for example, we
wish to be able to express
a man's
obligation not to tell his
neighbors he is coming if
he
does not go to help them.
But I see no analysis
analogous
to (101) for such a
sentence.
The condition,
that he does

not go, is not one which,
if ever true in a history,
is
true at most once in a
history.
There are instead many
times in each history when
it is true that he does
not go.
ndeed, if his going to help
his neighbors describes an
instantaneous individual event,
then in each history it is
true at every time in that
history, except perhaps one,
that he does not go. And it
seems much too strong to require that the agent does not tell
in each history in each
ought set of all those times, when
the conditional obligation sentence is true. Even if the
English sentence "he

goes to help his neighbors"
is taken to describe
an event
which is true at most
once in each history,
it is

dim _

cult to see how "he does
not go to help his
neighbors"
describes an event with
the same feature.

one might believe that
if P is a sentence
describing
an event true at most
once in a history then
drawing a

distinction between not doing
P and refraining
from P will
solve this difficulty. Por
one might argue that
refraining from P is an event
true at most once in a
possible
future, since refraining from
P requires consciously
considering performing P and
yet purposively not doing P.
However there are at least two
reasons why this strategy will not solve our
problem, even if a clear
distinction
can be made between not doing
p and refraining

from P.
First, our analysis for conditional
obligation sentences
with negated conditions will then
be restricted to conditions which are negations of acts
performed by agents
rather than events in general. Second,
if refraining from
P requires conscious thought
and effort on the part of the
agent, then the analysis will not even
apply to all conditions which are negations of acts of
agents.
For example,

the analysis will not be applicable to
failures to do P

which are instances of thoughtless negligence.
Amended versions of

(99)

-

(101)

alone are insuffi-

cient for analyzing all the conditional obligation
sentences
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express and yet

I

see no way of developing

analogous analyses for
sentences with complex
conditions
Furthermore, although „e
carefully formulated
101
and 102 to allow
expressions of conditional
obligation
sentences in which what is
conditionally obligatory
is to
occur prior to the condition,
nevertheless
,

(

,

)

it turns out
that interesting conditional
obligation sentences (in
particular, those sentences
describing cases where
fulfillment of the conditional
obligation is not inevitable,
with
this temporal relationship
will not be true given
(102,

after all.
To see this, consider
Chisholm's second sentence,
interpreted as expressing a
certain man's conditional obligation to tell his neighbors
he is coming given that
he goes to their assistance,
where the telling is to occur
before the going. According to
(102, this conditional obligation is true at a just in case
(i> there is a history
in which after a he goes to help
his neighbors and tells

them he is coming and

(ii,

history through a and

8,

every time

B,

a

<

8,

in a

at which he goes to help his

neighbors is such that every history morally
acceptable at
8 has
it a time T. a < Y < 8, at which he
tells them he
is coming.

m

3,

Although there are many alternative futures at a
time
some of which are morally acceptable, there is
only
one
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“o

past with respect
to
P

r
B-

t-f
If
we rule out moral
blind alleys

as Thomason does, and
require
4 Lre that at ^
every time
is at least one morally
-

acceptable history

With respect to

morally acceptable at

,

^^^
6

there

is part of that
history and so is

3

3

.

Thus if

(98)

0

(FG/FT)

is true at a,
6-

CX

<

8,

then according to our
analysis, every time
in a history through
a and g at which
G is

true is such that there
is an earlier time
y in that
history, “ < Y < B, at which
T is true
That
f
the conditional obligation
is true, then every
history in
which he goes is a history in
which he tells as well. No
history in which G is true at
g^ say, is such that there
is no
Yl on that history, a <
at which
< 8
.

r

Yl

^

,

T is true.

Yet in our example it is not
impossible at a to go without
telling; at a it is open to the
agent to go and tell, to
go and not tell, to not go and
tell, and to not go and
not tell, at a there surely are
possible futures in which
he goes but does not tell.
Thus 0
(FG/FT) is not true
S
at a given our analysis, although
the corresponding English
,

sentence is true. 28
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It is natural to
suggest that these
difficulties

which arise for the
proposals we have been
discussing
could be avoided if, instead
of focusing on ever^
time at
which the condition is true,
„ e merely look at one
time at
which the condition holds.
And it is natural to
believe
that this latter suggestion
could be developed
if we

appealed again to the counterfactual
conditional expression, for formulas A and B,
A > OB, which would force
us
to focus on a single time
in a history at which
condition
A is true.
It seems to me that there
are three major considera-

tions which motivate the use of
the counterfactual conditional for expressions of conditional
obligation

sentences, if these sentences are to
be analyzed within Thomason's branching time model.
First, if A > OB directs us
to look at a particular time in
a history at which A is
true and then determine whether or
not B is true in the

agent's ought set at that time, then
conditional obligation sentences in which the time of the
obligation is

earlier than the time of the condition may no
longer be
problematic.
For even if the agent tells his neighbors
he is coming in the history before that time
which the

counterfactual picks out when he goes to help them,
there may be other future times at which he goes to help

them but before which there is no time when he tells them

.

x

,
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he is coming.

Truth of the conditional
obligation
sentence will not restrict
the possible alternative
futures

Second

our main argument in Chapter
II against using
>
Oq
as a general symbolization
P
for conditional obligation sentences was that
p > 0 q implies p = 0 q.
Thus if
>
Oq
P
expresses a true conditional
obligation
for q

given p and p is true, we must
accept the general factual
detachment of Oq. This argument
is correct.
Yet if the
subjunctive conditional is built
into Thomason's model
this argument will no longer apply.
For even if it follows that

(

113

)

V

a

(A

>

OB)

- T & V

a

(A)

= T d V

(OB)

= T,

(

this will not produce unwelcome results.

If A is a purely

present or past tense formula, detachment of
the unconditional obligation seems unproblematic. Also, if
A is a
true future tense formula, FC, then C is true in
every

future scenario.

And when C is inevitable, detachment

seems acceptable as well.

tingent statement,

Whereas if A is a future conwill be undefined rather than true

(A)

and so no detachment will be possible 29
.

And third, the counterf actual conditional expression
A

>

OB does not imply A

&

C

>

OB

30
.

No other analysis of
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conditional obligation
we have evaluated,
except Lewis'
ll0Wed COnditi ° nal °
bli9atl0nS
with augmented
c
And we have seen
that Lewis' theory
allows
certain conditional
obligations to follow
given conjunctive
even
cases where it seems
that the added
condition actually override
Y overrides the original
conditional obligation.

—

V

m

•

tUrnS ° Ut

•

^

taSk ° f introducing
subjunctive
conditionals into the
branching time model is
a particularly difficult one.
Thomason has proposed one
method in an
unpublished paper, "A Theory
of Conditionals in
the Context of Branching Time,"
where he argues that if
conditionals are added to the
theory then the basic
notion of
the semantic theory,
should be replaced
says, the theory must
be able to take account
not merely
of a future course of
events, h, that is tentatively
designated the actual one for
the moment in which we find
ourselves, but of "counterfactual
actual futures" as well.
Although I shall not pursue
Thomason's thoughtful and

V>,

.

^^

detailed suggestions for revising
the theory to include
conditionals, I shall discuss a
difficulty which must be
resolved if S > OB is used within
Thomason's theory to
symbolize sentences of conditional
obligation. Furthermore I shall point out several
consequences shared by any
theory of conditional obligation built
on the indeterminist
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time model and Thomason's
theory of obligation.
If A > OB is used to
symbolize conditional
obligation
sentences, then presumably
we shall require a
selection
function to pick out a
particular time at which
A is true
and a future scenario
through that time (to
evaluate the
truth of A if A contains
future tense operators)
whatever is true in the ought
set at the selected time
is
then crucial for determining
the truth of the
conditional
Obligation sentence. We could
perhaps build selection
functions into the model structure
or, as Thomason does,
treat them as valuations.
But neither formal development
explains what makes the time
selected a proper choice for
deontic evaluation.
If „ e are not going to
look at all
times when the condition holds,
but will choose only one,
.

what criteria can possibly mark
off that time as the relevant one for deontic purposes?
If the semantic analysis of
counterf actual condition-

al statements within the branching
time model is analogous
to Stalnaker's original semantic
theory for the subjunctive

conditional, then it would be misleading
to say that the
selected time is the nearest or closest or
earliest time
at which the condition holds 31
.

For there is no ordering

of times in our model analogous to the ordering
of possible

worlds based on comparative similarity posited by
Stalnaker.
Perhaps the selected time is to be that time such that

.
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" WSre

11 "° Uld bS true

But what reason dQ

we have for believing
that this time win
be the appropriate trme to examine the
ought set? Furthermore,
if the
condition is a future tense
statement or a negation,
then
it may be true at many
times in the selected
history and
it is difficult to
see how we can select
a particular
time such that if mP or
FP, for example,

we^l^TIt

would be true then.

Or,

even if we can pick a
particular

time with this feature it
is difficult to see
why we
should focus on a time at
which FP is true rather than
one
at which P is true, at least
in deontic contexts, where
the time selected is the
one at which we examine the
ought set to determine the truth
of the conditional obligation sentence.
These puzzling questions must
be answered if A > OB, interpreted
within Thomason's model, is
to serve as an acceptable
symbolization for conditional

obligation statements.
Moreover, the use of truth-value gaps
leads to a peculiar consequence for any theory of
conditional obligation built on the indeterminist time
model.
In providing
a symbolization for Chisholm's
sentences, even if we can
develop an adequate formalization for the
second and

third sentences, interpreted as statements of
conditional

obligation, we may puzzle over how to symbolize the
fourth

sentence

.
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Suppose we agree that
given Thomason's
analysis of
0/ we should symbolize
the first sentence
of Chisholm's
puzzle as

(lb)

where

0

s

,FG /

s'

names the man and G
corresponds to "s' goes to
help his neighbors."
it is consistent with
the truth of
db) at a to symbolize the
fourth sentence as

(4b)

where

is also true at a.

(4b)

V (-G) =
a

%G,

T,

But the truth of

merely tells us that

s'

does not go at

at a,

and
so does not adequately
capture the meaning of the
English
a,

sentence.

A more natural reading of
Chisholm's fourth
sentence tells us that the man will
not go to help his
neighbors
But the alternative symbolization

(4c)

F%G

does not express the English sentence
either.
is true at a just in case

For

(4c)
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(114)

(h) (h e

T

V

h

(^G)

U14)

th ° U9h

'

a

3

Gs)

(6

G

h

&

ot

<

3

&

= T)

3

^

H

is uninteresting

.

Eve „ in those

histories where there is
a time later than
a at which he
goes, there is a time
after a at which he does
not go.
Thus we might symbolize
the fourth sentence as

(4d)

But if

(4d)

%FG.

is true at a, then

(115)

(h) (h

V

G

>

e

H

a =

(B) (6 £

h s a

<

6

3

= F>),

that is, there are no future
scenarios open at a in which
S' goes.
And this contradicts the truth of
(lb) at a,
that s' goes in the morally acceptable
futures open at a.
Thus within the indeterminist time
model we must interpret
the fourth sentence as asserting
that the agent will not
go where this is a future contingency.
in other words, we
formalize the fourth sentence as
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(

4d)

o-FG

where the value
ue of ^d)
=,+.
4 rn at
f

a is

undefined.

These symbolizations,

(lb)

O .FG
s

and

(

4d)

'VFG

when valuated at a time a as
true and undefined, respectively, are not inconsistent.
That s’
goes to help his

neighbors in all future histories
that are morally accept
able at a is consistent with the
truth that he goes in
some future scenarios but does not
go in others open at
a.
Furthermore, whatever analysis and
symbolization we
provide for the second and third sentences,
we can avoid
the contradiction spotted by Chisholm,
since the value
of vFG is undefined, we can not detach
an obligation not
to tell them he is coming.
Yet symbolizing the fourth sentence as a statement

with undefined truth value is unsettling.

First,

it

does not provide us with a formalization of the
sentences
for which all are true when valuated at the same time.
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Second, and more worrisome,
is the fact that
it is
natural to believe that
the first and fourth
sentences
tell us that s' does
go to help his neighbors
in the
morally acceptable futures
open at a,
„
a yet
and
in fact he
does not go.
He does not go in the
actual history; the
actual future at a. is not
a member of his
ought set at a
However, on Thomason's view,
within the indeterminist
time model we can not express
this compelling interpretation of the sentences.
Given his semantic theory
we can
not say that just one of
the possible futures open
at a
is the one which will be
realized without abandoning
the
point of the model.
if a single possible
future is the
actual one with respect to a,
then it is not clear what
relation those times in the
non-actual futures can bear
32
to a
.

And third, although the lack of
truth-value blocks
factual detachment for a deliberative
ought version of
the puzzle, it is not clear how an
analogous
past tense

or judgmental ought version of
Chisholm's paradox could
be avoided.

Two other major questions arise for any
theory of

conditional obligation built on Thomason's model and
theory of obligation.

First, Thomason developed his

semantics for the deliverative use of "ought" so that a

version of Kant's "ought implies can" principle does hold.
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He says,

"if we rule out moral
blind alleys by requiring
that for all a there is at
least one h such that aSh.
any
formula having the form OA =,
vlva is valid." 33 If
=

m

^A,

then M corresponds to an
important use of "can,"
which Thomason suggests has
these properties:
(1)

if we say a thing can
happen,
subsequent happening shows thatits
what we said was true;

(2)

the fact that in circumstances
similar to ours a certain thing
has happened is prima facie
evidence for the“claim that it
can happen (supposing it to be
in question whether it can happen) 34
.

But if the alternative future histories
we are considering are those which are temporally
possible, or

logically possible at

a

time a, then it may be argued

that the version of the "ought implies can"
principle

which will hold for his concept of obligation,
interpreted deliberatively

,

and thus any analogous deliberative

concept of conditional obligation as well, is too
broad.
Let us return to Thomason's example
(quoted on page 138)

according to which it is true that

I

ought to give you

$50 tomorrow and so every scenario in my ought set is

such that on that scenario

morrow.

I

do give you the money to-

Then, as Thomason aptly describes.

—
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S
mpatible With this situation
JLit ^°
there are also scenarios

ahead
of me on which, through
no fault of
mine, this ought is cancelled.
For
instance, it may be a matter
of chance
whether I will be hit by a car
later
today and spend tomorrow in
a coma in
h ° Spital
At a time after the accident
ent, on a scenario on which
such an accident, there will there is
be no
scenarios on which I give you
morrow, and so my ought set at $50 tothe time
won t contain any such scenarious.
It is characteristic of such
a theory*
(and might lead some to
entertain alternative theories) that when I
ought
to pay you $50 tomorrow it
will then
also be true that I ought not to
have
an accident that will prevent
me from
paying you; and that I ought not to
have a heart attack; and that I ought
not to have a death in the family
that
will call me out of town suddenly.
What makes these implausible is that
such matters are, to a large extent,
out of my control, and when I promise
to pay you $50 tomorrow it seems I am
not promising (or even obligating myself) not to have a heart attack beforehand.
The theory I'm proposing denies
this; I want to say that oughts are
risky and if I ought to pay you the
$50 tomorrow I ought not to have a heart
attack that will prevent me from paying
you.
Nevertheless, I agree, it would be
peculiar to say "I ought not to have a
heart attack" in these circumstances
but that isn't because it's false. 35
.

-

~
.

,

Even worse for Thomason's theory than the consequences
he lists above, if there are scenarios ahead of me on

which there is a flood and

I

subsequently do not pay you

the $50, we will have to say that when it is true that
I

ought to see to it that there is no flood.

This begins
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to seem ludicrous.
It appears that
Thomason's theory of
obligation and
any theory of conditional
obligation built upon it
win

make too much obligatory
in the deliberative
sense.
The
notion of possibility built
in to the theory is
too broad
What is obligatory in the
sense of ought-to-do
should be
possible in the sense of
being in the agent's
control or
power.
An attempt to restrict
an agent's ought set
at a time
in some way to limit what
will be obligatory or
conditionally obligatory seems
impossible.
However we have already
recognized that English sentences
such as "I pay you Saturday at 3:00" can not be
symbolized in Thomason's language
as it is given.
Thus we have agreed to exclude
sentences

with references to clock-times from
the domain of sentences
which atomic statement variables
may symbolize. Similarly,
we might add an informal condition
to further restrict the

set of sentences which may be
symbolized as atomics for
true obligation and conditional
obligation sentences to be
of the form "x does P," where x names
an agent and P names
an action in x's control or power, for
some suitable notion
of "being in the agent's power." This
limitation would be

inappropriate for purely tense theoretic contexts,
and is
too restrictive if applied to conditions in
conditional

obligation sentences, but it would be appropriate for

.
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Whatever is obligatory
or conditionally
obligatory.
ally, a major issue
which we have pointedly
avoided discussing thus
far is the question
of how the
relation S is to be
explained.
s
How do we determine
which
histories will be in an
agent s's ought set at
a time a’
a formal semantics may
escape the issue by
pointing out
that it is a substantive
ethical question. Thomason
himself makes no proposals;
he leaves the characterization
of morally acceptable
histories open. But to show
that
his theory of obligation
and any conditional
obligation
proposal built on it are
non-circular we must provide
an
independent specification of an
agent's ought
set at a

time
If David Lewis is correct
that possible worlds can

be ranked according to some
standard of goodness and that
for any obligation there is a
threshold beyond which the
better and better worlds are such
that whatever is obli-

gatory is true in them, then it would
seem that similar
reasoning would guarantee that possible
alternative
futures could be ranked according to
some criterion of
goodness and for any agent's obligation
there would be a
threshold beyond which the better and better
histories
would all be such that he fulfills his
obligation in them.
The better and better histories over the
threshold would
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be in the agent's ought
set at the time of
comparison.
In other words, then,
we might view an agent's
ought set
at a time as the set of
best histories open to
him at that
time, where the criterion
of goodness is left
unspecified,
as it was for Lewis.
But Lewis' view that
there is such a threshold
is
exactly what we have, agreeing
with Goldman and McMichael,
denied.
if we are correct,
then within Thomason's theory
any characterization of an
agent's ought set at a time
as
the set of best histories
open at that time is doomed
to
fail.
And an alternative characterization
must be provided
or other revisions imposed upon
his theory to develop an
analysis of conditional obligation
built within his indeterminist time model.
In conclusion

,

careful examination of what appeared

to be a plausible intuitive idea
upon which to develop a
theory of conditional obligation within
Thomason's inde-

terminist time model indicated that depsite
its apparent
suitability for contrary-to-duty conditionals,
it could

not be formulated within the semantic theory.

covered that an analysis which focuses on

a

which the condition holds might fare better.

We dis-

single time at
In particular,

there are several reasons to pursue the investigation of
one such analysis employing the subjunctive conditional

connective built within Thomason's branching time model.
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However it is difficult to
see how any analysis
of that
type can justify the
crucial choice of any one
time in a
history at which the condition
holds as suitable for
deontic evaluation.
Furthermore, we have discussed
several issues which
must be resolved if Thomason's
analysis of obligation and
any analogous analysis of
conditional obligation is to
be
satisfactory. We must pursue
the suggestions made in
Appendix II, since the original
semantic theory provides
no way of expressing obligations
and conditional obligations which are to be fulfilled
at a specific time.
We
must admit that within the theory
Chisholm's four sentences may be symbolized so that
none is false, although
they can not be symbolized consistently
as all
true at

the same time.

Moreover, we must determine whether
or not
a past tense version of the
paradox will arise. We must
attempt to restrict the theory or adapt
it so that obligations and conditional obligations are those
acts within
an agent's power, and should suggest
reasonable characteri-

zations of an agent's ought set at a time.

These issues are not trivial, and their multitude

may lead many to seriously question the ultimate suitability of the indeterminist time model for deontic contexts.

Nevertheless, our arguments have shown that it is unlikely
that an adequate theroy of conditional obligation can
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be developed without
a semantic theory
which countenances
the concept of an open
future.
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APPENDIX

I

Most systems of deontic logic
include some form of a
basic deontic logic as a subsystem.
Bengt Hansson, in "An
Analysis of Some Deontic Logics" (in
Risto Hilpinnen, ed.
Deontic Logic:
Introductory and Systematic Readings),
has
isolated this basic system and called
it the standard
deontic logic (SDL)
Since then SDL has been referred to
elsewhere
the literature and serves as a standard
system
within which it is possible to express
most of the philosophical problems associated with deontic
,

.

m

logic.

According to Hanson SDL is based on a basis
logic,
BL, which may be the propositional calculus
or any related
system, provided valuations and validity are
defined in
the usual way and provided BL is complete, that is,
every

valid formula is a theorem.
formula and

a

What constitutes a well formed

theorem is determined in the usual way.

SDL is minimal in the sense that it is the smallest
set fulfilling the requirements that
(i)

whenever f is a formula of BL then Of
is a formula of SDL,

(ii)

the negation of any formula of SDL is
a formula of SDL,

and (iii)

the disjunction of any formulas of SDL
is a formula of SDL.

The deontic operator 0 is read "it is obligatory that".
F,

read "it is forbidden that", and P, read "it is permis-

sible that', may be defined such that
197

)
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and

(iv)

Fp

=

0(^p)

(v)

Pp

=

% F p = ^o(^p)

Where P is a schematic sentence
letter expressing
sible act or state of affairs.
Truth functional

a

pos-

formulas

Of SDL are defined as usual
but no iterated operators
(e.g., OOp) nor mixed formulas
(e.g., p v Op) are allowed
in the language.

Every formula which is obtained from

a

theorem of

the propositional calculus by
substituting formulas of
SDL for the variables is an axiom
of SDL.
More than one
set of deontic axioms might serve as
the deontic base for
SDL.
One set suggested by Hansson and used by
others is:

and

(1)

Op

(2)

0(p

3

a>0(^p)
3

q)

&

Op

3

Oq

(equivalently,
0 (p 3 q)

3

(Op 3 Oq)

)

.

Furthermore, many authors have found it reasonable
to add
(3)

where

t

0 t
(

,

is a tautology in BL,

since denial of

(3)

excludes

only empty normative systems or those cases in which

nothing is obligatory

(cf.

Hansson points out that

(3)

F^llesdal and Hilpinnen,

p.

13).

is sometimes added not as an

axiom but as an inference rule,
(R)

If a formula f is provable in BL,
then Of is provable in SDL,

along with modus ponens and a suitable substitution rule.
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This system of SDL is
equivalent to the original
system proposed by von Wright
in '•Deontic Logic" in
Mind,
1951, in which permission
is the deontic primitive
and the
axioms are thus formulated
in terms of the deontic
operator P, except that von
Wright prefixed deontic
operators
to names of acts and did
not propose (3).
Hansson suggests
that although von Wright did
not propose (3), nevertheless
the system SDL as presented
above, including (3) or (R)
is essentially what von
Wright intended. Thus von Wright
truly did provide the foundation
for deontic
,

logic.

appendix II

We wish to investigate the
possibility of preserving
Thomason's system and 1 providing
a symbolization of
sentences in the form of (89), (2)
maintaining the idea
underlying his informally stated principle
(see (94)), and
(3) avoiding the difficulty presented
in Chapter V on
(

pages 138-145.

)

Suppose we enrich (no pun intended) his

language by adding to it a way of referring
to "clocktimes" such as Saturday at 3:00, and argue
that sentences
such as "I pay you Saturday at 3:00" can not
be symbolized
as atomic sentences in the language.

We shall then say

that although "I pay you" may be formalized as
an atomic
sentence, any reference to a clock-time such as Saturday
at 3:00 must be made explicit and can not be embedded

within

a

symbolization for an atomic sentence.

We have

discovered that clock-times such as Saturday at 3:00 can
not be symbolized in Thomason’s language as it is presented
and thus we must augment his language to enable explicit

reference to clock-times across histories.
Interestingly, in adapting his semantic analysis for
the deliberative use of "ought" to the judgmental use,

Thomason argues that a similar cross reference may be appropriate.

For in determining what ought to have been done

(although it is now too late to do it) one imagines that
200
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at some point in the past
things went more as they
should
than they in fact did.
Thus one in effect transports
oneself to a (not necessarily
unique) instant, a set of
count erf actual moments, if you
wish, which ought to have
been realized.
Thomason says,

...suppose that I've drawn up to a
cars at a red light and, looking stop line
in my rear
r<
1
e
a Car Coming U P behind me
too fast
Z
fc
?l'
f
a chance of its stopping in
time.
e re is
There
isVs
a sense
which the driver of the car
ought not to hit me.
While I'm waiting there
better to do 1 make this judgment
ii the following way.
in
First, I go back a few
b ° a P oan t i n time at which
the driver
still uhad a chance of stopping safely.
This, as
ve said
ls an a ct of imagination:
wishful
imagination, perhaps.
Then I consider a variety
of alternative scenarios in which
he drives as he
ought.
In general there is more than one
of
these...
All of these scenarios are, of course
might-have-beens, since he didn't in fact drive'
as he ought.
Along each of these scenarios, then,
I choose a particular instant
to serve as an alternative for the one in which I unhappily find
myself.
The most natural way of doing this in
our example is to use the metric properties of
time and take instants along the other scenarios
in which clocks show the same time they do
at the
instant in which I find myself.
("Deontic Logic
as Founded on Tense Logic", p. 13)

\

m
.

th^

!

'

»

,

Our interest is not in developing a semantics for the

judgmental use of "ought".

However if we are to make

explicit reference to clock-times, we need a way of
choosing an instant along each future history or scenario

corresponding to, for example, Saturday at 3:00.

In the

last sentence of the above quotation Thomason suggests a

natural way of doing this.
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Let us again suppose as we
did in Chapter I that
time,
conceived of linearly, can
be partitioned into
discrete
instants which we may refer
to by definite descriptions,
definite descriptions of what
we have been calling clocktimes.
Then suppose we introduce
to our language
t

t

,

as non-rigid designators for
descriptions such as
"Saturday at 3:00", bum
such that
if it
tnat it
designates Saturday
3
at 3:00, then for every history
or scenario h there will
be a B such that the value of
tj at h is «, which we may
abbreviate with a function V*(t ,h)
= B
other words
3
the non-rigid designator tj picks
out in each history an
,

.

m

instant corresponding to Saturday at
3:00, perhaps the
instant at which clocks and calendars
in the history
indicate it is Saturday at 3:00.
(But see below, Appendix II, pp. 204-205.)
The idea of using non-rigid designators
in this way
to refer across histories or worlds is
not new.

Jaakko

Hintikka made a similar suggestion in "On the Logic
of
Perception
&

R.

(in

Perception and Personal Identity,

N.

Care

Grimm, eds.. Case Western Reserve Press, 1969), to

refer to intensional objects in formalizations of certain

perceptual statements.

Although our project need not include

a

complete

explanation of the metric properties of clock-times, it
does seem that we will preserve the metric structure of

time if we require that for
every

t

and

t„

t.

<

t.

if

and only if the clock-time
named by t is earlier than
the
±
clock-time named by t
Furthermore, it seems reasonable
to require that for every t.
and history h there is one
and only one 6 such that V*(t.,h)
= e.
On any history
there is a e designating Saturday
at 3:00, for example,
and that 3 is unique.
.

.

Given this minimal explanation, we
might now let
atomic sentence variables rp n k,
r ... stand for
sentences
like "I pay you", where no reference to
a clock-time
4

r

-

ap-

pears in the sentence, and P
3:00".

m

a

for "I pay you Saturday at

Then we wish to say that P

r

is true at any time
3

history just in case P is true at the time corres-

ponding to Saturday at 3:00 in that history.

More gener-

ally, we might formulate Thomason's principle
for truth
of a formula at a clock-time as:

<«><h)<v£ (A^) = T iff

(1)

Because V*(t

simplify

(

1

i#

)

(2)

h)

h)

(A)

=T).

is clearly a time in history h, we may

to
(a) (h) (V*

(A

t

)

= T iff V

v*

jh)

(t

(A)

= T)

.

And finally, returning to the semantic rule for deliberative oughts we may have
(3)

And given

(1)

a

and
h

(OA

)

= T iff

(g)

(aSG = V g
ot

(2)

this is equivalent to

(A

t^

)

= T.
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we now have a rich enough
meta- language to give a
semantic rule for expressions
of

obligations in which what

is obligatory is to be
brought about at a certain time.
That is, we can distinguish
the time at which the obligation is said to hold and the
time at which it is to be

fulfilled.

(Cf.

Castaneda, "Ought, Time, and the
Deontic

Paradoxes", p. 782, on the importance
of this distinction.)
When the obligation statement is
interpreted deliberatively
we do not wish, for example, to
be obligated Tuesday to do
A Monday, and we now have a
language within which we can
require that
(5)

(Compare

(2),

V

a

(0A

t

}

= T D v *(t. ,h)
1

i

p. 21, of

Chapter I.)

incorporate this condition in
(6)

V

a

<OA

)

(4)

= T iff

i
&

V

(t

a.

And we may wish to
so that

(g) (aSg
(A)

i

*

,g)

=V*(t.,g)
1
= T)

*

a

'

where, as noted in Chapter V, h is irrelevant.

On this

analysis, a sentence indicating an obligation, for
example,
to pay you Tuesday at 4:00 will be symbolized without
the

use of a future tense operator, but with a sentence vari-

able and a non-rigid designator for Tuesday at 4:00.

There seem to me to be three main problems with this
suggestion.

First, although any formula can presumably

be true at a particular moment or clock-time, t^, it is

very difficult to see how the time, t^, at which a complex
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formula

negation or material implication,
for example)
is true is related to the
time or times at which its
atomic parts are true. Thus it
might be best to view (1)
(6) as principles which hold
only when A is an atomic sentence letter.
But then we have a much more
restricted
language than Thomason's and have
prevented ourselves from
providing a symbolization for the
sentence expressing
(a

.

Jones’ obligation not to tell his
neighbors he is coming,
for example.

Second,

m

stipulating that

a

non-rigid designator,

picks out the instant in each history at
which the
clocks and calendars in that history register
the same
t

i

/

time and date, we are restricting the set of
alternative

possible futures.

For we can not account for possible

futures in which the clocks and calendars go haywire.
Third, if two times in different branches of the

temporal model structure are truly incomparable in the
sense that they are neither identical with each other nor
is one earlier than the other,

then it would seem that

their incomparability precludes the very possibility of

choosing non-rigid designators to pick out corresponding
instants in each alternative history.

If we may truly

slice across histories to find clock-times then it appears

we really are conflating our model, however covertly, to
a conception of a unique course of time in which there
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are alternative possible
courses of events.

(See

Chapter V, note 1.)
To the second objection we
might reply that alternative futures in which the
clocks go haywire are indeed
irrelevant for the semantic
evaluation of sentences expressing obligations which are
to be discharged
at a

particular time.

And in response to the third
objection

it must be pointed out that
to pick out times from each

history to correspond to

a

definite description is not to

claim that they are identical, which
would clearly violate
their incomparability
Nor is the choice of times picked
out by a particular non-rigid designator
absolute
.

in any

sense.

The semantic proposals given here merely
attempt
to provide a semantic analysis for a
theory countenancing
a

single course of time within Thomason's more
general

semantic model.

